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Abstract
Eighteenth-century, British georgic poetry’s shift away from its conventional theme of
agriculture is often discussed as justifying Britain’s commercial imperialism and a broader
commitment to progressivist Whig history. I argue that such approaches neglect its participation
in the intellectual history of the liberal state itself. Georgics are exemplary texts to read
alongside politico-economic treatises like Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes
of the Wealth of Nations (1776). James Thomson’s The Seasons (1730) moralizes personal
industry and innovation while veering from detailed examples of natural phenomena, to vast
ecological networks, to nature’s determinative, physical and moral laws. Given georgics’
expanding, scientific and economy-adjacent interests, they notably omit the role of government
in administering socio-economic order. Such poems indirectly communicate a moral philosophy
amenable to the system of natural laws and natural rights in John Locke’s Two Treatises of
Government (1689) which gave rise to economic and political liberalism. In light of the
groundbreaking economic science of François Quesnay which Smith influentially revised in his
more historically-informed, open-ended analysis, states were increasingly regarded as serving
rather than served by their subjects who now best fulfilled their natural law-based obligation to
thrive by freely pursuing their rational self-interests.
I provide case studies of georgics that indirectly justify liberalism’s own depreciation of
the state. These poems primarily undermine a conception of state government as a locus of
moral authority and social order by presenting alternative, nominally natural sources of socioeconomic stability. William Mason’s The English Garden (1782) asserts that proprietors
possessing enough wealth and taste to landscape their estates in a naturalistic style thereby prove
their fitness to participate in liberal government. Scientist-poet Erasmus Darwin’s The Temple of
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Nature (1803) rigorously argues for emergent order by presenting a physiological model in
which a universal pleasure principle drives all organisms to imitate and synthesize ideas which
enable innovation and self-transformation. He defines liberty as immanent to organisms’
volitional capacity and locates potential progress in his model’s innate operations. In Darwin, as
elsewhere, government becomes an imperfect, refinable technology subservient to a nation’s
economy.

Keywords
British Literature, Eighteenth Century, Georgic Poetry, Natural Law, Natural Rights, Property,
Political Economy, Natural Philosophy, Gardens, John Locke, James Thomson, François
Quesnay, Adam Smith, Horace Walpole, William Mason, Erasmus Darwin
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Introduction

The georgic tradition
The georgic is an antique, poetic genre fundamentally concerned with the production of
order. Both in its classical form and in many of the versions written during its resurgence in
eighteenth-century Britain, this production of order primarily appears in terms of humans
confronting the problem of food scarcity by understanding and harnessing nature’s own
productivity through agronomy and farming. Hesiod and Virgil (70 BCE-19 BCE) wrote the
exemplary, classical Georgics. Hesiod’s Works and Days, written at the end of the eighth
century BCE, argued for the moral value of industry while also functioning as a guide for
managing a thriving oikos. The oikos was a self-sufficient, productive, social-unit with
nominally natural power relations between husbands and wives, parents and children, and
masters and servants. The oikos’s prosperity depended in part on the farmer’s sophrosyne,
meaning the frugality and efficiency required to free the family from scarcity and to free the
proprietor to participate in public politics.
Like Hesiod’s poem, Virgil’s Georgics (29 BCE) venerated toiling farmers and the
beauty and utility of nature’s physical forces and material resources. Both poems’ narrative
tension arose from nature’s frequent intractability and from economic and political insecurity
caused by years of civil war and governments’ inability to ensure socio-economic order. Virgil
developed Hesiod’s less explicit analogy between farmers’ technical, though largely manual
labor and the georgic poets’ own intellectual, literary labor. Georgics was the second poem in a
triad of literary genres including the pastoral and the epic called the rota Virgiliana, which
allowed poets to hone their professional skills on subjects of increasing world-historical
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importance. These two poems established conventions which would persist through British
elaborations of the form. Thus, georgic authors practice a high, literary style by applying it to
nominally low subjects, which arguably become ennobled in the process. The poetry makes
burdensome manual labor performed on fruitful soil a fit subject for the consideration of the
upper ranks of society from whom poets sought approval and patronage. Georgics moralize
industry by clothing it in beautiful figures and reiterate the physical control of nature through the
poet’s own aesthetic, intellectual control. Their content and self-reflexive style both
acknowledge the problem of imposing order on nature’s infinite variety of finite things.1
John Dryden’s (1631-1700) translation of Georgics in 1697 boosted the standing of a
long-neglected genre. Dryden’s famous assessment, “The best poem by the best author,” was
supplemented by Joseph Addison’s (1672-1719) prefatory “Essay on Virgil’s Georgics,” which
asserted that the genre’s combination of the rustic “science of husbandry” with the “beauties and
embellishments of poetry” could reconcile and convey “Precepts of morality” better than natural
philosophy, which “puzzles the reader with the intricacy of its notions and the multitude of its
disputes.”2 Virgil’s discrete gestures to the emperor Octavian prefigured British authors’
attempts to have their works reach and resonate with an upper class whose virtuous stewardship
of national prosperity they commended. British georgics such as John Philips’s Cyder (1708)
and James Dyer’s The Fleece (1757) continued to assert the comparable, moral value of
agricultural and intellectual cultivation and ultimately suggested that wealthy landowners could
prove their own virtue and fitness for political office by supporting land improvement and
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I take the concept that, liberal government notwithstanding, the infinite variety of finite things compels
governments to perpetually refine their own control over the socio-economic order’s infinite complexity
in order to optimize the exploitation of resources and to minimize the risk of social crises. Michael
Dillon, Biopolitics of Security: A political analytic of finitude (New York: Routledge, 2015), 6-8.
2
Joseph Addison, Poems on Several Occasions (Glasgow: Robert & Andrew Foulis, 1751), 156.
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tenant-farmers in addition to the arts and sciences. Even if landowners only improved their
estates through picturesque landscaping rather than following practical, agronomic manuals like
Stephen Switzer’s (1682-1745) Ichnographia Rustica (1715-1718), eighteenth-century georgics
acclaimed such landowners as guardians of the public good. Both classical and eighteenthcentury georgics thus demonstrated concern for rulers’ management of the socio-economic order.
Such concerns overlap with political economy, a scientific discipline which emerged during the
second half of the eighteenth century in rough contemporaneity with the British georgic.
Georgic poems have lent themselves to many critiques addressing topics within the scope
of political economy such as land, property rights and labor. For example, one recent thread in
scholarship on the British georgic useful for my study, which more narrowly focuses on
statecraft, identifies georgics as ideological tools for justifying British imperialism. Karen
O’Brien exemplifies such scholarship by arguing that georgics “assumed the burden of securing
the aesthetic and moral links between country, city, and empire.”3 O’Brien suggests that British
georgics such as James Thomson’s (1700-1748) The Seasons (1730), a poem which I address in
my second chapter, incorporate conventional georgic themes such as agriculture into a wider
consideration of the nation’s domestic and international commerce. Developing O’Brien’s
implications, David Armitage supports readings of the imperial georgic in which they influence
Britain’s self-definition of its national character. This self-definition had been complicated by
the 1707 Act of Union in which England united with Scotland and Ireland to form Great Britain.
Armitage states that Britain “and the conceptualization of its dependencies was…a shared
conception of the British Empire that could describe a community and provide a distinguishable

Karen O’Brien, “Imperial Georgic, 1660-1789,” in The Country and the City Revisited: England and the
Politics of Culture, 1550-1850, ed. Gerald MacLean (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999),
161.
3
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character for it.” A page earlier, Armitage describes this character: “In sum, the British Empire
was, above all and beyond all other such polities, Protestant, commercial, maritime and free.”4
Whereas the imperial georgic may expand its scope outward from the country’s rural labor to the
city’s commerce to the empire’s markets and colonies, we can also read in the imperialist
pretensions of British georgics an attempt to define the values and commitments which unify and
stabilize a nation composed of diverse cultures, religions, and modes of production. The themes
of commerce and liberty which often appear in georgics fall within the scope of political
economy but also only incompletely reflect political economy’s conception of natural law and
natural rights which are at the core of the discipline’s understanding of statecraft. To understand
how my study differs from the work of earlier critics requires an initial understanding of the
origins of the discipline of political economy, political economy’s self-definition in the long
eighteenth century, and finally the state’s role in liberal political economy.

Political economy’s contexts
Because political economy is central to my reading of British georgics, knowing the
philosophical domains from which political economy developed will help understand the
interests which it shares with georgics but which georgics also may conceal or refigure. 5 In An
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David Armitage, The Ideological Foundations of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000), 9; 8.
5
For example, by applying political terminology to natural phenomena. Thomson describes the sun in the
following terms:
The vegetable world is also thine,
Parent of Seasons! who the pomp precede
That waits thy throne, as though thy vast domain,
Annual, along the bright ecliptic road
In world-rejoicing state it moves sublime.
James Thomson, Summer, in The Seasons, ed. James Sambrook (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981), 112116.
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Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations Adam Smith (1723-1790) describes
political economy as a subsystem, “a branch of the science of the statesman or legislator” within
the larger system of moral philosophy.6 In the centuries leading up to and including the time of
Smith’s writing, moral philosophy was dominated by theories based on natural law.
Philosophers of natural law believed that God created the world including its moral laws,
physical laws, matter, and rational humans.7 Though humans have access to Scripture, natural
law assumes that humans may recognize their moral obligations to God and to each other
through the rational study of the physical world. Because I primarily address natural law in
regard to John Locke’s (1632-1704) moral philosophy, I borrow A. John Simmons summary of
Lockean natural law:
(1) Duties to preserve oneself (i.e., not to kill or endanger oneself)
(2) Duties to preserve others (when this does not conflict with self-preservation)
(3) Duties not to “take away the life” of another
(4) Duties not to do what “tends to destroy” others (by, e.g., interfering with or
“impairing” their “liberty, health, limb or goods”)8
Nowhere in his writings does Locke explicitly define natural laws, but Simmons’ list
demonstrates that they prioritize society’s proliferation and that these obligations require humans
not simply to survive but to prosper. Moreover, Locke complicated natural law by claiming that,
in addition to reason, God affords humans natural rights which enable them to fulfill their
obligations. As I discuss in my first chapter, these natural rights include property rights over not

6

Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Indianapolis: Liberty
Classics, 1976), IV.introduction.1.
7
For example, Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694) was natural law theorist who wrote De iure naturae et
gentium (1672) which would influence the philosophical development of liberalism.
8
A. John Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 60.
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only one’s own life, liberty, and labor but also over any objects which an individual legitimately
appropriates. A person appropriates an object by “mix[ing] his labor with it, and join[ing] to it
something that is his own” which thereby establishes a private use right as well as an exclusory
right and which prevents others from stealing, damaging, or profiting from that property.9 The
three politico-economic philosophers central to my projects, Locke, François Quesnay (16941774), and Smith, each believed that private property rights were necessary for individuals to
best exploit their possessions.
Given that natural laws establish obligations which fundamentally necessitate the rational
use of resources for the public good as well as natural rights which enable people to fulfill those
obligations, political economy addresses the problem of how states also enable their polities to
fulfill their obligation to prosper. It will help to introduce some terminology relevant to political
economy before further pursuing my argument. I use state to refer to a sovereign, political entity
holding a monopoly on violence and whose political power enables it to determine the form of its
government. Government refers to types of regimes such as monarchies and republics in which
states invest their power. The activity of government is statecraft. Through statecraft,
governments create and control a variety of state apparatuses through which states influence the
behaviors of their subjects. I also refer to the whole government itself as a state apparatus or
sometimes as a piece of political technology. I use polity and body politic interchangeably to
describe an independent, socio-political population while the concept of the nation fuses
population, state, and government into a single entity.
My discussion primarily addresses Althuserrian ideological state apparatuses (rather than
repressive state apparatuses) which influence subject’s behavior without immediate recourse to

9

John Locke, Two Treatises of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. Ian Shapiro (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), II.v.27.
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state-sanctioned violence.10 Positive laws, a key example of a state apparatus, differ from natural
laws for being made by humans rather than God. In the eyes of the theorists I discuss and
because states are subject and subservient to natural laws, states’ positive laws aspire to yet
imperfectly reflect natural laws. One implication of these imperfections riven through
governments and their state apparatuses is that governments are indeed mutable, political
technologies open to continuous refinement as well as decadence and delegitimization. Though
Quesnay and Smith did not strictly adhere to Locke’s theory of the social contract in which
collectives form body politics and then states, each philosopher held that states maintained their
moral legitimacy to the extent that they adequately helped the nation conform to natural law.
Doing so principally meant administering the socio-economic order such that free, rational, selfinterested individuals could participate in the national economy and contribute to its collective
prosperity. Even though Locke, Quesnay, and Smith did not share a common set of economic
theories, they are important to my project for being discursive founders of liberalism in their
respective domains of political philosophy, economics, and political economy. To clarify,
Quesnay established the first, holistic economic theory called Physiocracy in his Tableau
économique (1758), while Smith’s Wealth of Nations established the discipline of political
economy. However, all three philosophers address topics pertinent to political economy and
ultimately participate in legitimizing liberal political economy.
The emergence of economy and political economy as scientific disciplines points to
another important overlap between political economy and the georgic. I noted that my authors,
even those preceding the emergence of political economy as a discipline, believed that statecraft
should encourage polities’ abidance of natural laws by using state apparatuses to reinforce
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Louis Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,
trans. G. M. Goshgarian (New York: Verso, 2014), 75-77.
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natural rights. Further, humans discover natural law (and the proper ends of government) by
studying nature, which in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries took the form of natural
philosophy and which coincided with the scientific revolution. This revolution was spearheaded
by Francis Bacon’s (1561-1626) empiric method and led to the heroization of Isaac Newton
(1642-1727) who exemplified the spirit of English, intellectual progress. Robin Valenza
observes that natural philosophers developed increasingly specialized methods and discourses
while the fields themselves grew increasingly distinct. She argues that “practitioners across all
disciplines…found the process of defining and describing their fields of study to nonexperts both
wrenching and difficult. And most struggled to negotiate how print could help them reach
targeted audiences of fellow experts at the same time that it could help them gain wider public
support for their work.”11 Nevertheless, advancing life sciences, the study of inorganic matter
and the earth’s moving parts, and social sciences such as economics continued to cross-pollinate
and collectively contribute to philosophers’ understanding of natural law. The genre of physicotheology emerged as an attempt to reconcile empiric knowledge of physical nature with the
Bible’s stories and its moral implications. Thomas Burnet’s Telluris Theoria Sacra (1689) and
William Derham’s Physico-theology; or, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God,
from His Works of Creation (1713) are some of the more well-known examples of the form and
H. Grant Sampson claims to identify at least one hundred examples of a literary form he refers to
as the physico-theological epic.12 The Seasons explicitly uses the georgic mode’s depictions of
nature to produce a physico-theological argument for the benevolence of natural law.
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Robin Valenza, Literature, Language, and the Rise of the Intellectual Disciplines in Britain, 1680-1820
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 3.
12
H. Grant Sampson, “The Physico-Theological Epic in the Later Eighteenth Century,” Man and Nature
2 (1984): 49.
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Georgics highlighted and attempted to negotiate these intersecting problems of accessing
truth, especially moral truth, in the face of fragmenting fields of knowledge which could
themselves problematize humanity’s self-understanding. As the eighteenth century progressed,
several georgics displaced the standard theme of agricultural, manual labor by devoting more
space to communicating the findings of natural philosophy. In addition to The Seasons, I discuss
Erasmus Darwin’s (1731-1802) poems, The Botanic Garden (1791) and The Temple of Nature
(1803) as case studies of such georgics. The subject of labor did not disappear in these poems;
instead, authors diffused it throughout their subject matter. Nature itself is described as
performing continuous, productive, recycling labor; the natural phenomena which are its
“works” provided material for poets to veer into aestheticized, conversable descriptions of the
physical processes which contemporary natural philosophers understood to be taking place.13
Relatedly, British georgics displayed a new regard for the intellectual labor of natural
philosophers and also of entrepreneurs who exploited new, scientific and technical knowledges
by applying them to technological innovations.14 The Botanic Garden in particular praises
several inventors and elaborates the effects of their creations. For example, Darwin devotes a
passage to the canal systems of the engineer James Brindley (1716-1772).
We therefore see a similar tendency for organizing knowledge shared by certain georgics
and by the natural philosophy which the poetry attempted to convey. The expansion of georgics’
content with no restraining, narrative through-line beyond world-historical progress meant that
its own, potential excesses and disjointed vignettes could only be contained by, at the level of

13

Thomson, Winter, 108. Valenza distinguishes between learned discourse which marks specialization
and professionalization and conversable discourse meant to interest and teach the fundamentals of science
to non-professionals. Valenza, Literature, Language, and the Rise of the Intellectual Disciplines, 18-19.
14
I take this analogy a step further in my fourth chapter in which I argue that the work of beautifying
landscape design corresponded with and validated a landowner’s participation in government.
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style, the imposition of a unifying, literary beauty, and at the higher level of didactic
moralization, the assertion that its depicted content is subject to immaterial natural laws. Noel
Jackson identifies this tension in Darwin’s “philosophical poetry” and points to the evidence of
the poems’ layers of detailed, explanatory footnotes which dominate the poetry.15 Kurt
Heinzelman also highlights the still-emerging divisions between literary and scientific labor by
identifying an epistemic tension between georgics’ fictions, signifying the aesthetic pleasures of
its literary stylistics and speculations, and facts, signifying its scientific, pragmatic, and moral
interests: “Because of the georgic’s apparent faith in determinate knowledge as a functional
component of its own discourse, some eighteenth-century readers were reluctant to permit
georgic writing the dispensation necessary for imaginative or fictional discourse.”16 By
comparison with the georgic, natural philosophy seemed to serve and legitimize natural laws; but
as we see in the case of Darwin who was both poet and natural philosopher, fields such as his
favored physiology seemed to discover new sources of order immanent to the material systems
which they studied. Such fields could give additional credibility to natural law but occasionally
offered counternarratives that disturbed biblical authority.
British georgics’ turn toward science and technology has long been acknowledged by
literary critics. Anthony Low partially attributes the genre’s success to the period’s enthusiasm
for discovering new methods for explaining and harnessing nature: “The result of this fruitful
combination of poetic vision and new science was what amounts to a georgic revolution in the
seventeenth century, a revolution that preceded and was directly responsible for the well-known

Noel Jackson, “Rhyme and Reason: Erasmus Darwin’s Romanticism,” Modern Language Quarterly
70, no. 2 (June 2009), 171; 181.
16
Kurt Heinzelman, “Roman Georgic in the Georgian Age: A Theory of Romantic Genre,” Texas Studies
in Literature and Language 33, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 192.
15
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Agricultural Revolution of the eighteenth.”17 Low thus asserts that the georgic’s popularity not
only was motivated by an interest in nature’s productive potential but also could itself be
productive. Nascent enthusiasm for enlightened agriculture was already in evidence due to the
Georgical Committee’s founding in 1664. This group traded essays on and offered prizes for
advances in the field of agronomy. From a different perspective, philosophical poetry could be
argued by its practitioners to itself contribute to philosophical thought; Darwin argued that
philosophy and poetry differed only in the respective strictness or looseness of their analogies.
Analogy could access truth because, as Devin Griffiths notes, “For Bacon (and for Darwin),
analogy is an attribute of the world, not ascribed to it; it is not applied to nature by the scientists
but is “of” the “things” themselves.18
Kevis Goodman also addresses the georgic’s connection to increasingly institutionalized
science by calling it the poster-poem for scientific and agricultural reform and by its commitment
to cultivating order among ideas and things. Georgics frame disruptions and discontinuities
caused by encounters with history or with unfamiliar aspects of nature in order to then soothe
disturbing feelings through aesthetic mediation and the assertion of encompassing,
philosophically-interpreted systems:19

17

Anthony Low, The Georgic Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 119.
Devin Griffiths, The Age of Analogy: Science and Literature between the Darwins (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2016), 72. See also Gillian Beer, “Plants, Analogy, and Perfection: Loose and
Strict Analogies,” in Marking Time: Romanticism and Evolution, ed. Joel Faflak (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2018), 29-44.
19
Goodman emphasizes that Locke’s An Essay concerning Human Understanding exhibited an anxiety
commonly repeated in georgics that humans’ limited senses may receive excessive and unprocessable
information which often arrives distorted. Words “signify only Men’s peculiar Ideas, and that by a
perfectly arbitrary Imposition, is evident, in that they often fail to excite in others (even that use the same
Language) the same Ideas, we take them to be the Signs of…” John Locke, An Essay concerning Human
Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), III.ii.8.
18
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Within and in part under the influence of georgic, the poetry of the long eighteenth
century underwent a process whereby it became conscious of itself as one “sensible path”
among others…Such verse inhabits a cultural situation in which it has to define itself not
only against an array of prose genres, whose material it often usurps, but also in relation
to non-written means of perception and communication, whose several mystiques it often
courts.20
The georgic presents itself as a literary apparatus among multiple other forms of written, more
overtly mechanical, or even, I would argue, politico-economic technologies for teasing order out
of complexity. In doing so, it consciously imitates the stricter and narrower, organizing work of
natural philosophy firstly by encompassing the subjects of various, philosophical fields within
the poetry’s harmonizing and beautifying style. Secondly, georgics move freely between
examples of empiric phenomena, references to the ecological system in which given phenomena
participate, and mostly importantly, the moral, natural laws which we can consider to be the
meaning of that phenomena. For example, Thomson attributes botanic growth to the “Universal
Soul / Of heaven and earth”:
By thee the various vegetative tribes,
Wrapt in a filmy net and clad with leaves
Draw the live ether and imbibe the dew.
By thee disposed into congenial soils,
Stands each attractive plant, and sucks, and swells
The juicy tide, a twining mass of tubes.21

20

Kevis Goodman, Georgic Modernity and British Romanticism: Poetry and the Mediation of History
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 9.
21
Thomson, Summer, 556; 561-566.
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Thomson collapses God and Nature into an allegorical, all-comprehending force responsible for
the circulation of nutrients presumed to have been drawn from the “live ether” and “the dew”
through each plant’s “tubes” and tissues. Several lines later, Thomson amends “Universal Soul”
to “the soul of love [which] is sent abroad / Through the vital air.”22 Notwithstanding his
ignorance of photosynthesis and air’s components, he attributes plants’ growth to physical
processes which are themselves determined by a higher, poetically-figured, benevolent force.
In Goodman’s terms, the georgic acts as one, self-consciously tropological path for
organizing the phenomena organized by the more rigorous path of natural philosophy
simultaneously championed by the poetry. Other critics have observed that georgics’ interest in
the sciences, especially as performed by British luminaries, went together with Britain’s selfdefinition as a commercial empire. Alan Bewell observes that the concept of nature offered
Romantic and proto-Romantic writers a productive contradiction:
…the British came to see nature as something that stood apart from the modern
world...—of mobility, exchange, and transformation—at the same time as they were
actively engaged in translating it into the very forms that would allow it to be accessed
from a distance, marketed, exchanged, and improved, the very activities that led to its
achieving cultural priority in British society.23
Bewell argues that nature could be reified into a timeless ideal apposite to natural laws.
Concurrently, nature’s physical materials were not only studied and used to produce naturalphilosophical knowledge; they also became resources which could be entered into economic

22

Thomson, Summer, 582-583.
Alan Bewell, Natures in Translation: Romanticism and Colonial Natural History (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2017), 6.
23
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circuits which themselves could then be studied to discover yet new forms of order.24 As
scholars such as John Barrell, Tim Fulford, and Blanford Parker have shown, the orderly paths
represented in georgics helped to naturalize economic liberalism and justify capitalism as it
emerged in Britain. 25 Their work confirms the British georgic to be a thoroughly politicoeconomic genre.
Whereas scholars address georgics’ political economy in terms of empire or domestic
commerce, I argue that they miss the extent to which georgics may be read as addressing
statecraft, though they often do so in an indirect manner. Like the georgic itself, the work of
government offers yet another path for organizing the goods and people constituting the socioeconomic order. However, concomitant with political and economic liberalism26, georgics
tended to marginalize the state through their own representations of ecological and commercial
economies and thus imply a smaller, regulatory role for the state than it had held in prior
centuries. I will briefly address the historical background of the mercantilist political economy
which preceded the rise of liberalism before expanding on my argument for the two, broad
methods by which georgic marginalized and otherwise delimited states’ functions and authority.

The work of Margaret Schabas grounds the part of my argument linking political economy’s
commitment to economic liberalism to several, earlier natural philosophic fields:
…until the mid-nineteenth century, economic theorists regarded the phenomena of their discourse
as part of the same natural world studied by natural philosophers. Not only were economic
phenomena understood mostly by drawing analogies to natural phenomena, but they were also
viewed as contiguous with physical nature. Economic discourse was, in short, considered to be
part of natural philosophy and not, as we would now deem it, a social or human science. It did
not then address an autonomous sphere as it does today.
Her point reinforces the conception I attribute to Locke, Quesnay, and Smith of the state as distinct,
political technology which functions as an external influence on the economic domain.
Margaret Schabas, The Natural Origins of Economics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005), 2.
25
John Barrell, English Literature in History, 1730-80: An Equal, Wide Survey (London: Hutchinson &
Co., 1983); Tim Fulford, Landscape, Liberty and Authority: Poetry, Criticism, and Politics from Thomson
to Wordsworth (New York: Cambridge University, 1996); Blanford Parker, The Triumph of Augustan
Poetics: English literary culture from Butler to Johnson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
26
Political liberalism generally refers to the assertion of natural rights secured by positive laws whereas
economic liberalism is typified by commitment to free trade.
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To preview these methods, first, georgics identified what I consider to be alternative sources of
order which the poems presented as contributing to socio-economic stability and often
anticipated a science-driven progress of opulence. Second, as I have already suggested, georgics
often presented governments as, so to speak, political technologies susceptible to improvement,
refinement, delegitimization, and, when necessary, abandonment. States remain viable so long
as they support the interests and natural rights of their subjects and by extension natural laws.
This conception of states as subordinate to markets contrasts with mercantilist political economy
which imagined the state as occupying a much more prominent and decisive role in
administering the socio-economic order.
Mercantilism refers to the statist economic policy of European countries prior to the
gradual adoption of economic and political liberalism. Modern scholars agree that the term
mercantilism reflects a shared set of main assumptions and goals in the period, but also
uncertainty regarding the effects of policies, the definition of sources of value, or how buyers
and sellers agree on prices.27 Under mercantilist government, states exert external pressure on a
discrete, economic sphere comprising the aggregate activities of autonomous, self-interested
agents.28 Mercantilism highlights a distinction between the state and the economic sphere it
oversees; markets were viewed as means for strengthening the state as much as the body politics.
The rise of a Lockean, natural rights discourse coincided with a reversal in which states serve the
economic interests and so also the moral obligations of collectives. Still, Locke’s own economic

Lars Magnusson, “Mercantilism,” in A Companion to the History of Economic Thought (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2006), 46-60.
28
Jerome B. Schneewind argues that Locke’s definitions of volition and self-interest, which I discuss in
chapter one, tend to individuate people as accountable and so also autonomous moral agents. Jerome B.
Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 144-146.
27
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theories were roughly consistent with other mercantilists who typically maintained two key
assumptions:
1. International trade being zero-sum, states benefit by intervening in international
markets using protectionist policies in order to increase the inflow of bullion.
2. Greater material wealth improves the security of both a society and the state itself by
stabilizing social order through the prevention of food shortages and by enabling the state
to afford traditional expenses like armies.
Istvan Hont’s Jealousy of Trade describes this competitive approach to international markets as a
commercial war between states which weaponize economic activity and trade policies against
each other in order to amass resources.29 Notable English mercantilists included Edward
Misselden (1608-1654), Thomas Mun (1571-1641), and Gerard de Malynes (1585–1641). Their
debates regarding the inherent value of bullion, the causes of the economic crisis of the 1620s,
and the effect of freeing international regulations on the all-important balance of trade
demonstrate that even policies like free-trade were not unknown or unappreciated.30 The land
surveyor William Petty (1623-1687) also destabilizes a fixed definition or periodization of
mercantilism. Besides being a physician like Locke, Quesnay, and Darwin, helping found the
Royal Society, and proposing laissez-faire state policy, Petty wrote Political Arithmetic (1690),
which demonstrated the utility of statistical analysis for studying economic forces. Deemed the
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Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical
Perspective (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 5-6.
30
Terence Hutchison, Before Adam Smith: The Emergence of Political Economy, 1662-1776 (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1988), 3-13; Lars Magnusson, “Mercantilism,” in A Companion to the History of
Economic Thought, eds. Warren J. Samuels, Jeff E. Biddle and John B. Davis (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006),
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founder of political economy by David McNally, Petty foreshadows the rise of econometric
analysis and, we may say, the gradual depoliticization of political economy.31
This rehearsal of mercantilism demonstrates the extent to which states were assumed to
directly influence the economic sphere for the public good while also reinforcing their own
power by increasing tax revenues. By contrast, liberal political economy argued for reduced
governmental influence and posited that a mixed government such as Britain’s would provide the
best security for individuals’ natural rights. As mentioned, this argument was premised on the
belief that, given the liberty to pursue their self-interest, the collective, economic activities of a
nation’s subjects would likely produce prosperity and achieve a measure of socio-economic
stability. Such prosperity helped fulfill natural laws with minimal imposition from a state
operating on mercantilist principles and arrogating to itself the moral authority to prescribe
economic policies. It remained to various philosophically-inclined authors to argue for the
natural laws and rights to which economic and political liberalism were amenable. Of course,
georgic authors did not write with the specific intention of justifying proto-capitalism or
possessive individualism. Yet, I argue that georgics, often by borrowing from natural
philosophy, depicted several sources of order which reinforced economic and political liberalism
and thereby undermined governments’ prerogative to interfere in the socio-economic order. One
example from natural philosophy and one example from the fine arts will demonstrate what I
mean by natural, even apolitical sources of order.
Georgics’ references to liberty implicitly refer to state-protected natural rights which
enable the pursuit of self-interest such as when Thomson writes, “Liberty, abroad / Walks
unconfined even to [Happy Britannia’s] farthest cots, / And scatters plenty with unsparing
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hand.”32 However, Thomson was well-versed in Locke and a clear line of influence gives us
reason to recognize liberty not simply as a juridico-moral condition granted by God to rational
subjects, but to think of liberty in increasingly physiological terms. Locke’s Essay concerning
Human Understanding describes liberty as a power to make choices based on one’s volition,
volition itself considered as a quasi-physiological power of the mind.33 Darwin’s Temple of
Nature also offers a physiological account of humanity’s innate hedonism and volition based on
his theory that fibrous tissues sensitive to pleasure and pain compose all organisms. The basic
capacities of irritation34 and sensation lead to the higher capacities of volitional preference and
selective association in more complex organisms. Crucially for Darwin, the volitional capacity
expands as humans learn new ideas, develop new skills, and harness new technologies. In
Darwin’s radically materialist conception of life, liberty is immanent to and nothing other than
the extent of the volitional capacity which remains continuously interested in finding new means
for achieving pleasure:
[Reason] With quick Volitions unfatigued selects
Means for some end, and causes of effects;
All human science worth the name imparts,
And builds on Nature's base the works of Arts.35
32

Thomson, Summer, 1443-1445.
“We must remember, that Volition, or Willing, is an act of the Mind directing its thought to the
production of any Action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it. To avoid multiplying of words, I
would crave leave here, under the word Action, to comprehend the forbearance too of any Action
proposed; sitting still, or holding one's peace, when walking or speaking are propos'd, though mere
forbearances, requiring as much the determination of the Will, and being often as weighty in their
consequences, as the contrary Actions, may, on that consideration, well enough pass for Actions too...”
John Locke, The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke: An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford University Press, 1975), II.xxi.28.
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Because organisms’ innate imitative processes allow them to synthesize new ideas and transform
the internal and external conditions of their own existence, Darwin’s physiology naturalizes the
mutual expansions of liberty and technological development. Though elsewhere in the poem
Darwin acknowledges that states may repress their subjects through various policies and
apparatuses, an individual’s liberty does not derive from God-given rights for which states
become responsible. Instead liberty is coextensive with individuals’ own volitional capacities
and the limits imposed by external conditions such as the tools and resources they can access or
political constraints on their actions. Like Smith, Darwin believes that liberty expands
concurrently with the progress of opulence. The collective progress of a society’s volitional
capacities is reflected in its stadial mode of production which determines its socio-economic
order.36
A more abstract, nominally natural order seemed discoverable in the correspondence
between the aesthetic beauty of landscapes improved according to naturalistic design principles
and the moral beauty and fitness to rule of the estate-owners who oversaw their improvement.
William Mason’s (1724-1797) georgic poem The English Garden (1782) argued for the
naturalistic aesthetic which asserted that landscapers should only seek to refine nature’s own
beauty by harmonizing excessive irregularities or creating them when few interesting features
exist. This aesthetic captured by the Hogarthian principle of unity in variety or, in Mason’s
terms, “Simplicity” contrasted with the highly formal and geometric French gardens which
advocates of naturalism disdained for their association with not only arbitrary and unnatural taste
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Darwin, like many of the authors I discuss, posited a version of stadialism, a form of conjectural history
popular in the eighteenth century, which asserted that societies pass through predictable modes of
subsistence usually beginning with hunting and gathering and concluding with commerce. Stadialism is
associated with progressive, Whig history and moral philosophy, because it tends to undermine political
absolutism by reading aspects of the socio-economic order including government to be partly determined
by the mode of subsistence.
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but also arbitrary despotism.37 Rather than performing farmers’ manual labor or the aesthetic
labor of poetry, landowners who improved their estates in the naturalistic style demonstrated a
disinterested taste heedless of transient, French fashions or the garish excesses and grotesqueries
associated with recently popular Chinese gardens. Large, naturalistic landscape gardens
conveyed their proprietors’ taste and freedom from mercenary interests. The supposed beauty
and coherence of their composition announced their owners right to rule. Though naturalistic
landscapes implicitly legitimized oligarchy, they also conveyed that fit politicians foster the
public good by pursuing benevolent, light-handed government administration.
Whereas the first method by which georgics delimit states’ influence over the economy
involves defining alternative, natural sources of socio-economic stability, the second method
more directly addresses states’ durability and functionality. We have already seen Locke’s claim
that states exist at the will of polities bound by social contracts and persist to the extent that they
adequately served the interests of their subjects as defined by natural law. Lacking absolute
authority, states may fall due to historical contingencies such as war but also because they lack
moral legitimacy and deserve to be dissolved by the body politic. The Seasons acknowledges
this susceptibility by referring to the rise and decline of nations on the strength of their political
leaders. For example, “SOLON the next, who built his Common-Weal / On Equity’s wide Base;
by tender Laws / A lively People curbing…” compares favorably with Julius Caesar whose
excessive self-love allowed a proud, Roman republic to transform into a corrupt, vulnerable, and
unstable empire.38 Mason too rests a nation’s stability on the virtues of its politicians which he
demonstrates in a vignette that sees Alexander the Great grant the humble gardener Abdalonimus
the title of king of Sidon. States whose corruption and tyranny disenfranchise subjects, steal
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their liberty, and prevent labor and commerce from contributing to common prosperity
undermine the public good and sow the seeds of their own ruin. By contrast, political and
economic liberalism and the ideal of liberty create a challenge for states which Quesnay and
Smith recognized. Smith in particular observed that states must do everything possible to ensure
the progress of opulence up to and including indirectly influencing their behavior through
incentivizing infrastructure and public education. However, in attempting to support an optimal
economy, states cannot directly intervene in the economy for fear of disrupting the natural flows
of goods which enrich the nation and especially of infringing on subjects’ rights. Government
must thus be viewed as a political technology as open-ended as the progress of technology itself,
one which requires constant elaboration and refinement in order for it to best serve the socioeconomic order.
My dissertation attempts to tell a part of the story of political economy’s depoliticization.
From the perspective of philosophers addressing politico-economic topics, natural laws became
the bases for the development of statecraft oriented toward economic and political liberalism.
These liberalisms at once proposed that states remained legitimate to the extent that they served
the economic interests of their polities and that doing so only required the establishment of state
apparatuses sufficient to protect and guide rational economic behavior. British georgics
reinforced this post-mercantilist view of statecraft though only rarely by directly addressing
British state apparatuses. When they do so, they typically critique only the most egregious
institutions needing reform such as the legalized slave trade or the penal system. Instead,
georgics increasingly leaned on natural philosophy and the fine arts to support the idea that,
given adequate government oversight of liberties, not only stability but progress would ensue
from the independent interests of the subjects comprising Britain’s vast and complex socio-
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economic order. Reading georgics together with politico-economic treatises allows us to see that
the georgic’s prospective, optimistic discourse of liberty, innovation, and prosperity validated the
work of liberal statecraft which proceeded by developing more complex and subtle apparatus for
regulating and policing the body politic.
My first chapter addresses Locke, whose influential revision of natural law and liberty
threads through the remaining texts. I argue that studies of Locke’s labor theory of property
have given inadequate attention to volition. Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding describes volition as a prerequisite for liberty, which also provides him with a
mechanism for naturalizing the efficient use of resources. Locke’s tacit assumption that
appropriation depends on volition demonstrates that he sought a natural mechanism for justifying
large wealth gaps and assuages his own anxiety that resources may not always be used to serve
the public good. I also observe that recognizing the role of volition in the labor theory
strengthens the argument of scholars who side with the workmanship model interpretation of
labor theory over those who side with the mixing model interpretation.
Locke’s understanding of natural laws and rights provides a foundation for my reading of
Thomson’s The Seasons in my second chapter. I argue that Thomson unfavorably compares the
imperfect moral authority of provisional state governments with the immutable and absolute
moral authority of natural laws. Rather than expounding on natural laws themselves, he
represents their force by analogizing them with the physical laws whose own force are expressed
by their effects on a variety of natural phenomena depicted in the poem. Thomson also
indirectly describes natural laws by comparing them to timeless virtues which politicians must
aspire to embody. Whereas nature’s moral and physical laws are eternal and can be difficult to
comprehend, he attempts to show that the work of natural philosophy coincides with humanity’s
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continuously improving ability to provisionally harness and benefit from nature’s allcomprehending benevolence. Two allegorical genealogies of technological progress signify the
gradual emergence of provisional socio-economic order and prosperity; such development
recuperates the cycles of summer growth and winter waste which remind the reader of the
impermanence of all natural and artificial things. Finally, I show that Thomson applies his
optimistic sense of gradual progress to the work of government, which he conveys to be yet
another technology susceptible to improvement and decline. He cites glorious empires that
passed like the seasons, because the rulers neglected their natural law-based obligations to
prioritize the public good by securing their peoples’ liberty. Still, he retains hope that Britain
remains a beacon, however imperfect, of liberty and progress.
My third chapter demonstrates that the disciplines of economics and political economy
emerge already largely committed to economic liberalism. I first introduce the fundamentals of
Quesnay’s theory of Physiocracy. I show that while he insisted on free trade, his economic
theories were both politico-economic and homeostatic. Because he identifies his economic
science as disclosing natural laws, he insists that its maintenance requires the support of an
absolutist, monarchic form of government he called legal despotism. In Le despotisme de la
Chine (1767) he proposes that China’s imperial government is the best historical expression of
his agriculture-based political economy, which moreover requires a fixed, triadic division of
labor between farmers, merchants and artisans, and a land-owning aristocracy. I then show that
Smith’s revisions of Quesnay’s theories of wealth-production and the division of labor produced
a much more historically-informed theory of political economy. While the progress of opulence
offers boons, it also produces negative unintended consequences. Smith reinforces the narrative
I develop of the recognition of state’s mutable, technological character by arguing that
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governments must develop new apparatuses for managing the consequences which arise as
society’s enter new, stadial modes of production. Interestingly, we find that the crucial state
apparatuses of infrastructure and public education, which Quesnay considered key to legal
despotism, also suit Smith’s version of modern, commercial liberalism. However, Smith’s openended political economy acknowledged that governments will need to continuously adapt and
grow in response to new unintended consequences incurred by the progress of opulence.
My fourth chapter introduces the practice of naturalistic landscaping with reference to
Horace Walpole’s (1717-1797) treatise The History of the Modern Taste in Gardening (1780). I
use his text to demonstrate his assertion that unity in variety is an artistic principle of beauty and
pleasure discoverable in nature itself, but which benefits from the improving work of human
labor. However, this labor as well as any indication of the land’s economic utility requires
obfuscation in order to maintain the façade of unity and order. His text also usefully
demonstrates that, though lower social orders could develop an appreciative taste, only those
with the enormous wealth adequate to landscaping country estates could provide evidence for the
virtue connoted by good taste. Mason’s georgic, The English Garden, reaffirms each of these
points but also makes far more explicit Walpole’s implication that naturalistic landscaping
demonstrates a person’s fitness to rule. I make this case with reference to two vignettes in the
poem which depict these proprietor-politicians. I also introduce the concept of the georgic
garden, which emblematizes the British georgic’s decentering of toilsome, manual labor with
alternative, pleasurable, often intellectual forms of labor. I close by arguing that Mason uses the
classical figure of the genius loci, which exhibits passive and active traits, to elaborate the
passive and active aspects of both sides of the proprietor-politician. Mason proprietor-politician
thereby presents a rough model of both economic and political liberalism in (in)action.
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My fifth chapter argues that Darwin’s georgic poem, The Temple of Nature, locates order
in the physiological model he applies to all organic life. The model’s two principles, hedonism
and imitation, cooperate to explain transformations as small as an organism’s integration of a
sensation and as large as the evolution from species into another. It also allows him to assert the
continuity between humans’ acquisition of technical skills and their innovation of technological
instruments. Among these instruments, he highlights the particular utility of language for
exchanging and developing ideas which together increase the volitional capacity of pleasureseeking humans. Darwin also employs the figure of the georgic garden to signify the dominion
of pleasure which his physiology underwrites. Moreover, the revaluation of pleasure participates
in his own revision of georgic poetry. Though his proliferating footnotes strove to explain his
poetic figures for scientific ideas, he also considered human reason inadequate to the task of
grasping the essential truths regarding the material world. Most importantly, comprehensive
understanding of pleasure, which originates organic life and drives its progress, must also be
foreclosed and so is properly represented if not mostly strictly understood by means of
mythopoeia. Consequently, Darwin authorizes a much larger role in the georgic garden for
myth, which he exploits in order to anticipate a future, nigh-Edenic age made glorious by the
flourishing of liberty and wealth.
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Chapter 1
1

Volition and Appropriation in John Locke’s Labor Theory of Property

1.1

Something that is his own
My introduction identified thematic overlaps between some eighteenth-century, British,

georgic poems and roughly contemporaneous politico-economic theory. Among their shared
ideas, the efficient exploitation of natural resources and human labor is particularly important,
and poems like James Thomson’s The Seasons and Erasmus Darwin’s The Botanic Garden
increasingly focused on the potential for natural-philosophical discoveries and technological
innovations to improve such exploitation. Various poets and philosophers also questioned
pleasure’s function in regard to the socio-economic order by, for example, asking if pleasures
could be moral ends in themselves or whether pleasure served higher purposes determined by
God’s moral order. Due in part to eighteenth-century Britain’s revolutionary advances in
economic theory and the life sciences, and also due in part to its constitutional discomfort with
absolute monarchy, georgic poets and political economists took interest in empirically observed
forces and systems at least partially attributable to nature and which seemed to contribute to
socio-economic stability. The consequence of such interests and approaches was, especially in
georgics, to examine almost any factor, whether geographic, physiological, or otherwise that
might influence the economy while disregarding or actively seeking to establish limits on a
government’s moral or pragmatic justifications for intervening in the nation’s economic affairs.39

For example, Erasmus Darwin’s poem The Temple of Nature attributes sympathy, sociability, and
various forms of cultural and economic progress to physiological operations innate in complex organisms.
Georgics fold human economies into wider ecological and moral systems characterized by order and
harmony and which reduce the importance of political bonds and legal institutions.
39
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Georgics thus reflect a native commitment to economic liberalism visible in much early, British
politico-economic thought. I therefore begin my project by discussing John Locke’s arguments
for natural law and natural, property rights in order to ground my later discussions of the
imagined importance for socio-economic stability of land, labor, and liberty in georgic poems.
Given these shared interests in extra-governmental sources of socio-economic order, I
read Locke as a key voice in this depoliticization of politico-economic topics, because his labor
theory of property in Two Treatises of Government claims that individuals in the state of nature
can appropriate and use material goods without the consent of others by simply mixing their own
labor with an object. This theory has given rise to lively debates as to whether Locke makes a
convincing, pragmatic argument or one that is coherent in the context of his other beliefs. This is
how he describes appropriation:
§ 27. Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man
has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The labour of
his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he
removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour
with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It
being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this
labour something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men. For this
labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right
to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common
for others.40
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I am particularly interested in his use of the word “something” which appears twice. The first
use in the passage’s third sentence ostensibly refers to the labor that innately belongs to
individuals and that by being “joined to” an object appropriates it. However, the following
sentence suggests that labor bears an additional element which “excludes the common right of
other men” to use and benefit from the object.41 This chapter argues that supplying the concept
of volition, which Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689) defines as an act
of willing that executes an action, fits within and strengthens a coherent interpretation of the
labor theory of property called the workmanship model, an interpretation which I find to be more
convincing than its main alternative, the mixing model. Additionally, my reading contributes to
my larger argument by providing an example of an author who marginalizes government’s
influence over an increasingly autonomous and private, economic domain by offering
alternative, nominally apolitical explanations for the national economy’s orderly operation. For
Locke, volition is a quasi-physiological attribute of humans which enables them to act in a
rational, moral manner. My chapter also shows that volition’s role in the labor theory exposes
Locke’s anxiety that wealth may be misused and wasted, which forces him to justify its
concentration in the hands of an economic elite based on the assumption that concentration
permits its more efficient use. Reading the labor theory of property as implying volition’s role in
appropriation frames the hard-to-falsify nature of Locke’s theories of appropriation; one may
own something because the act of appropriation depends on the owner’s volitional intent to
rationally exploit it in the future. Thus, in defending a natural, common right to appropriation
that preempts the need for social contracts and rebuts arbitrary acts of government, Locke’s labor

Another potential reading could supply natural right for the unspecified “something.” This would not
change my fundamental argument that volition remains a necessary component for that natural right to be
the “something annexed to” the object.
41
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theory is a de facto, conservative justification for preserving domestic, economic power relations
and foreign, colonial expropriation.
I begin by describing the labor theory of property’s nominal function as a plank in
Locke’s rejection of absolute monarchy. Doing so allows me to introduce the assumptions and
justifications informing his belief that the labor theory is necessary for enabling humans to fulfill
their obligations to the natural laws created by God. I use natural law as a frame for establishing
the mutual arguments for the workmanship and mixing interpretations. I propose that the
assumptions determining the labor theory favor a reading in which the workmanship model
incorporates the mixing model, because the workmanship model better comports with Locke’s
theory of natural law, while the mixing model remains useful for explaining labor’s ability carry
and transfer volition as a necessary component in appropriation. Locke’s Essay claims that we
empirically know that volition helps to filter potentially wayward desires so that our actions
conform with natural law. Further, the dependence of natural property rights on agents’ intent to
efficiently exploit property naturalizes calculative rationality, a concept I borrow from Max
Weber to signify the mastering and efficient instrumentalization of all available resources; Locke
imagined such instrumentalization served the public good as obligated by natural law.42 Volition
therefore offers Locke a quasi-physiological lever which allows him to claim that the uneven
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distributions of wealth which universal, equitable property rights tend to cause should also
theoretically serve society’s interests by improving material conditions for the whole nation.
Volition’s bearing of reason into the socio-economic order offers Locke comfort in his
assumptions that concentrated wealth optimizes prosperity, validates ownership, and satisfies
natural laws.
Locke’s labor theory functions in support of Two Treatises’s broader refutation of Robert
Filmer’s (1588-1683) defense of royal absolutism in Patriarcha (1680). The crux of Filmer’s
argument relevant to our discussion is that all monarchs descend from Adam and consequently
inherit political power over their kingdoms equivalent to Adam’s absolute rule over his
household.43 Therefore, subjects only own lands at a monarch’s pleasure and have no recourse
against arbitrary acts of expropriation. In addition to Locke’s counterargument that monarchs
instead rule at the pleasure of a body politic formed by a social contract, the labor theory of
property argues that property depends neither on a monarch’s grant nor even on an agreement
between members of a society. Instead, all reasonable people possess a bundle of natural rights
which accords them certain freedoms:
§ 87. Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom, and
uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature, equally with
any other man, or number of men in the world, hath by nature a power, not only to
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preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty, and estate, against the injuries and attempts
of other men. (Two Treatises, II.vii.87)
Natural rights are themselves a kind of immaterial property granted by God in part to ensure that
people do not impose on each other’s obligated self-preservation. Though Locke does not list
labor in this passage, my first quote identified labor as another form of personal property over
which a person has a natural right and which allows one to appropriate material goods necessary
for self-preservation. To better understand how and why Locke proposes his labor theory of
property to functions as it does, we must first be familiar with his belief that natural rights are
subservient to natural law.

1.2

Natural law and natural rights
Prior to Locke, moral philosophy of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was

dominated by natural law theories still influenced by a legalistic discourse derived from Thomas
Aquinas (1225-1274). Natural law was premised on the beliefs that by observing the world
human reason could extrapolate God’s existence and that both humans and the moral laws which
rule them had been made by God.44 Apropos of legalism, Samuel Pufendorf was much
respected by Locke and preceded him in subscribing to voluntarism, the theory that God’s willful
creation of humans juridically obliges them to follow his laws.45 In Essays on the Law of Nature
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Locke asserted that reason should be able to comprehend and codify the natural laws of morality as it
would other demonstrable sciences such as mathematics. Natural laws should be coherent, and
demonstrable, because, according to Locke, morals are complex, archetypal, and adequate modes which
humans (re)create through their own reasoning. However, Locke does not perform the demonstration
himself and ultimately defaults to supplementing human reason with divine revelation to confirm the
universal, natural laws which God wills. Knud Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From
Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 37.
45
Voluntarists like Grotius (1583-1645) and Pufendorf were opposed to intellectualists like Leibniz
(1646-1716) who considered reason to be more important than will. However, reason remains crucial for
voluntarists, because only reasonable creatures can understand and be subject to laws. Dunn argues that
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Locke argues that certain exertions of will can establish persistent influence over a thing or
person:
…obligation seems to consist in…the authority and dominion which someone has over
another, either by natural right and the right of creation, as when all things are justly
subject to that by which they have first been made and also are constantly preserved; or
by the right of donation, as when God, to whom all things belong, has transferred part of
his dominion to someone and granted the right to give orders to the first-born, for
example, and to monarchs…46
Locke’s quote justifies his voluntarism by referring to the concept of maker’s rights borrowed
from Francis Bacon, which will be important for understanding volition and the workmanship
model of appropriation.47 Maker’s rights are predicated on the Aristotelian idea that knowledge
of an object and its powers grants its maker control over that object. Because God creates
humans with capacities such as reason and rights, those capacities (and humans themselves)
necessarily exist for the purpose of fulfilling God’s ends which he defines by creating natural
laws. Specifically referring to human reason’s purpose in helping people conform to natural law,
John Colman writes of Locke’s voluntarism:
…all things are designed to fulfil some function and, as man’s distinguishing
characteristic is his rationality, it follows that his function is to act in accordance with
reason. Moreover, besides positive laws which differ from society to society, we believe

Locke switches from intellectualism to voluntarism and Tully also sees both intellectualism (or
“rationalism”) and voluntarism to be involved in Locke’s use of natural law. Dunn, The Political
Thought of John Locke, 188; James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and his adversaries
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 41.
46
John Locke, Locke: Political Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 117-118.
47
For a fuller discussion of maker’s rights, see Antonio Pérez-Ramos, Francis Bacon’s Idea of Science
and the Maker’s Knowledge Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
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there are laws which have validity everywhere; these must constitute the universal law of
nature. That men act as if there were no law of nature or disagree as to what the law
demands does not cast doubt on its existence, for there are many factors which can hinder
the operation of reason in the individual.48
Reason serves humans by helping them to decipher natural law, but even if it cannot it still must
be employed in following and fulfilling them as best as possible by, for example, contributing to
the commonwealth. In light of Locke’s voluntarism, we should regard natural rights as powers
provisionally “granted” to humans by God as means for following natural laws.49 Reviewing
Locke’s conception of natural rights helps to explain that the right to possess property must
depend on volition so that the material resources also granted by God can be put to their best
uses for the common good.
Pufendorf can again helpfully frame our topic of liberty-granting, natural rights and
specifically the right of appropriation.50 His key natural right (ius) of libertas establishes a
“power over one’s own actions,” which coincides with a natural law forbidding injuring or
restricting another person’s actions.51 According to Pufendorf, I may act freely and unhindered
(though am obliged to not harm others) and may even use resources without others’ consent.
However, libertas cannot create private property or prevent others from using those same

John Colman, John Lock’s Moral Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1983), 29.
My claim that Locke subjects natural rights to natural law stakes a position in a long, critical debate as
to whether Locke believed that God indeed grants humans natural rights so that they may fulfill the
obligations of natural law or whether he approaches Hobbes’ position by defining natural rights in a
manner which insulates people from social obligations and anticipates a thoroughly individualist, liberal
autonomy.
50
Also, because Locke’s definition of liberty takes us into the quasi-physiology of the Essay which is
better understood in the context of volition.
51
Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, 40.
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resources.52 Regarding property in goods, Locke’s concern is to establish a justification that
allows a person a natural use right to property and also a natural exclusory right to prevent its
expropriation by another person. Further, natural law obliges that appropriation must not
infringe on others’ equivalent rights to a common pool of resources. Locke considers this
exclusory right vital to self-preservation, because haphazard expropriation threatens selfpreservation, so his labor theory avoids dependence on social contracts or the tacit consent of
others. Locke poses the stakes: “there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some
way or other before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular man.” Therefore,
Lockean private property does not depend on a state’s positive laws but is instead appropriated
by a freely executed act of labor. As the labor theory states, “the labour of his body and the work
of his hands, we may say, are properly his,” and are therefore already circumscribed by a natural
right. When mixing this labor and “something” else with a good, the person’s natural right
encompasses the good and “excludes the common right of other men” as long as “there is
enough, and as good, left in common for others” (Two Treatises, II.v.26). This final phrase,
known as the enough-and-as-good proviso, reinforces the notion consistent with voluntarism that
natural rights operate as accessories to the fulfillment of natural laws and may be negated in part
or whole should they fail to serve those laws. Preventing others from surviving by hoarding
resources represents such as failure, because there must be “enough” resources left for others to
use. However, the labor theory of property not only fosters self-preservation, which in any case
is motivated by self-interest, it also compels individuals to put their property to the best possible
use for society’s collective prosperity, a position supported by Locke’s labor theory.

52

This is because Pufendorf believed that private property in goods can only exist after social contracts
have been formed.
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Locke raises two points in the chapter “Of Property” related by their nominal interest in
ensuring the efficient use of property for the sake of the public good. Locke supports his labor
theory by claiming firstly that a persistent property right in a resource appropriated by a person’s
labor is the best way to ensure a person’s optimal contribution to the commonwealth and
secondly that wasting a possessed resource invalidates a person’s right to that resource. Two
initial quotes reflect that humans are obliged to recognize that God created the world’s resources
for the good of all people:
God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason to make
use of it to the best advantage of life and convenience. The earth, and all that is therein,
is given to men for the support and comfort of their being. (Two Treatises, II.v.26)

§34. God gave the world to men in common; but since he gave it to them for their benefit,
and the greatest conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be
supposed he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the
use of the industrious and rational, (and labour was to be his title to it). (Two Treatises,
II.v.34)
Both quotes use superlatives emphasizing that resources should be maximally exploited by those
who appropriate them. “[B]est advantage of life and convenience,” “support and comfort,” and
“greatest conveniences of life” insist that humans should not only survive but fully enjoy the
world’s potential, material benefits by means of the “industrious and rational labor” that not only
grants “title” but improves resources’ ability to satisfy various desires. The words used in the
passages’ first sentences closely parallel each other and emphasize that Locke considers that
though natural property rights presume a proprietor’s self-serving, calculative rationality in the
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good’s use, the labor theory of property’s higher function ensures that more wealth is produced
so that none may be without life’s necessities. Two Treatises does not define an exact, natural,
circulatory mechanism by which redistribution occurs53, but Locke is satisfied to emphasize that
labor produces such exponential improvements in the total available wealth, such that the poor
may nevertheless benefit and account themselves better off than kings in uncivilized lands:
…he who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not lessen, but increase the
common stock of mankind: for the provisions serving to the support of human life,
produced by one acre of enclosed and cultivated land, are (to speak much within
compass) ten times more than those which are yielded by an acre of land of an equal
richness lying waste in common. And therefore he that encloses land, and has a greater
plenty of the conveniencies of life from ten acres, than he could have from an hundred
left to nature, may truly be said to give ninety acres to mankind. (Two Treatises, II.v.37)
The most important of the several points Locke makes in this passage is that land appropriated
by rationally employed labor will significantly increase the total available wealth theoretically
available to a community. His reference to enclosure indicates that he had in mind an English
upper class who had recently benefited from Acts of governments allowing them to incorporate
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Popular consent to the use of money and wage-labor invalidates the as-much-and-as-good proviso,
because proprietors can compensate for resource-scarcity by paying laborers with nonperishable money.
Moreover, although introducing money allows agents to exchange perishable or improvable goods for
potentially limitless sums of durable wealth, I would argue that the waste proviso retains its force for
many goods even beyond the institution of money. Several scholars have recognized that Locke was
concerned for the circulatory velocity of money, or the rate at which money changes hands during trade,
which means that slow-moving money could in some sense be wasted by inadequately facilitating the
circulation, incorporation, and optimization of other, improvable goods. Karen Iversen Vaughn, John
Locke: Economist and Social Scientist (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 41; Terence
Hutchison, Before Adam Smith: The Emergence of Political Economy, 1662-1776 (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1988), 63; Tony Aspromourgos, On the Origins of Classical Economics: Distribution and
value from William Petty to Adam Smith (New York: Routledge, 1996), 114.

37

common land into their private property and who had been privately doing so well before.54
Among enclosure’s effects was to force impoverished people off of land and to reduce the
opportunities of others to supplement their income by, for example, selling firewood collected
from the commons.55
Locke supports theoretical appropriation in a state of nature and practical enclosures in
seventeenth-century England by raising the specter of waste. The passage states that
unappropriated land is necessarily wasted, but also implies that an owner’s natural right to
appropriated land that remains inadequately exploited may be justifiably nullified and that the
land be expropriated. These concerns over utility are reflected in what scholars call Locke’s
waste or spoliation proviso:
…whatsoever [an owner] tilled and reaped, laid up and made use of, before it spoiled,
that was his peculiar right; whatsoever he enclosed, and could feed, and make use of, the
cattle and product was also his. But if either the grass of his enclosure rotted on the
ground, or the fruit of his planting perished without gathering and laying up; this part of
the earth, notwithstanding his enclosure, was still to be looked on as waste, and might be
the possession of any other. (Two Treatises, II.v.38)
Locke again allows for enclosure which, given the potential for tenants to work the fields in a
system of wages and rents, does little to limit the likelihood of massive wealth concentration.
Moreover, the waste proviso justifies expropriation of land in the Americas from native peoples
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based on the argument that higher yielding, European farming techniques better satisfy the
obligation industriously and rationally to cultivate the land.56 While Matthew H. Kramer
critiques the labor theory of property’s philosophical validity as the optimal means for promoting
economic efficiency, he notes that “Locke protractedly argued that refinements and
transformations induced by toil should receive overwhelming credit for the conveniences that
served human wants” and that such credit justified an owner’s proprietary use rights.57 Locke
does not always differentiate between increases of wealth based on currently available
advantages like economies of scale as opposed to innovative technologies; still, he consistently
refers to increased utility, value, and production as outcomes of rational labor.58 The value
added by labor represents a source of socio-economic stability, because quantitative increases of

Andrew Fitzmaurice presents a version of this position while discussing Locke’s justification for
colonization. Andrew Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, Property and Empire, 1500-2000 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2014), 116. Locke’s defends his labor theory of property in part by arguing
that it will be improve quality of life through a body politic:
There cannot be a clearer demonstration of any thing, than several nations of the Americans are
of this, who are rich in land, and poor in all the comforts of life ; whom nature having furnished
as liberally as any other people with the materials of plenty, i. e. a fruitful soil, apt to produce in
abundance what might serve for food, raiment, and delight ; yet, for want of improving it by
labour, have not one-hundredth part of the conveniencies we enjoy: and a king of a large and
fruitful territory there feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day-labourer in England. (Two
Treatises, II.v.41)
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computed, he will then see how much labour makes the far greatest part of the value of things we
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to nature, that hath no improvement of pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is,
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a society’s aggregate wealth and improvements to its general quality of life should limit social
unrest otherwise caused by lack of life’s necessities.
According to Locke’s labor theory of property, labor, which we now know grants
property rights due in part to its potential for increasing wealth, nominally appropriates resources
by being mixed with an object. As mentioned, critics have argued over the premises which
Locke imagined giving appropriative acts their efficacy. I reiterate that supplying Locke’s
concept of volition for the unspecific “something” that labour “annexe[s]” offers a valid reading
of the labor theory of property and supports my claim that Locke deployed quasi-physiological
concepts in order to dissociate socio-economic stability from dependence on the state’s authority
or its policies. Moreover, my reading strengthens the case that Locke considered the
workmanship model firmer ground from which to argue than the mixing model.
To preview my rationale for claiming volition’s importance for appropriative labor, I
argue that mixing remains a valid method for understanding the actual act of appropriation if we
understand it to be nested within and operating under the voluntarist principles which accord the
workmanship model its higher authority. I borrow Adam S. Seagrave’s nesting model which he
applies to the more general problem of whether theories of natural rights serve or destabilize
natural laws. However, he does not elaborate its potential implications for Locke’s labor theory
of property which requires a fuller demonstration of the ways in which Lockean, natural,
property rights serve the public good. In Seagrave’s reading, each human is doubly-owned in a
“nested” system of possession, because individuals “make” their own, accountable, personal
identity through continuity of consciousness while God makes the material, natural world, its
laws, and each human body.59 Consequently, humans possess a form of maker’s rights which
To explain more fully, Seagrave’s joint, “nested” ownership of individuals depends on the
workmanship model’s basis in maker’s rights, which establish an apolitical, juridical obligation of object
59
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weakly reflect the maker’s rights of God. Humans’ maker’s rights allow them the right to make
unclaimed goods their property by mixing their labor with them rather than making them, but
keeps humans subject to God’s own claims over all of his created things. It will be necessary to
summarize the workmanship and mixing model’s respective claims to understand why the
workmanship model is the more reasonable premise on which Locke to base a natural property
right.

1.3

The two models
The workmanship model, first argued by James Tully and usefully elaborated by Gopal

Sreenivasan, interprets maker’s rights, which are foundational for Locke’s voluntarism, as we
have seen, as also necessary to establish the efficacy of appropriation.60 Again, humans are
subject to natural law because both are created through the force of God’s omnipotent will,
which endows him with maker’s rights over his creations. Locke refers to workmanship and
maker’s rights in his Two Treatises: “for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and
infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of one sovereign Master, sent into the world by his order,
and about his business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during

to maker. Nested ownership of individuals by both themselves and God supports my contention that
volitional liberty operates in Locke’s voluntarist, political philosophy by enabling economic agency while
correspondingly making agents accountable to natural and political laws. Seagrave addresses the crux of
autonomy-with-obligations by first noting that God initially creates humanity en masse which comports
with Locke’s beliefs in divine maker’s rights and, indirectly, voluntarism. God’s creation and consequent
ownership over humans limit their autonomous ability to make, own, and use property including property
in their selves, limits codified by God’s will in natural laws. God also grants humans volitional liberty
and reason, which are prerequisites for extending the limited rights of self-ownership to property, for
accessing “the possibility of a demonstrative science of morality,” and to ensure a person’s accountability
to a higher, moral authority whether it be God’s law or the state’s civil law. S. Adam Seagrave, “Locke
on the Law of Nature and Natural Rights,” in A Companion to Locke, ed. Matthew Stuart (West Sussex:
Wiley Blackwell, 2016), 386-389.
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his, not another’s pleasure…” (Two Treatises, II.ii.6). God’s willful, ex nihilo creation of all
things grants him final determination over the means and ends of those creations. The means he
creates in humans include volition, liberty, and reason, each of which Locke describes in the
Essay’s chapter “Of Power.” Humans also willfully exert labor, but because they lack God’s
divine understanding and creative power such labor only grants a limited mastery over objects,
which natural law supersedes. For Sreenivasan, rational, willful making slides from divine
creation to non-omniscient crafting to a mere mixing that may be achieved by acts as simple as
gathering acorns. He notes that Locke blurs making and mixing but argues for making’s
preeminence by stating that Locke’s “making processes can also be identified as mixing
processes, but not all mixing processes can be identified as making processes.”61 This reading of
mixing as a weaker version of making is reflected in the imperfection of human reason, which
necessarily limits the maker’s knowledge required to give humans absolute, maker’s rights over
their property. Crucially, human labor cannot create ex nihilo, but only, in addition to
appropriation, use their labor to add value. In sum, Locke’s voluntarism is supported by his
statement that God’s will grants Him absolute maker’s rights which He exerts by imposing on
humans the obligations set by natural laws. Locke’s communitarian insistence that physical
property’s primary function is to serve the public good rather than its owner’s interests
demonstrate his at least nominal deference to natural law, a deference which comports with an
interpretation of his labor theory of property that gives the workmanship model priority over the
mixing model.
The mixing model remains important to my argument, however, because its nesting
inside the workmanship model provided Locke with a way to describe how the labor that is
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added to a good can also add volition. The mixing model interprets the labor of theory
somewhat more literally than the workmanship model by arguing that mixing one’s innately
possessed labor with unclaimed objects encompasses those objects within the domain of one’s
natural property rights. As my discussion of calculative rationality showed, this interpretation
also accepts natural rights’ subjection to natural law, but generally credits labor’s ability to
improve the use-value of resources as justification for their appropriation. A. John Simmons
offers a representative defense of the mixing model:
What Locke writes about labor suggests that he thinks of labor as free, intentional,
purposive action aimed at satisfying needs or supplying the conveniences of life. To
“mix” my labor with an object for Locke is simply for me to make productive use of the
object within the scope of my labor’s purpose…. I bring (part of) nature within my
legitimate sphere of self-government by physically imposing my plan for its useful
employment upon it. My plan, which is the product of my mental labor, is “mixed” with
the object through the purposive activity that constitutes my physical labor.62
Simmons addresses two important points in this quote. The first suggests that labor exploits
resources’ potential utility either through short-term consumption or by making them longerterm factors of production. Though Simmons attests that “it simply makes no sense to talk of
literally mixing labor with nature,” we should not discount that we can justifiably read Locke’s
quotes, cited earlier, as intending to mean that the application of labor to a resource often
increases its value and is therefore, as Simmons says, productive.63 Worthier of examination is
another point he suggests with the terms “free, intentional, purposive action aimed at satisfying
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needs” and “[m]y plan for its useful employment.” Without quite using the word volition,
Simmons’s account of the mixing model supports my argument that in being mixed with an
object, labor, as the expression of an agent’s volition, executes and thus validates appropriation.
He describes the mixing of labor as a willed act the intent of which does not reside only in the
initial, willful, appropriative act, but includes a longer-term intention to exploit one’s goods.
Simmons’s prospective terms like “plan” and “aim” also connote something of a
demotion of the improving labor Locke deems necessary in the initial act of appropriation. I
note this in order to emphasize the initial, appropriative labor’s coincident, at least as important
function of bearing volition. With the example of picking up an acorn, Locke minimizes the
need for the initial, appropriative labor to add value to the good relative to the benefits derived
from its imagined, future exploitation and particularly relative to resources like land, which
provide owners with additional goods and rents for generations. Little effort may go into
gathering and consuming goods, but a person may spend an afternoon cordoning off several
acres of unclaimed land, thereby appropriate it, and profit from it indefinitely as long, given the
spoliation proviso, as it is efficiently exploited. Though labor’s facilitation of exploitation,
production, and improvement remains important for maintaining property rights, the demotion of
improving labor required for the appropriating act connotes the importance of the volitional
intent, which assures Locke, God, and others of a good’s optimal future use. In the case of any
good not more or less immediately consumed by its use, the minimal labor Locke requires for
appropriation shows that the initial mixing of labor is more proclamatory and promissory than
improving and thus implies that appropriative labor’s significance depends on it performing a
message-bearing function. The execution of appropriation in the present relies on a future
conditional of anticipated exploitation the default of which would pose challenges for any party
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seeking to prosecute an expropriation.64 Turning to Locke’s definition of volition, we see that it
serves Locke’s argument for the labor theory of property by letting him presume landowners’
calculative rationality.

1.4

Volition, calculative rationality, and liberty
In Locke’s view, volition would beneficially coincide with appropriative labor because he

understands volition as a power the operation of which theoretically disciplines the desires that
originate the volitions for agents’ free actions. This reading of volition’s role in appropriation
lets us see that Locke can justify a natural right of appropriation by imagining that efficiently
exploited property necessarily serves the natural law obliging society’s preservation by its ability
to increase the commonwealth and to promote socio-economic stability. And again, volition’s
ability to optimize property’s exploitation seems to provide means for Locke to assuage his
concern that resources may be wasted due to owners’ laxity or their immoral desires. In “Of
Power,” Locke defines volition as a mental capacity that mediates a desire and an intentional
action:
We must remember, that Volition, or Willing, is an act of the Mind directing its thought
to the production of any Action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it. To avoid
multiplying of words, I would crave leave here, under the word Action, to comprehend
the forbearance too of any Action proposed; sitting still, or holding one's peace, when
walking or speaking are propos’d, though mere forbearances, requiring as much the

There seems to be a parallel here with Locke’s proposed right of revolution. The social contract
reinforced by natural rights grants a body politic the theoretical power to dissolve a tyrannical
government (as well as itself), but Locke sets the bar so high as to render the idea all but toothless. On
the other hand, having seen his country in the throes of civil war, Locke recognized a need for social
stability, which he optimistically hinged on the moral, economic rationality of England’s landowning,
upper class.
64
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determination of the Will, and being often as weighty in their consequences, as the
contrary Actions, may, on that consideration, well enough pass for Actions too:65
It is worth emphasizing that volition itself is more active and performative than its name might
suggest if we read it as analogous to desire or, a shade more active, intent; we can accurately
describe volition as an act of willing necessary to execute a desired, intentional action. Volition
is not the physical or mental act itself but is of the act and occurs all but contemporaneously with
actions such as laboring. Neither is volition the pre-existing desire that volitional actions attempt
to satisfy. Rather, for a volitional action to occur, two other conditions must be satisfied: one
must be at one’s liberty, which I will address shortly, and one must, as Locke terms it here, be
able to forebear from performing the action.
Forbearing from executing a desired, considered act also constitutes a volitional action,
and though it is not precisely the same as suspension, it gestures toward this additional power
that gives volition its moral force. Because volition’s power to incite rational, calculated actions
depends on suspension, Locke is emphatic in presenting suspension’s importance and potential
benefits:
This seems to me the source of all liberty; in this seems to consist that, which is (as I
think improperly) call’d Free will. For during this suspension of any desire, before the
will be determined to action, and the action (which follows that determination) done, we
have an opportunity to examine, view, and judge of the good or evil of what we are going
to do; and when, upon due Examination, we have judg’d, we have done our duty, all that
we can or ought to do, in pursuit of our happiness; and ’tis not our fault, but a perfection
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of our nature to desire, will, and act according to the last result of a fair Examination.
(Essay, II.xxi.47)
I will take up liberty’s dependence on suspension shortly. Again, to be volitional, an act must
also be willfully forborne. Suspension occurs between the initial period during which desire lies
dormant and the moment when volition initiates an action. Specifically, suspension willfully
executes the action of forbearance, which prevents volition from following through on an active
action, so to speak. During the interval of suspension, reason scrutinizes the mind’s
justifications for the initial desire and the morality of the action’s predicted outcomes.
Suspension thereby offers agents the possibility of correcting their desires and conforming action
and outcomes to the moral obligations predetermined by natural law. Agents act morally and
rationally by not transgressing natural laws and by performing, among other things, actions
economically favorable to society. The ability to judge and choose one’s actions exemplifies the
obligatory use of God-given reason.66 Employing reason should cause morally accountable
individuals to choose virtuous actions, which Locke defines as “Actions conformable to God’s
Will, or to the Rule prescribed by God, which is the true and only measure of Vertue, when
Vertue is used to signifie what is in its own nature right and good.” (Essay, I.iii.18)
Our understanding of suspension’s ability to interrupt problematic actions should help to
clarify why Locke would rely on volition to burnish people’s fundamental right to appropriate
desired, unclaimed land by doing little more than proclaiming their intention to do so with a
potentially negligible act of labor. Locke views humans as hedonistic creatures whose wills are
motivated by desire. A perceived lack of pleasure, often attributable to a physical discomfort or
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a missing resource, registers as uneasiness that then motivates desire.67 Locke’s faith in
empiricism and natural law inclines him to believe that humans can reason their way from
perceptions of pleasure and pain to an understanding of Good, Evil, and their obligations to God.
Yet the Essay registers Locke’s concerns about faulty reason and immoral desires. The
vicissitudes of the experiences of pleasure and pain all but ensures desire’s moral errancy.
Namely, immediate pain causes immediate unease, but absence of the Good and its
compensation by a train of moderate, potentially spurious pleasures, does not necessarily cause
us the unease that would orient our desire toward the Good if we were to adequately consider the
consequences of acting on such desires. One should theoretically derive pleasure from
exploiting one’s property for the public good by, for example, enclosing land, employing the
lower ranks to help maximize harvests, and placing profits back into circulation rather than
hoarding them. Though some of these activities may be primarily conducive to personal
pleasure, they nevertheless contribute to the commonwealth, and one’s ability to reflect on
hoarding’s long-term disadvantages should reduce desire to pursue irrational and anti-social,
economic activities. As Locke says, “by a due consideration and examining any good proposed,
it is in our power to raise our desires in a due proportion to the value of that good, whereby in its
turn, and place, it may come to work upon the will, and be pursued” (Essay, II.xxi.46).

“That Desire is a state of uneasiness, everyone who reflects on himself, will quickly find” (Essay,
II.xxi.32). Beginning with revisions in the Essay’s second edition, Locke differentiates desiring from
willing, the latter term which he equates with volition, since individuals can will the performance of an
action which they do not desire, and because willing is integral to any action, whereas a desire does not
necessarily compel action. As Stuart points out, Locke specifies in the second edition that desires are
oriented toward things, while volitions are necessary for and part of the performance of actions. Unease
may motivate a desire to act in one’s self-interest, but volition is necessary for causing a willful action to
occur and may be thought of as an intentional doing. Matthew Stuart, Locke’s Metaphysics (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2013), 458-459. Lowe defends Locke’s insertion of volition as a layer in too-simple,
intentionalist philosophical accounts of agency, since intention does not convey the necessary
contemporaneity of volition with the willed action. E. J. Lowe. Locke: on Human Understanding
(London, Routledge: 1995), 139-140.
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Suspension enables agents to correct their desires prior to performing a volitional act; without the
potential for suspension acts may neither be considered volitional nor free. Having largely
evacuated the need for appropriating labor to immediately exploit or improve goods and because
“Of Property” functions as a general defense of contemporary economic conditions,68 the
inclusion of suspension in volition, as I have noted, reassures Locke that appropriative acts are
executed with moral intent and that present landowners persistently effect such intentions.
It behooves me to say more about liberty, because Locke defines it in a tellingly different
fashion from Pufendorf’s libertas, and because liberty will be a keyword throughout my other
chapters. Locke’s liberty resembles Pufendorf’s libertas in its general contours by defining the
ability to act freely and unhindered by external restrictions. However, the first sentence of
Locke’s definition of suspension indicates a quasi-physiological precondition, which also
appears in his definition of liberty; Locke calls suspension “the source of all liberty” and
liberty’s definition shows us that liberty in fact depends on volition:
…the Idea of Liberty, is the Idea of a Power in any Agent to do or forbear any particular
Action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is
preferr’d to the other; where either of them is not in the Power of the Agent to be
produced by him according to his Volition, there he is not at Liberty, that Agent is under
Necessity. So that Liberty cannot be, where there is no Thought, no Volition, no Will; but
there may be Thought, there may be Will, there may be Volition, where there is no
Liberty. (Essay, II.xxi.8)
This definition shows us that volition is necessary though not sufficient for liberty. Conversely,
liberty requires volition, because volition involves the capacity to suspend executing an action
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and therefore cannot itself be under necessity. Locke placing this condition on liberty adds
another, quasi-physiological layer to free action which, as we have seen, allows socio-economic
stability to emerge from the often-self-interested actions of autonomous individuals.
Additionally, those who lack liberty fundamentally lack the ability to exercise natural rights,
while those possessing liberty are morally accountable and obligated by natural law.
To underscore the mixing model’s importance, it is again useful to interpret Locke’s
theory of property rights through and against Pufendorf. To the extent that a person possesses
reason (“Thought”) and liberty, they are morally accountable agents with powers and rights
granted by God for fulfilling natural law. Therefore, volitional acts are themselves either moral
or immoral. As we have seen, Locke considers the optimal exploitation of resources for the good
of the commonwealth to be a moral act. Yet the appropriative act of labor does not necessarily
have to improve or immediately exploit a resource; it must simply carry the volitional intention
to do so in order to grant a natural right to exclusive use. Whereas Pufendorf considered
personal, natural rights in terms of libertas, he differentiated rights such as the right to property
which depend on the social contract as belonging to one’s dominion (dominium). Locke also
refers to a person’s dominion but describes it in terms of the bundle of natural rights that can be
extended to include physical property.69 Given that labor is required for appropriation, I thus
highlight Steven Buckle’s argument for the workmanship model:
…Locke’s theory does not require, and even can be better stated, without resorting to this
(mixing) metaphor. The reason is this: although the idea of extending the suum
encourages thinking of it as a kind of physical realm, as some sort of special substance, it

“And hence, subduing or cultivating the earth, and having dominion, we see are joined together.” (Two
Treatises, II.v.35).
69
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is in fact a moral realm: that realm which cannot be encroached upon by others without
doing an injury.70
First, the term suum, derived from natural law philosopher Hugo Grotius, influences Locke’s
notion of dominion as a sphere or “realm” that includes an individual’s belongings such as their
person, their rights, and their property. Appropriative labor functions to the extent that the
volition executing it expresses the moral desire to exploit the good. Even though the initial
appropriative act seems of little significance as an improving act, we can surmise why Locke
would not want to separate appropriation from improvement; his provisos guard against abuses
of an otherwise largely free right of appropriation. Other acts not involving directly applied
labor might announce a moral intent for a resource’s use, but the mixing of labor serves the
practical function of establishing one’s prospective intentions by means of a definite act, often
proximate to the act of consumption where applicable, and reasonably expressive of the actual
future work required for improvement. The workmanship model incorporates and even requires
appropriation to involve labor’s mixing with goods, because labor imbues the good with
volition’s moral valence and thus nominally assures Locke’s readers that England’s wealth rests
in the hands of those who will put it to best use rather than use their power to immiserate the
lower orders.
I have reserved discussing Locke’s relation to political economy for two related reasons.
Firstly, a self-conscious, disciplinary discourse of political economy did not appear until about
three-quarters of a century after Locke published his major texts; a reasonably coherent
economic science only emerges around 1760s with the French Physiocrats, whom I discuss in
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my third chapter. In Locke’s time, though some thinkers had given thought to free trade and
constitutional monarchy’s checks on the crown were considered favorably, mercantilist thought
remained a powerful influence for justifying various government interventions into foreign and
domestic markets for the sake of increasing national prosperity and state revenues. Locke’s
theories in the Two Treatises, among which the labor theory of property is exemplary, were
foundational for later thinkers attempting to justify economic and political liberalism. Reading
the labor theory of property in conjunction with his descriptions of volition and liberty in An
Essay on Human Understanding offers insight into the quasi-physiological bases on which
Locke could argue that rational, economic behavior tended to satisfy both proprietor’s selfinterest while also benefitting society by increasing the nation’s collective prosperity. Further,
while the labor theory of property applies to an all-but-fictional state of nature, natural laws
remain in force for national governments and their subjects. Consequently, states tend to govern
best largely by codifying and protecting God-granted natural rights which allow people to thrive
and which Locke claims people formed social contracts and governments to protect in the first
place:
The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the
bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community,
for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure
enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any that are not of it. This
any number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left as
they were in the liberty of the state of nature. (Two Treatises, II.viii.95)
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This quote as well as any demonstrates Locke’s preference for an equitable, communitarian
version of liberal government based on his sense that simply allowing rational agents to pursue
their economic interests with little fear for interference or injury will foster the public good.
Locke imagines that natural laws determine acceptable forms of socio-economic and
socio-political order and that the labor theory serves natural law by facilitating both individual
self-preservation and the expansion of collective pools of wealth. My next chapter discusses The
Seasons, a physico-theological, georgic poem similarly interested in the relation between natural
law and socio-economic development. Emblematic of the poem’s physico-theology, Thomson
expresses enthusiasm for the study of nature’s physical laws by natural philosophy which
benefits humans by enabling innovative, technological methods for harnessing nature.
Consequently, The Seasons places greater emphasis on intellectual labor and scientific discovery
than do other, contemporary georgics. Thomson compares nature’s material recycling with the
human capacity for remaking which allows humans to not simply accumulate wealth, but drive
gradual, world-historical, technological progress. Thomson’s emphasis on the mutability of
things created by both “Nature’s swift and secret-working hand” and humans distinguishes such
objects from nature’s immutable laws both physical and moral.71 Ultimately, Thomson uses his
physico-theological distinction between eternal, unchanging laws and material, transient things
to critique the state and its apparatuses. In his poem, governments become one refinable
technology among the many which contribute to their nation’s socio-economic stability. Thus,
state apparatuses merge with and participate in the wider, technological progress optimistically
envisioned by Thomson, or undermine the industrious efforts of its subjects and sow chaos. But
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they can never embody the perfection of natural laws and so remain open-ended and perpetually
susceptible to refinement.
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Chapter 2
2

Natural Law, Economy, and the State in James Thomson’s The Seasons
What cannot active government perform, / New-moulding man?
-James Thomson, The Seasons

2.1

The Seasons: Background and the argument
James Thomson’s georgic poem, The Seasons (1730), prefigures an imminent trend in

British politico-economic treatises like Smith’s Wealth of Nations by regarding states and their
apparatuses as mutable, historically contingent formations suited to protecting natural,
proprietary rights and promoting the commonwealth. Thomson performs this revision in part by
hybridizing the georgic with physico-theology in order to frame humanity’s gradually improving
understanding and utilization of its environment with respect to the moral authority of natural
laws.72 Much recent scholarship on The Seasons considers the text’s attention to natural
philosophy, commerce, and empire, each relevant to my analysis of maturating, British theories
of the state’s role in political economy.73 These critics read the poem’s representation of nature’s
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Useful work including still valuable, older material on The Seasons and natural philosophy includes
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physical transformations as I do as an allegory for the poem’s political economy which
comprises its understanding of the relation between human economies and the state apparatuses
which affect them. For example, Tim Fulford states that Thomson “encourage[d] readers to
approve of legislation to end the man-made oppression of extortion and torture in prison. In this
respect Thomson shows himself a reforming Whig, keen to oppose injustices which…he believes
to be remediable.”74 I build on these critics but part ways with them by first arguing that the
poem distinguishes between the juridico-moral authority of absolute, natural laws on the one
hand and the weaker authority of states and state apparatuses on the other hand.75 The latter
section of my chapter argues that the poem claims that states coordinate with and are akin to
other, more overtly technological apparatuses participating in a disembedded economy.76 I
borrow the idea of the disembedded economy from Karly Polanyi and use it to signify the
emerging idea in the eighteenth century that the economy is not an isolated domain within social
life; rather, the economy comprises and is influenced by all aspects of social life such that
distinct institutions like governments are understood in term of their subordination to and ability
ideally to strengthen the socio-economic order. Thomson indicates this shared capacity for the
synergistic improvement of the commonwealth and government when he admires those “who
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toiled / Through long successive ages to build up / A labouring plan of state” (Winter, 960-62).77
Throughout, I show that The Seasons uses the georgic mode to liken the imperfection and
provisionality of state apparatuses such as positive laws not only to other products of human
labor but also to the transient, natural phenomena Thomson often calls works. In terms of the
state’s role in the intellectual history of theories of political economy, the poem curtails the
moral authority of states and refigures them as imperfect, refinable apparatuses for supporting
science-driven, economic prosperity.
Thomson’s progressive education and his desire for literary recognition informed his use
of a georgic mode whose own popularity had been on the rise for nearly three decades.78 John
Dryden’s celebrated translation of Virgil’s Georgics (1697) was supplemented by Joseph
Addison’s appended “Essay on the Georgics” and preceded John Philips’s Cyder (1708),
Stephen Duck’s grimmer “The Thresher’s Labour” (1730), and James Dyer’s The Fleece (1757).
These latter poems each address a single, English, rural industry; though the poems depict
contemporary forms of work and even, as The Fleece does with the textile trade, reconcile
themselves to the benefits of industries that would reshape England’s land and economy, they

All references to Thomson’s The Seasons are taken from James Thomson, The Seasons, ed. James
Sambrook (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).
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exhibit nostalgia and do not take as broad and optimistic account as The Seasons does of the
various scientific discoveries and technological improvements which Thomson valorizes. The
Seasons therefore reduces agriculture’s conventional prominence in georgic poetry and presents
a more capacious view of the philosophical influences and material objects affecting Britain’s
political economy. Thomson insists that “the gift of Industry” provides “whatever / Exalts,
embellishes, and renders life / Delightful” (Autumn, 141-143). He particularly attributes
Britain’s prosperity to the intellectual work of natural philosophy as a preliminary to
technological innovation. I show that The Seasons expands the georgic’s scope by folding
admiration for the work that drives scientific discovery into its claim that the public good
depends on innovative exploitation of resources by a government-supported, economic sector.
The Seasons uses physico-theological argumentation to distinguish the absolute and
immutable moral authority of natural law from the imperfect moral authority of states and their
apparatuses which the poem implicitly compares, as it does with the transient works of humans,
with its own mutable, physical works. From this premise, the poem argues that studying the
fixed, physical laws of nature which regulate phenomena can help lead moral philosophers to
better grasp the similarly fixed, natural laws which regulate morality.79 Physico-theology sets
the poem’s moral table with regard to political economy by establishing that nature’s moral laws
are reflected in its physical laws, that physical laws determine nature’s diverse, material
economies, and finally, that statecraft should support the rational instrumentalization of those
material economies by free and happy individuals. For example, Thomson presents a long

Describing physico-theology, Jonathan Israel states that “regularity, purposeful intricacy, and
coherence of the universe, held Newton, are in themselves proof of supernatural agency in its design” and
thus also seemed to illuminate the moral, benevolent character of that design. Jonathan Israel,
Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man, 1670 – 1752 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006), 207.
79
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passage on the sun and its productive influence on a variety of systems including the “planetary
train,” “[t]he vegetable world,” “the surface of the enlivened earth,” and the “unfruitful rock”
(Summer, 104; 112; 130; 140). The passage merges the georgic themes of nature and the sun’s
own potential to remake physical nature. It announces its physico-theological significance by
claiming that in the sun “Shines out thy Maker” and concludes with the physico-theological
commonplace that the natural world provides evidence of God’s existence: “To me be Nature’s
volume broad displayed, / And to peruse its all-instructing page” (Summer, 192-193). The
Seasons’ hybridization of georgic poetry with physico-theology makes the poem a case study for
my larger story of the British georgic’s mediation of nascent, politico-economic ideas which
include a liberalist statecraft predicated on natural, proprietary rights and a disembedded
economy served by rather than serving a sacrosanct state.
I first show that the poem represents natural law’s absolute, moral authority by means of
two heuristics. In the first heuristic, Thomson distinguishes absolute, natural law from its
provisional expressions in phenomena, actions, or institutions first by indirectly describing
morality in terms of timeless virtues and secondly by analogizing the universal force of moral
laws to the force of physical laws. Thomson favors the virtue love, which he uses to convey
natural law’s absolute righteousness and to deny the existence of disorder. He owes his portrayal
of love in part to the optimistic, moral philosophy of Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of
Shaftesbury (1671-1713). Shaftesbury’s sense of the world’s “moral beauty” uses the rhetoric of
aesthetics to reflect the virtuous order, consistency, and continuity of nature’s laws. The
Seasons’ shares his confidence that God’s infusive love harmonizes nature’s transient particulars
into a perfect whole.80 For Thomson, love epitomizes the benevolence of Creation’s natural
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laws, invokes without defining the blurry relation between moral laws and phenomena like
gravity, and can characterize individual acts of sensibility or sociability. Shifting to the second
heuristic, I show the poem using physical laws to represent the moral authority of natural laws.
The Seasons represents the universal force of both types of fixed law by dressing world-spanning
examples of physical phenomena with signifiers of imperial authority and power. Imagery
relating seasonal weather patterns to distant, extreme climates conveys not only the sublime
force of physical and moral laws, but also their preeminence over any of humanity’s transient
works.
In the chapter’s second section, I show that The Seasons expands the georgic’s esteem for
labor to include the intellectual work which supports commerce and technological innovation
before addressing government itself as a mutable, political technology. This shift reinforces the
poem’s claim that a body politic’s moral well-being is indexed by the dynamism of its economy
rather than being a function of the state’s irreproachability. The poem sketches natural material
works which are at once the source of and analogize human discoveries and innovations. Two
genealogies of technology in the poem promote the moral and material benefits of mixing
scientific progress, industrious labor, and sociable commerce. In this context, state apparatuses
are themselves refinable, politico-economic technologies meant to help individuals fulfill the
natural law which we saw Locke describe as obliging the community’s collective thriving. 81
Finally, the poem’s account of failed polities show that states are not discrete, transcendent

His weakness prompt to shade, to raise his aim,
To touch the finer movements of the mind,
And with the moral beauty charm the heart. (Summer, 1555)
81
“God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to
the best advantage of life and convenience. The earth, and all that is therein, is given to men for the
support and comfort of their being.” John Locke, Two Treatises of Government and A Letter Concerning
Toleration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), II.v.26.
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entities, but are themselves composite apparatuses capable of dysfunction, delegitimization, and
replacement. Thomson cites Britain’s slavery and jail systems as institutions presently afflicting
the moral standing of government. Yet he remains optimistic that a Britain made to flourish by
the synergy of its scientists, industries, and government will be able to amend these severe,
socio-political defects.

2.2

Physico-theology and the gap between nature’s laws and human knowledge
Following some unremarkable juvenilia submitted to the Edinburgh Miscellany,

Thomson published Winter (1726), the poem that would lead to The Seasons, one year after
moving to London. A financially secure group of local Scots Whigs supported Thomson with
positive literary reviews and with recommendations for tutoring positions. David Mallet (17051765), a soon to be popular Scottish poet and dramatist, arranged the selling of Winter to John
Millan for three pounds.82 In a letter to his friend William Cranstoun, Thomson says that a
poem, now lost, by Reverend Robert Riccaltoun “first put the design (for Winter) into my
head.”83 Thomson envisions Cranstoun as a penseroso figure, “wandering, philosophical, and
pensive…while deep, divine Contemplation, the genius of the place, prompts each swelling
awfull thought.”84 Winter’s blank verse is less obviously georgic than other sections; though
optimistic, its tone is closer to Duck’s resignation than to Philips’s exuberant, convivial swains
and so may reflect a struggling artist’s uncertainty and homesickness.85 James Sambrook states
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that Winter “foreshadows Thomson’s later concern with political issues, but Winter as a whole is
mostly in keeping with its devotional conclusion. Its logic is summed up in one of its
invocations.” 86 Sambrook then quotes Thomson:
Nature! great Parent! whose directing Hand
Rolls round the Seasons of the changeful Year,
How mighty! how majestic are thy Works!
With what a pleasing Dread they swell the Soul,
That sees, astonish’d! and, astonish’d sings! (Winter, 106-110)
These lines evoke physico-theology’s faith in Creation’s benevolence signified by nature’s
“majestic” sublimity.87 A calm rationalization of winter’s value as a cleansing precursor to
nature’s bountiful renewal sets an optimistic tone that reached new heights in Thomson’s
subsequent writing of Summer, Spring, and Autumn. The completed cycle, fully revised and
published under subscription in 1730, runs from Spring to Winter and concludes with A Hymn.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, physico-theological texts deriving from the
natural law tradition of moral philosophy presumed to reconcile Christianity’s biblically
revealed, moral principles with knowledge derived from empiric, experimental, natural
philosophy. Stephen Gaukroger calls physico-theology an innovative, yet rear-guard formation
that responded to rising regard for English, philosophic heroes in Francis Bacon, John Locke,
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and Isaac Newton.88 Crucially for my argument, The Seasons recognizes physico-theology’s
distinction between Creation’s immutable laws and the imperfect knowledge systems describing
the natural phenomena determined by those laws. The difference is highlighted in comparing
God’s perfect, creative logos to humans’ limited abilities:
This infancy of being, cannot prove
The final issue of the works of God,
By boundless love and perfect wisdom formed,
And ever rising with the rising mind. (Summer, 1802-1804)
“Boundless love,” “perfect wisdom,” and “ever rising” signify the gap between the absolute
potency of the moral and physical laws produced by God’s will and the human incapacity to
comprehend, act, or create in full accord with those laws. “This infancy of being, cannot prove”
describes philosophy’s ignorance of the laws which give Creation its perfect, ineffable harmony.
Key to physico-theology, natural philosophy’s discoveries were thought to imperfectly
reach across the gap between empiric experience and moral laws by reading the former as proof
of the latter’s perfect, enduring righteousness. Colin MacLaurin (1698-1746), a Newtonian
professor at the University of Glasgow, stated that “natural philosophy, is subservient to
purposes of a higher kind, and is chiefly to be valued as it lays a sure foundation for natural
religion and moral philosophy, by leading us, in a satisfactory manner, to the knowledge of the
author and governor of the universe.”89 Thomas Burnet’s early example of physico-theology,
Telluris Theoria Sacra, attempted to reconcile contemporary geology with biblical history.
William Derham published his 1711 and 1712 Boyle Lectures as Physico-theology; or, A
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Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, from His Works of Creation (1713). He tells
readers that “nothing tended more to cultivate Religion and Piety in a Man’s Mind, than a
thorough Skill in Philosophy.90 H. Grant Sampson classifies a set of literary texts from the
eighteenth century which share such assumptions and methods as physico-theological epics.
Like contemporary georgics, “they are moral and didactic” and present observed patterns of
phenomena and bountiful, renewing resources as evidence of nature’s benevolent, ordering
principles.91 As an example, Alexander Pope’s An Essay on Man (1733-1734) urges, “Go,
wondrous creature! Mount where science guides.” Stating his goal to be “vindicat[ing] the ways
of God to man,” Pope accords with The Seasons by accepting Creation’s absolute righteousness
and assigning perceptions of disorder and evil to the limits of human reason.92 A 1743 letter
from Thomson to his beloved Elizabeth Young suggests that despite incomplete knowledge,
observers of nature can sense the perfect order which God instills in Creation:
But what ought to settle our Hearts into perfect Peace, and joyful Serenity, is, the
Consideration that Infinite Wisdom and Goodness, who made and rules all, does [and
deleted] cannot but do every Thing for the best. His Works are continually going on
from Excellence to Excellence, from Bliss to Bliss, and will thro’ eternal Ages ever be
disclosing new Scenes of inexhaustible Wisdom and Goodness. There is no real Evil in
the whole general System of Things; it is only our Ignorance that makes it appear so.93
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“Infinite Wisdom and Goodness, who made and rules all” insists that God invests his perfect
benevolence not only in natural laws, but also in physical laws and phenomena. Nature proves
its inherent morality by offering renewing bounties and rewarding communal, georgic industry
with prosperity. Though humans may be “astonish’d” and befuddled by empiric phenomena,
natural philosophy can reinforce the surmise that nature’s complexity and affordances depend on
a fixed system of orderly rules wrought by an omnipotent, benevolent God.
Autumn and Winter trust that laws regulate nature and admit the difficulty humans face
attempting to understand those laws. In Autumn, Thomson apostrophizes: “O Nature! Allsufficient! over all / Enrich me with the knowledge of thy works; … Show me; their motions,
periods, and their laws” (Autumn, 1352-1353; 1356-1357). Earlier, he describes the poem’s
broader, philosophical program:
…I solitary court
The inspiring breeze, and meditate the book
Of Nature, ever open, aiming thence
Warm from the heart to learn the moral song. (Autumn, 669-672)
Nature’s material, didactic book offers fragments of knowledge for refinement into more
complex, contingent theories. Thomson presumes that this practice, which Courtney Weiss
Smith calls empiricist devotion, instills moral sensibility even in those who simply contemplate
nature’s harmonious elements and thereby perform an alternative, georgic, intellectual labor.
Winter expands on this personal thought process, which first uses empiric knowledge to
extrapolate the existence of physical laws, before making an analogical leap to supreme, moral
laws:94
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Hence larger Prospects of the beauteous Whole
Would, gradual, open on our opening Minds;
And each diffusive Harmony unite,
In full Perfection, to th’ astonish’d Eye.
Then would we try to scan the moral World,
Which, tho’ to us it seems embroil’d, moves on
In higher Order; fitted, and impell’d
By WISDOM’s finest Hand, and issuing all
In general Good. (Winter, 579-587)
The “scan [of] the moral World” suggests that natural law’s contours can be discerned by
observing natural phenomena, while “WISDOM’s finest Hand,” which “issu[es] all / In general
Good,” grants those laws determinative power over nature’s physical laws. In Thomson’s
transition from phenomena to morality, the credulous impression of a theoretical “Whole”
compensates the limited utility of vision with a more vague and diffuse moral harmony
attributable to the Whole’s subjection to moral laws. Reflecting philosophy’s uncertainties,
“each diffusive Harmony unite” leans on an aesthetic ideal of holism to convey that moral laws
reconcile seemingly haphazard or disorderly phenomena.

2.3

The virtue of love
Rather than engaging in theological niceties or rigorous, moral philosophy, one of the

two ways the poem conveys the absolute, moral authority of natural laws is to present them as

distinction between the moral authority of fixed laws and the contingent, imperfect morality of transient
works. Courtney Weiss Smith, Empiricist Devotions: Science, Religion, and Poetry in Early EighteenthCentury England (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2017), 187-188.
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evocative, gnomic virtues. The Seasons principally describes its sense of nature’s consistent,
moral orderliness in terms of the world-infusing virtue of love. For example, “the soul of love is
sent abroad / Warm through the vital air, and on the heart / Harmonious seizes” (Spring, 582584).95 Moral laws precipitate God’s originary love throughout the poem’s georgic array of
mutable, material works. Thus, love operates in the poem as a subjective affect capable of
guiding perception and action as well as, more speculatively, an intrinsic quality instilled in
things by God which gives them purpose and order. That order depends on physical laws
reflecting and serving natural law. Looking ahead to Thomson’s second heuristic for
representing natural law, he often uses an allegorized version of love to liken morality’s juridical
authority to the world-shaping force of physical laws. Love supports the comparison by
presenting God’s love not only as the archetypal virtue, but also as the first principle dictating
Creation’s physical laws that regulate phenomena.96 The poem’s closing Hymn summarizes each
season; referring to God, it states that “Forth in the pleasing Spring / Thy beauty walks, thy
tenderness and love” (Hymn, 3-4). As we will see, the line recalls Shaftesbury’s idea that
spring’s characteristic creativity pleases us, because its harmonic beauty can be recognized as
indicating the galvanizing, moral beauty of God’s benevolence. It also echoes an earlier, more
majestic passage on the relation between ordering principles and empiricist devotions:
Hail, Source of Being! Universal Soul
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Of heaven and earth! Essential Presence, hail!
To thee I bend the knee; to thee my thoughts
Continual climb, who with a master-hand
Hast the great whole into perfection touched. (Spring, 556-560)
The Miltonic “Essential Presence” suggests that God’s “master-hand” infuses Creation with his
perfect, moral laws, which reiterates Thomson’s sense of God as the originary, georgic maker.
The gap between the humble subject’s climbing thought (“ever rising with the rising mind”) and
the infinite, eternal Source reinforces the omnipotence of God whose harmonizing “perfection”
can only be imperfectly manifested in isolated works of nature or humans. Since physicotheology must reconcile the limitations of natural philosophy with the certain existence of
Christianity’s moral norms, the robust trope of love betokens natural law’s righteous authority.
Even during Winter, the poem’s season of deformation, loss, and death, “Virtue sole survives-- /
Immortal, never failing friend of man, / His guide to happiness on high” (Winter, 1039-1041).
Love emblematizes the poem’s faith that God’s benevolence determines a natural order and, by
extension, the material goods which support creaturely life. Humans manifest and recirculate
love by performing virtuous actions that tend to improve the commonwealth.
God’s love funds an affective economy of pleasure in which people who do not directly
benefit from nature’s abundance may still appreciate that natural law’s moral consistency and
coherence transcend confusing, sometimes painful experience. Thomson claims that properly
contemplating Creation confers a calm, humbling gratification by affectively attuning subjects to
the existence of nature’s benevolent, moral order:
What is this mighty breath, ye curious, say,
That in a powerful language, felt, not heard,
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Instructs the fowls of heaven, and through their breast
These arts of love diffuses? What, but God?
Inspiring God! Who boundless spirit all
And unremitting energy, pervades,
Adjusts, sustains, and agitates the whole.
He ceaseless works alone, and yet alone
Seems not to work; with such perfection framed
Is this complex, stupendous scheme of things.
But, though concealed, to every pure eye
The informing Author in his works appears:
Chief, lovely Spring, in thee and thy soft scenes
The smiling God is seen—while water, earth,
And air attest his bounty, which exalts
The brute-creation to this finer thought,
And annual melts their undesigning hearts
Profusely thus in tenderness and joy. (Spring, 849-866)
The ineffably large and small scales of natural phenomena obstruct vision and intellection, which
means that nature’s intrinsic, absolute virtue must be intuited or extrapolated, and part of the
ideological work performed by Thomson’s poem is to rationalize the experiences of pain and
difficult work as serving natural law’s higher, benevolent ends.97 The example of birds shows

Kevis Goodman’s superb reading of The Seasons addresses the uses and limits of subjective
observation and natural philosophy. From the perspective of political economy (and the deformed record
of lost polities recycled by the earth), subjects register encounters with material history as an affective
disturbance. Dimly aware of the predation, exploitation, and violence mingled with civilization, history
requires aesthetic mediation, namely the work of many georgic poems, that depict civilizing labor as
beneficially mixed with or even an extension of natural forces. Analogizing history with natural
97
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even non-rational creatures taking pleasure in a sense of having been put in their right place by
the “informing Author.” Patricia Meyer Spacks’s observation that Thomson’s “Retreat from
Vision” in his later poem The Castle of Indolence (1748) bears on The Seasons, because, for lack
of rigorous understanding, morality is often perceived through sensibility and expressed through
personal industry.98 While moralizing labor and innovation remain central to the poem’s
argument, the idyllic, loco-descriptive scenes in which Thomson personally appears model a
comparatively passive, contemplative, mental activity. Humans may appreciate nature’s material
bounty, but the passage also indicates that God’s love may be pleasurably recognized in and as a
vague sense of ecological harmony which a familiarity with natural philosophy can deepen. By
contrast with effortful, enterprising virtue, a disinterested appreciation for the moral beauty of
nature’s harmony can demonstrate a person’s liberal benevolence and subjection to nature’s
benign jurisdiction.
The poem supports its use of virtuous love to analogize the link between abstruse, moral
laws with pleasurable experience by citing Shaftesbury, whose Characteristics of Men, Manners,
Opinions, Times (1711) Thomson ordered in 1737. Shaftesbury’s optimistic, moral philosophy
claimed that polite and sensible enjoyment of agreeable discourse and well-formed objects
reflects an instinctive, though educable experience of moral beauty. Thomson’s invocation of
Shaftesbury reinforces my point that the poem substitutes the harmonizing virtues of love and

philosophy, Goodman shows that Thomson adopted Locke’s claim that God limits humans’ senses in
order to suit them to productively interacting with their environment. Supposing that more powerful
eyesight, for example, would produce an unpleasant, debilitating overload of informational noise,
Thomson argues that the limits God sets on human knowledge demonstrate how God’s moral
benevolence comprehensively determines human experience. Goodman, Georgic Modernity and British
Romanticism, 3-9; 55-56.
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benevolence for explications of God’s moral laws.99 Thomson’s advice to appreciate lived
experience despite incompletely understanding that experience softens morality’s rigid, legalistic
force; love and optimism do the ideological work of attempting to console bereft individuals who
face pain, hardship, and loss with a dim sense that all things happen for reasons determined by
God. The pleasures of consensus and formal harmony derive from the intrinsic, moral beauty of
the concord and benevolence God “diffuses” into nature through its moral and physical laws.100
Aesthetic appreciation for people and things sparks affective warmth, greater sociability, and
ultimately leads to a more intricate and stable economy of love:
The generous Ashley thine, the friend of man,
Who scanned his nature with a brother’s eye,
His weakness prompt to shade, to raise his aim,
To touch the finer movements of the mind,
And with the moral beauty charm the heart. ( Summer, 1551-1555)
The “finer movements of the mind” let individuals express their latent sociability and neighborly
care through their actions. Love, nature’s highest virtue and the essence of natural law itself,
informs not only physical laws and nature’s fecundity, but also the moral beauty in acts and
works contributing to intellectual refinement, creativity, and social harmony. With respect to
Robert Inglesfield notes Shaftesbury’s influence on the poem’s argument that the contemplation of
nature elicits feelings of social sympathy and benevolence, which influence social exchange, selfimprovement, collective gain. People cultivate an internal moral harmony, which encourages them to
work toward bettering the socio-political order. Robert Inglesfield, “Thomson and Shaftesbury,” in
James Thomson: Essays for the Tercentenary, ed. Richard Terry (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press,
2000), 87. Shaftesbury’s essay An Inquiry Concerning Virtue “argued that goodness and virtue had real
foundations in the nature of the human self and in its relation to a morally designed universe and that
virtue was its own reward since its practice conduced to human happiness.” “Introduction,” in Anthony
Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, ed.
Lawrence E. Klein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), x.
100
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political economy, Shaftesbury’s ideal, virtuous politician possesses a disinterested, benevolent
desire for the public good. Such a politician mixes agreeable sociability, a disinterested desire
for the common good, and oversees the benefits of a Whig history in which agents can pursue
pleasure without fearing government oppression. Philip Connell sees the poem reinforcing its
Shaftesburian strain by emphatically embracing Newtonian physico-theology. Connell states,
“the whig principles of limited monarchy and ministerial government were increasingly
amenable to justification in terms derived from the language of popular Newtonianism.”101
Newton’s work had been embraced by and could seem to support the Hanoverian succession and
the Court Whigs, the latter from which Thomson increasingly tried to distance himself by
revisions that celebrated the virtue of long, aristocratic land tenures. Creation’s morality lacks a
positive, oppositional evil, but instead entails a slow, civilizing progress, which for Thomson
includes the advance of philosophical knowledge and the growth of prosperous, body politics
supported by inexact but nonetheless well-meaning statecraft.

2.4

Physical laws analogized with natural laws
The second heuristic Thomson uses to signify the absolute authority of nature’s moral

laws involves comparing their jurisdiction to the universal force of physical laws. Jonathan
Israel notes Newton’s assertion that gravity, one of The Seasons’ examples of a physical force,
and the laws of motion prove the existence of a “general providence” in which God’s constant,
compassionate, intervention keeps the universe from collapsing into chaos.102 The example of
gravity demonstrates that just as the poem is neither willing nor able to define moral laws, The
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Seasons also does not define physical laws. Instead, it indirectly affirms the power of physical
laws over phenomena by attaching figurative, political motifs to those laws. To avoid confusion,
though I argue that the poem presents politico-economic apparatuses as mutable, transient, and
imperfect, it uses the rhetoric of sovereignty to underline the moral distinction between those
apparatuses and natural law’s absolute and enduring jurisdiction. Physical laws’ causative
relation over phenomena also implies that physical and moral laws share a similarly immutable
power. While Spring emphasizes the moral principle of love by emphasizing various kinds of
intercourse, exchange, and creativity, Summer and Winter exemplify the force and even the
violence of physical laws which can deform and destroy transient things. Further, though spring
and fall are the planting and harvesting seasons, the complete, seasonal cycle signals the shift
from the Golden Age’s relative stasis and easy virtue into fluid time, history, and political and
socio-economic change.
Thomson uses political motifs like dominion, command, power, and violence to describe
the material effects caused by physical laws and so also, indirectly, moral laws. The heat and
light from the remote, sublime, and magisterial sun instantiates the world-shaping power of
physical laws. However, we should again note that Thomson explicitly attributes the sun’s
physical eminence to God’s moral design. The lines “O Sun! / Soul of surrounding worlds! In
whom best seen / Shines out thy Maker” repeat the soul motif which Spring also associated with
love (Summer, 94-96). Here, “soul” provides the metaphorical vehicle for the sun’s material
presence, because its enlivening powers more or less directly determine the form of all things.
The sun plays an able scion to its own Creator by not only superintending earthly developments
but also by stabilizing the solar system “with a chain indissoluble bound” (Summer, 98). In
terms of specific, physical laws, the sun’s “chain” represents the “secret, strong, attractive force”
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of gravity, the quintessential force, visible in its effects, that seemed to philosophers like Newton
and physico-theological poets like Thomson to prove God’s existence. While gravity literally
holds bodies in proximity, “attractive” also connotes God’s foundational love, which organizes
and harmonizes each new thing appearing on earth through fixed physical laws. Thus, “secret,
strong, attractive force” also seems to prefigure other causal, physical chains in which the sun’s
heat and light influence phenomena.
In an epic catalogue of precious stones103, Thomson imagines that “the unfruitful rock,
impregned by thee, / In dark retirement forms the lucid stone” via light’s penetration and
infusion of the earth (Summer, 140-141). At the time, natural philosophers pondered whether
minerals’ growth indicated shared organic characteristics with vegetative growth. The
mineralogy passage uses the central figure of the sun to expand the georgic mode’s topical range
into natural philosophy as well as socio-economics. Thomson poetically describes stones to
engage readers then seeks to deepen their appreciation with contextualizing reference to
Newtonian colorimetry; having preceded the catalogue with a claim for the benefits of mining,
wealth, and trade, the passage recasts pragmatic, commercial topics in the light of aesthetic,
disinterested appreciation for physical forces’ mysterious formation of material phenomena.
Though the passage instructs, it also frames the reader’s uncertainty in the face of the ineffable
complexity of both geology and commerce, which serves Thomson by inclining readers to adopt
his tranquil optimism regarding history’s progress.
The following apostrophe reinforces life’s dependence on the sun:
Informer of the planetary train!
Without whose quickening glance their cumbrous orbs

103

Thomson, Summer, 140-159.

74

Were brute, unlovely mass, inert and dead,
And not, as now, the green abodes of life!
How many forms of being wait on thee,
Inhaling spirit, from the unfettered mind,
By thee sublimed down to the daily race,
The mixing myriads of the setting beam! (Summer, 104-111)
Again, Thomson emphasizes the capacity of the sun’s heat and light to give form and beauty to
an otherwise chaotic mix of elements. Moreover, the following passage uses overtly political
language to characterize the sun:
The vegetable world is also thine,
Parent of Seasons! who the pomp precede
That waits thy throne, as though thy vast domain,
Annual, along the bright ecliptic road
In world-rejoicing state it moves sublime.
Meantime the expecting nations, circled gay
With all the various tribes of foodful earth,
Implore thy bounty, or send grateful up
A common hymn… (Summer, 112-120)
Thomson represents the sun’s manifestation of physical laws through heat and light as the
generosity of a benevolent despot while also conveying the world’s dependence on and
supplication to its power. Time and space blur as he reconfigures the successive year as the
“vast domain” upon which the sun enjoys a constant, imperious triumph. Elsewhere, Summer
portrays the death and destruction due to solar or human empire, but motifs of exchange and
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communion predominate here. Consistent with his extensive personification throughout the
poem, Thomson uses “nations” and “tribes” for most any category of living beings, which
emphasizes their common animation, transience, and dependence on the sun.104 The “gay” and
“grateful” beings also highlight the sun’s starring role in engineering the aforementioned
economy of pleasure. Indeed, “world-rejoicing state” serves as a concise vision statement for
righteous politico-economic institutions. The sun’s “state” trades on the physico-theological idea
and georgic aspiration of world order by fusing the images of an omnipotent, benevolent autocrat
with the material goods that proliferate due to the physical effects of the sun’s presence. In
short, the “boundless majesty” of the “powerful king of day” epitomizes the universal force of
physical and so also moral laws by enabling and regulating various, natural and nature-adjacent
economies (Summer, 87; 81).
Thomson’s fantasias on extreme temperatures develop his sun-as-benevolent-despot trope
by incorporating the sun’s capacity for violence alongside its generosity. The Seasons’ closing
Hymn indicates that the sun correlates with love and creativity in Spring and with material
bounty in Autumn. Whereas sunny growing and harvesting seasons seem to provide
straightforward evidence of a natural order based on God’s bountiful love, harsh, destructive
weather, as well as other catastrophic phenomena, might temporarily challenge his physiotheological optimism. At Summer’s start, spring gives way to the sun’s “hot dominion” where he
“mounts his throne” each morning to subject common Creation to its “All-conquering heat.”

Heather Keenleyside’s study of Thomson’s use of personification and other metaphorically enlivening
language makes the claim that his participles and descriptives blur persons and things. Keenleyside
argues that extensive personification “associate(s) the instability of persons or things with issues of
agency or animation.” Her work supports my own by highlighting the extent to which Thomson presents
all phenomena to be, in my terms, mutable, in flux, and part of contingently harmonic economies.
Moreover, and where my emphasis differs from Keenleyside’s, these commonalities distinguish the
mutability of personified things and multiply-determined, human subjects from the fixed, natural laws
that are the direct products of God’s love. Keenleyside, “Personification for the People,” 448.
104
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(Summer, 8; 639). The motif of the sun’s sovereignty over varied phenomena and places
signifies the consistency of physical laws which are themselves attributable to the higher order of
benevolent, moral laws. Thus, Thomson states that “far as the ranging eye / Can sweep, a
dazzling deluge reigns; and all / From pole to pole is undistinguished blaze” (Summer, 434-436).
Summer’s sun compels recognition of the power God exerts through nature’s physical forces:
…glory in the Summer-month,
With light and heat refulgent. Then thy sun
Shoots full perfection through the swelling year:
And oft thy voice in dreadful thunder speaks… (Hymn, 8-11)
In practice, “glory” can amount to punishing heat which withers plants, parches landscapes, and
forces those who can to seek shade.105 Though Thomson optimistically observes that the sun
lends Creation its own “perfection,” empiric experience shows that the lavish heat and light of
high summer in Britain can reach destructive extremes. While the heat may cause temporary
discomfort or even poor harvests for local farmers, Thomson invokes Africa to signify sublime,
even horrific excesses. Only the Nile can invigorate the “life-deserted sand” of the “joyless
desert” (Summer, 818; 819). Yet even then, the sun’s intensity strips African peoples of their
virtue, since fertile areas produce without effort and encourage luxury without discipline:
The parent Sun himself
Seems over this world of slaves to tyrannize…
Love dwells not there…
The very brute creation there
[The sun’s] rage partakes, and burns with horrid fire. (Summer, 890-898)
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Scenes of refuge from hot or cold weather often become for those so-sheltered compensatory
opportunities for contemplating the relationship between phenomena and nature’s ordering principles.
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Rather than signifying God’s neglect, absent Love here reflects a collective fault of Africa’s
inhabitants. Thomson seems to argue that, though they need not labor for their daily bread made
“wasteful” by its own excess, neither do they cultivate discipline or stem the corruption of their
moral sensibility by bending their labor toward any civilizing works. Despite and sometimes
even because of Africa’s overwhelming richness in resources, its nations fail to manage their
wealth through private industriousness or with the aid of wise government. Such misuse justifies
African wealth’s appropriation by nations more capable of exploiting its potential benefits. 106
Whereas summer’s heat benefits living things until it reaches challenging extremes,
Thomson defines Winter as the season of deformation, erasure, and uncertainty. The Seasons’
revisions of the 1726 Winter keep its somber tone and remind readers of mortality and
transience. More so than Summer, Winter foregrounds images of entropy to figure the georgic
themes of uncertainty and constant, needful remaking as characteristic of both natural and human
works.107 For Thomson, winter’s elemental chaos ultimately signifies the earth’s annual
repotentialization and the possibility of gradual, if inconsistent, socio-economic progress. On the
other hand, and more imminently, harsh weather threatens catastrophic losses which must be
endured with resignation and optimism.
Thomson represents winter’s landscape-deforming power a bit more diffusely by
focusing on the effects of meteorological conditions as opposed to directly attributing them to an
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emblematic, sovereign sun as Summer does. Ralph Cohen’s landmark study, The Unfolding of
the Seasons, identifies deformation, Winter’s central motif, as prerequisite to Spring’s renewal
and creativity.108 Above all, Thomson’s images of cold-induced congelation signify the
deformation and reversion of matter into a state susceptible to remaking and reuse. When “the
whitening shower descends” and snows blanket all things in a common “winter-robe of purest
white,” field labor ceases and animals only unwillingly venture out of shelter for food (Winter,
229; 233). Still, metaphors for political power persist and allude to physical laws’ authority in
scenes where phenomena are transformed into undiscernible wholes:
Nature’s King, who oft
Amid tempestuous darkness dwells alone,
And on the wings of the careening wind
Walks dreadfully serene, commands a calm;
Then straight air, sea, and earth are hushed at once. (Winter, 197-201)
The passage is organized around the motif of a sole patriarch capable of sovereign decisionmaking. By bringing together “air, sea, and earth” in euphonic stillness, it also exemplifies
Winter’s motifs of de- and reformation which often involve the merging, condensation, or
binding of previously more distinct phenomena or objects. Most obviously, condensation occurs
in the freezing of water into snow or ice, but as Thomson develops his weather imagery,
snowstorms cover landscapes, reduce the mobility and productivity of persons and things, and
produce a broad, visual uniformity that challenges analytic comprehension. The work of
physical laws during Winter figuratively underscores the gap between those laws and
interpretation of the phenomena they regulate.
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Though Thomson also describes winter storms in violent terms, the canto’s figures for
violence are often more subdued than in Summer. Instead, Thomson focuses on winter’s threats
to life as continuous with its threats to acts of interpretation and use. However, he also uses
Winter to show that its deformations and dangers are recuperated by dependable, seasonal cycles
of growth. Winter’s own exigencies can be hard to see past, which makes Thomson’s reassuring,
physico-theological poem all the more necessary for drawing people through the hard times to
the good ones he insists will follow. Here again, natural processes analogize politico-economic
cycles of decline which are recuperated in a general, science-driven trajectory of progress. He
observes that the cold seems to impose a general tranquility on all things despite describing
conditions which can easily become lethal for exposed, living beings. Thus, like extreme heat,
images of extreme cold summon the thought of common mortality and the transience of all
things.
The snow’s monochromatic unity becomes Winter’s main, visual metaphor for
deformation first in its effect of blurring earth and sky while falling and then in its ability to
smoothen and hide terrain. Whereas Thomson speaks of the summer sun’s rage and glory,
winter’s blizzards present a softer though no less oppressive violence. He signals this oppression
with motifs of restraint and bondage applicable to freezing weather. For example, “clouds, /
Slow-meeting, mingle into solid gloom” (Winter, 203-203). In its “capacious womb / A vapoury
deluge lies, to snow congealed” prior to the “gathered storm” (Winter, 225-226; 228). Running
waters are “by the breath of heaven / Cemented firm; till, seized from shore to shore, / The whole
imprisoned river growls below,” an image prefiguring the problem of carceral oppression which
he addresses elsewhere in the poem in terms of tyrannous state apparatuses (Winter, 729-731).
After a snowfall, Thomson emphasizes the landscape’s uniformity and inutility: “Earth’s
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universal face, deep-hid and chill, / Is one wild dazzling waste, that buries wide, / The works of
man” (Winter, 238-240). Though we might think of destructive violence in terms of the
rendering of a whole into parts, Winter also conveys violence as the merging of previously
fashioned, distinguishable parts into a weakly differentiated mass due to the power of nature’s
physical laws. Thomson insists that we view such troublesome masses as matrices which enable
future growth. Again, he uses nature’s work to figure the potential for georgic remaking which
underwrites his physico-theological optimism.
Thomson uses winter, perhaps the least characteristically georgic season, to represent the
conventionally georgic themes of uncertainty, transience, and mutability in order to direct our
attention to the moral priority of natural laws over our own flawed perceptions and plans.
Though these themes are present in Virgil’s Georgics, The Seasons repurposes them in part to
advance public conversability in natural philosophy, though at the very least to provoke wonder
and admiration for nature’s physical laws within the poem’s physico-theological context. The
Hymn reminds us that Winter’s snowscapes imply that subjection to nature’s laws will always
supersede understanding them. He addresses the “varied God” in nature to frame an
incomprehensible magnitude:
In Winter awful thou! with clouds and storms
Around thee thrown, tempest o’er tempest rolled,
Majestic darkness! On the whirlwind’s wing
Riding sublime, thou bidst the world adore,
And humblest nature with the northern blast. (Hymn, 16-20)
This précis of winter highlights matter’s violent and tempestuous mixing rather than the resulting
“trackless plain” or “formless wild,” but “awful,” “darkness,” and “sublime” underline the
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poverty of our comprehension in the face of nature’s physical power (Winter, 281; 283). The
ensuing parable of the frozen man expresses the poem’s broader physico-theological reasoning
with regards to ineffable nature. In short, a blizzard entraps a swain travelling home from work.
It renders his surroundings increasing unfamiliar, slows his pace, and ultimately incorporates him
into the landscape by freezing him to death, a “bleaching” and “stiffened corse” (Winter, 321,
320). Summer contains an analogous parable in which lightning suddenly and seemingly
purposelessly yields an innocent maiden into a “blackened corse” while her lover’s “marble”
astonishment mimics her immobility (Summer, 1216; 1220). Both stories didactically present
faith in the higher, all-reconciling order of natural law as the resolution to stories that foreground
uncertainty and loss. Particularly in the frozen man’s story, physical nature poses itself as an
intractable enigma whose incomprehensibility is replicated by the reader’s desire to reconcile the
man’s apparently arbitrary death with a satisfying, natural order. The story upholds classic,
georgic values, including accepting uncertainty, subjecting one’s self to nature’s fixed laws, and
recognizing, in contrast with those laws, the transience of all earthly things as one struggles to
exploit them through one’s labor. The following sections demonstrate that Thomson leverages
the georgic theme of remaking to recuperate and capitalize on mutability and transience. Having
seen that the deformations caused by winter constitute a dependable prelude to the warmer
seasons, Thomson presents the imperfection of philosophical knowledge and refinable
technologies as justifications for their gradual progress and exploitation in the service of natural
laws. Similarly, because state apparatuses are also the work of human artifice, they too are
susceptible to improvement, a process which Thomson describes in terms of matching their
operations to the moral ideals established by great, classical politicians.
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2.5

Human labor and technological progress
Natural law’s consistency alleviates Winter’s seemingly bleak chaos by assuring readers

that all things adhere to a well-regulated order. Spring must follow winter, but within the context
of Winter itself the mutability and instability of phenomena represented by snowscapes also
signify restored potential and opportunity for improvement. Thomson revalues mutability with
reference to three domains whose respective susceptibilities to remaking give him grounds for
optimism: seasonal cycles and recurring bounties, labor and technological progress, and
statecraft. I have dealt with the first of these above in terms of nature’s de- and reformations.
Snow refashions the landscape into what Thomson repeatedly refers to as “waste,” by which he
means potentially arable land that is presently uncultivated. Winter frames the wisdom in
recognizing that snow-covered fields imply the possibility of future crops and bespeaks largely
stable growing, human-assisted cycles. In this and the following subsection, I take up the second
and third of these domains which reinforce the poem’s position distinguishing the weaker moral
authority of states and state apparatuses from the true and absolute moral authority of nature’s
laws.
Regarding the second domain of labor and technological progress, Thomson signals the
potential for innovation by analogizing the annual, creative work of Nature’s Hand with not only
the manual but also the intellectual labor of humans. He builds on the georgic’s convention of
framing itself as an emblematic work of intellectual labor capable of bearing a didactic message
proclaiming the value of intellectual labor in general. Poetry promotes natural philosophy by
aestheticizing and disseminating its ideas to cultivate its audience’s appreciation for and interest
in science’s potential benefits. In this case the georgic uses physico-theology to promote and
limn the moral value of natural philosophy: “Tutored by thee, hence Poetry exalts / Her voice to
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ages; and informs the page / With music, image, sentiment, and thought” (Summer, 1753-1755).
Thomson closes Summer by celebrating philosophy’s value as a tool for the mutual development
of technology and the public good: “With thee, serene Philosophy, with thee, / And thy bright
garland, let me crown my song!” (Summer, 1730-1731). Even more explicitly, philosophy “The
height of science and virtue gains” (Summer, 1741). He then asserts the practical benefits of
philosophy with a few elementary examples of technological progress:
Without thee, what were unenlightened man?
A savage, roaming through the woods and wilds
In quest of prey; and with the unfashioned fur
Rough-clad; devoid of every finer art
And elegance of life. Nor happiness
Domestic, mixed of tenderness and care,
Nor moral excellence, nor social bliss,
Nor guardian law were his; nor various skill
To turn the furrow, or to guide the tool
Mechanic; nor the heaven-conducted prow
Of Navigation bold, that fearless braves
The burning line or dares the wintry pole,
Mother severe of infinite delights. (Summer, 1758-1772)
Of note, Thomson places positive, “guardian law” between the list of moral virtues and the list of
technical, instrument-mediated practices whose presentation in terms of their lack (“nor”) almost
suggests that they wait in the wings to be called forth by human creativity. I will shortly address
positive laws and statecraft at greater length, but here Thomson presents them as a security
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system which removes people from the state of nature and opens to them civilizing society’s
potential, material benefits. Plowing nods to the poem’s georgic heritage while the prow is an
insistently forward-looking and imperializing image which connotes economic growth and the
expansion of territory, markets, and political power. Though the poem elsewhere admits some
ambivalence toward Britain’s militaristic empire, its description of celestial navigation
optimistically connotes that innovation and commerce aid a general trajectory of world-historical
progress.
The accumulating fruits of manual and intellectual labor are emphasized in another, far
more elaborate, though again allegorical genealogy of technological innovation. Instead of
“serene Philosophy,” the more virtue-tinged theme of Industry organizes the following passages:
These are thy blessings, Industry, rough power!
Whom labour still attends, and sweat and pain;
Yet the kind source of every gentle art
And all the soft civility of life … (Autumn, 43-64)
“Industry” enfolds the ideas that labor can express personal virtue and that it contributes to the
public good by accumulating wealth and transforming modes of production. Thomson’s allegory
again begins with a dire state of nature wherein humanity’s capacity for industry remains
unavailing without the state’s security apparatuses. Nature forecasts the gifts humans give
themselves through their hard work; natural laws oblige industry in part by confronting humans
with material challenges such as scarcity to initially compel survival-driven, human labor and
which gradually inculcates an appreciation for the moral and material benefits of creative,
manual and intellectual efforts. Thomson stresses human labor’s world-transforming potential
by expounding on the unpleasantness of the state of nature:
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Raiser of human kind! by Nature cast
Naked and helpless out amid the woods
And wilds to rude inclement elements;
With various seeds of art deep in the mind
Implanted, and profusely poured around
Materials infinite; but idle all,
Still unexerted, in the unconscious breast
Slept the lethargic powers:
….
and thus his days
Rolled heavy, dark, and unenjoyed along—
A waste of time! till Industry approached,
And roused him from his miserable sloth;
His faculties unfolded; pointed out
Where lavish Nature the directing hand
Of Art demanded… (Autumn, 47-54; 70-76)
The passage continues to destabilize the distinction between natural phenomena which prefigure
and prompt human labor and that labor’s creative, yet artificial productions. Whereas
personification figures nature as capable of artifice and technological creativity, “seeds of art
deep in the mind / Implanted” uses agricultural language to paint humans, themselves having
been “cast” like seed, as an extension of nature (Autumn, 50-51; 47). Though Thomson
correlates natural and human works based on their common transience and mutability, only
humans (and God) truly possess the potential for innovation and the ability to significantly alter

86

the conditions of their own, collective existence. Industry, as positive laws and agriculture had
done in the previous passage, divides the period Thomson describes as “waste,” a spatiallyinflected term denoting untapped potential, from the period when humans can substantively
change their socio-economic forms of life. By contrasting industry with “sloth,” Thomson
emphasizes that humans’ considered, intentional labor “unfold[s]” latent skills and apparatuses
the innate virtues of which are proven by their ability to increase quality of life.
In the passage’s following lines, Thomson most clearly argues his politico-economic
vision of a fruitful, orderly community. He first lists an emblematic series of early, technological
innovations beginning with “chip[ping] the wood, and hew[ing] the stone” (Autumn, 82).
“[G]lossy silk” and “the generous glass” precede civilizing societies “advancing bolder…to
pomp, to pleasure, elegance, grace” (Autumn, 86; 88; 91-92). Following these signifiers of “high
ambition” via creative artifice, Thomson devotes a stanza to the emergence of the “public,”
meaning a legislated body politic, then “Society,” meaning civic life, and then “Commerce”
(Autumn, 97; 113; 118). This allegorical chronology imagines adequate, positive laws, here
idealized as “holy guardian laws,” to be a precondition for the socio-economic health attested to
by urban growth and modern commodities (Autumn, 101).109

In a third example of civilizational progress, Thomson admires Peter the Great’s ability to make
statecraft secondary and subservient to the modernity and prosperity of Russia’s economy:
…behold the matchless prince!
Who left his native throne, where reigned till then
A mighty shadow of unreal power;
Who greatly spurned the slothful pomp of courts;
And roaming every land, in every port
His sceptre laid aside, with glorious hand
Unwearied plying the mechanic tool,
Gathered the seeds of trade, of useful arts,
Of civil wisdom, and of martial skill. (Winter, 963-971)
Thomson freely diagnoses the illegitimacy of the Russian state, which had become “unreal” by devolving
into tyranny and “slothful” corruption, a potential dislocated critique of Court Whigs. Peter models the
benefits not only of governments prioritizing domestic commerce, but also of Britain’s maritime
imperialism. He embodies in his person the state’s capacity to use its resources and institutions to
109
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2.6

Statecraft
Within the third domain of statecraft, the Season’s broad scope for mutable works

includes socio-political entities and institutions such as the state, its governmental regime, and
state apparatuses. Thomson’s georgic theme of mutability applies to these entities insofar as
they vary in their ability to serve their function of supporting the public good and can be
perpetually remade and refined. The poem proposes that a state composed of state apparatuses
and institutions can serve a moral function by meshing with and supporting its body politic’s
material and moral commonwealth. For example, the questions of what positive laws can and
should do overlap with the problem intrinsic to natural law of knowing how best to fulfill moral
obligations. A gap will necessarily exist between natural law’s ideals and state apparatuses’
ability to facilitate a body politic’s fulfillment of those ideals. This gap potentially impairs
states’ moral authority. In theory, states whose institutions allow tyranny or despoil their
subjects become illegitimate and, according to Locke, may be dissolved and reformed.110 In
practice, though, many factors, environmental and otherwise, can help or harm a body politic,
The Seasons shows that weak institutions can lead to insupportable conditions that invite civil
war, revolution, rioting, and other forms of social turmoil. Conversely, Thomson cites Britain as

facilitate the importation of foreign, raw goods, techniques, and technologies. Given its foundation of a
uniquely stable, liberty-vaunting, mixed government, Britain flourishes and satisfies natural laws by
absorbing the best, global affordances which are otherwise not being optimized, as in the case of Africa’s
seemingly wasted wealth.
110
There is therefore, secondly, another way whereby governments are dissolved, and that is, when the
legislative, or the prince, either of them, act contrary to their trust:
First, the legislative acts against the trust reposed in them, when they endeavour to invade the
property of the subject, and to make themselves, or any part of the community, masters, or
arbitrary disposers of the lives, liberties, or fortunes of the people. John Locke, Two Treatises of
Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003),
II.xix.226.
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an example showing that reasonable laws and an industrious, thriving polity mutually reinforce
each other. Thomson alludes to this agreeable, contemporary condition in his allegorical
example when, laws having “Unit(ed) all, / Society grew numerous, high, polite, / And happy”
(Autumn, 111-113).

Thomson predicates a body politic’s economic vitality and long-term viability on the
ability of state apparatuses to function to proper, moral effect. Instead of presenting a
philosophical theory of the state, The Seasons invokes moral ideals which state apparatuses
should aspire to embody. Winter’s harsh weather inclines him to the indoor work of
contemplating these ideals in light of classical philosopher-politicians who seem to originate and
emblematize them. Some, like “happy, mild, and firm” Timoleon, model personal virtues, but
others like “Just” Aristides typify moral ideals to be enshrined in positive laws. 111 Summer
compares English “statesmen” and “patriots” to their Greek and Roman progenitors (Summer,
1487-1488). Solon is the most important Greek in this series of parallel lives which conceives
Britain’s mixed government to be the modern champion of republican ideals:
Solon the next, who built his commonweal
On equity’s wide base; by tender laws
A lively people curbing; yet undamped
Preserving still that quick, peculiar fire,
Whence in the laurelled field of finer arts,
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The poverty or incorruptibility of Cimon, Agis, Fabricius, and Cincinnatus show that moderation and
personal economy befit politicians. The emphasis condemns Robert Walpole’s self-dealing, Whig
administration from the perspective of an opposing faction of dutiful, patriotic Country Whigs.
Moreover, though Thomson expresses a measure of pride in Britain’s global sphere of influence,
Timoleon, for example, defended Greek liberty against the encroachments of the Persian Empire.
Elsewhere in the poem Thomson exhibits anxiety regarding the violence Britain exports around the world
in the form of warfare and slavery.
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And of bold freedom, they unequalled shone,
The pride of smiling Greece and human-kind. (Winter, 446-452)
Looking ahead to a comparable Roman we see “Servius, the king who laid the solid base / On
which o’er the earth the vast republic spread” (Winter, 504-505). In both cases, Thomson
presents moral laws as the foundation or “wide base” for a flourishing body politic. Values such
as justice frame states’ proper functions of protecting its subjects from various injuries; the
“equity” of such laws unify and help direct the creative energies of a free people who share the
material benefits of their collective, philosophic and commercial collaboration. The “finer arts”
signify the multiple forms of culture-refining, intellectual work which ornament leisure and
luxury while “laurelled” again points back to poetry, an emblematic art which reflexively
promotes the value of such intellectual work. In this respect, poems such as The Seasons are not
state apparatuses, yet they do serve as political instruments for being able to reflect on the
universal ideals and specific socio-political and socio-economic conditions. The Seasons
critiques state-sanctioned institutions, but these are largely overwhelmed by Thomson’s
assurances to his readers that the country’s enlightened industry and centers of knowledge
production indicate happy prospects for the future of “Britannia’s weal” (Spring, 930).
Again, Thomson’s account of positive laws enmeshes the state’s securitizing apparatuses
and the economy in part by asserting that morally deficient laws which fail to protect common
interests destabilize a body politic while well-crafted, well-enforced laws can promote
innovation and prosperity. Thomson’s admiration for incorruptible Greeks acknowledges the
threats of venality and expropriation, essentially two forms of state-sponsored thievery, as
hallmarks of tyrannous government. His repeated phrase “guardian laws” in Summer and
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Autumn indicates the paramount function of positive laws to protect persons and property. A
stanza acclaiming British liberty identifies property rights as a fundamental object of laws:
Happy Britannia! where the Queen of Arts,
Inspiring vigour, Liberty, abroad
Walks unconfined even to thy farthest cots,
And scatters plenty with unsparing hand.
….
Thy country teems with wealth;
And Property assures it to the swain,
Pleased and unwearied in his guarded toil. (Summer, 1442-1445; 1454-1456)
The poem invokes liberty and freedom in a variety of figurative, ecological contexts112, but this
passage’s politico-economic context clearly argues that common prosperity depends on legally
securing private property from unjust and arbitrary appropriation. Thus, “guarded toil” echoes
the essential function and purpose of “guardian laws.” Laws guard property by protecting both
the negative right of a freedom from injury in one’s property and the positive right of freedom to
make use of one’s property according to one’s will. The latter, positive right ensures individuals
can enjoy rewards derived from their own industry; freedom of property facilitates its
commercial circulation and distribution. “Teems” connotes that, beyond immediate, personal
consumption, goods fed into markets may yield greater benefits for society through their
circulation and redistribution rather than simply being wasted in satisfying the vices of oligarchs.
Liberty is one of the poem’s many flexible words for drawing associations among
ecological and political economies. Thomson uses a variety of natural phenomena such as birds,
For example, “By Nature’s swift and secret-working hand, / The garden glows, and fills the liberal air /
With lavish fragrance” (Spring, 97-99).
112

91

bees, rivers, and wind to figure liberty and freely circulating things such as the contrapuntal
images of people and goods passing into and through cities. These economic flows are the
desired outcome of the “guardian laws” formed by the “patriot-council” who “by thousands
drew, / From twining woody haunts…aspiring sons” to the city to merge their works in “the
general good” (Autumn, 101; 99; 115-117; 97). Autumn’s stanza on commerce cites the “groves
of masts” on the Thames to signify economic flows and exchanges that yield the “busy
merchant” and the “big warehouse” (Autumn, 124; 119). States which adequately protect their
subjects’ economic interests with laws girding natural property rights and preventing corruption
are rewarded with happy and prosperous populaces.

2.7

State apparatuses and the life spans of polities
Thomson reinforces the notion that governments are complex, imperfect, but improvable

political technologies by providing examples of nations that lived and died on the strength of
their state apparatuses. The slow advance of civilization through technological progress involves
contributions from innumerable societies that have completed their own life cycles. Continuing
the passage quoted earlier on the progress of the “general Good,” Thomson predicates polities’
sustainability on the moral quality of their political institutions:
The sage Historic Muse
Should next conduct us thro’ the Deeps of Time:
Show us how Empire grew, declin’d, and fell,
In scatter’d States; what makes the Nations smile,
Improves their soil, and gives them double Suns;
And why they pine beneath the brightest Skies,
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In Nature’s richest Lap. (Winter, 587-509)
The Seasons adapts the opening lines of Virgil’s Georgics announcing his theme to be the
agricultural techniques and technologies which enable collective prosperity.113 Thomson takes a
wider view of the intellectual work which causes modern polities to enjoy liberty and wealth.
The sun, sky, and soil imply the informed, efficient use of natural resources, but the poem’s
references to empires here and elsewhere reiterate that their socio-economic stability depend on
the moral quality of their statecraft. Thomson claims Rome’s decline to have begun when its
dictatorial phase displaced its republican values and institutions. He offers ambivalent
admiration for the “awful virtue” displayed by Brutus in defending the nation against caesarism
(Winter, 525).

Closer to home Thomson reflects on British, socio-political institutions both stabilizing
and faulty. He diffuses disapproval of Prime Minister Robert Walpole and the Court Whig party
throughout the poem. For example, Tim Fulford notes that later editions of the poem added
dedications to anti-Walpolean statesmen like George Bubb Dodington (1691-1762). The poem
leverages the georgics’ conventional reverence for land and property rights into a partisan
preference for long-established, landholding families over persons raised by commercial success
which constitutes a tension with his poem’s more progressive inclinations.114 He represents his
own patrons as disinterested, uncorruptible stewards of the nation’s land. Indeed, their
improvement, aesthetic or practical, of their estates and their employment of tenants demonstrate
their competence for statecraft. John Barrell notes that The Seasons’ implicit political economy
continued the ennobling of republican, civic humanism which in Thomson’s time was based on

“What tickles the corn to laugh out loud, and by what star / to steer the plough, and how to train the
vine to elms, / Good management of flocks and herds…” Virgil, Georgics, trans. Peter Fallon (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006), 1-2.
114
Fulford, Landscape, Liberty and Authority, 29-31.
113
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aristocratic virtue and right to rule on land ownership, a topic which I take up in my fourth
chapter on landscaping: “The owner of fixed property, even when conscious (according to some
theorists) of consulting only his own interests, would also necessarily be consulting the true, the
permanent interests of the country in which his family had a permanent stake.” 115 Owning an
estate justifies proprietors holding state offices which allow them to shape laws capable of
protecting land, virtue, and the nation’s economic prospects.
Thomson reserves his strongest criticism for Britain’s slavery and jail systems, which
exemplify tyrannous state apparatuses in need of reform. Slavery being the grosser outrage,
these immoral institutions both hold people in bondage and so, as Locke would say, injure their
natural rights to liberty. Whereas Spring couches the concept of slavery in images of caged birds
“by tyrant man / Inhuman caught,” Summer’s slave ships, which draw the “direful shark” by
their gruesome, “rank” conditions, are meant to scandalize and elicit sympathy from the reader
(Spring, 703-704; Summer, 1015; 1016).116 Thomson paints the shark as nature’s avenging tool
when it in “one death involves / Tyrants and slaves” on the Middle Passage (Summer, 10221023; 1017).
The jail reform passage’s closing lines underscore my argument that Thomson presents
positive laws as political technologies that vary in their adherence to natural law’s absolute,
moral authority:
…in this rank age,
Much is the patriot’s weeding hand required.
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John Barrell, The Birth of Pandora and the Division of Knowledge (Houndmills, Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1992), 51.
116
Fulford expresses skepticism at Thomson’s pathetic scenes. He uses the example of Winter’s frozen
man to argue that Thomson exploits images of suffering less to inspire empathy and social change than to
recommend reliance on benevolent social systems and Providence. Fulford, Landscape, Liberty and
Authority, 26-27.
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The toils of law—what dark insidious men
Have cumbrous added to perplex the truth
And lengthen simple justice into trade—
How glorious were the day that saw these broke,
And every man within the reach of right! (Winter, 382-388)
The first two lines use the conceit of the farmer-politician to portray the state, the purported
sanctuary of moral “truth,” as an inadequately maintained and overgrown plot. The “cumbrous”
laws imply chains consistent with the passage’s bondage theme. Preceding lines establish that
the carceral apparatus exemplifies injustice and immorality by describing its imposition by “little
tyrants.” State officials who unjustly steal from, torture, and kill the imprisoned show the “land
of liberty” to be a distant ideal due to its present oppression of its citizens (Winter, 367; 365).
Thomson indicates that Britain’s jail system is tarnished by, among other outrages, permitting
the use of arbitrary force in punishments. Like slavery, jails mistreat individuals by committing
immoral, disproportionate injuries against their persons not only by means of inordinate prison
terms, but in the use of corporal punishment and other tortures. Though Britain’s government
and the intellectual and commercial industry of its people remain sources of pride for Thomson,
motifs of tyranny, oppression, burdens, and bondage signify misguided state apparatuses which
fail by far to meet natural law’s standards and weaken the state’s moral legitimacy.
Thomson’s politico-economic ideas must be understood within a physico-theological
context that finds the poem less interested in specific state apparatuses than in the need for a
variety of interweaving, human and non-human economies to operate in accord with nature’s
moral laws. Such economies exemplify various contributors to socio-economic order
irrespective of states’ political powers. The study of natural phenomena by natural philosophers
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also thickens our understanding of moral philosophy, the field of thought from which political
economy developed, and so also our understanding of the proper ends of state apparatuses.
Moreover, natural philosophy enables innovation in the largely private, socio-economic sphere
the security of which eighteenth-century political economists increasingly identified as the
primary object of positive laws. The state protects industry and commerce by ensuring that its
own apparatuses aspire to immutable, moral ideals like justice and all-important liberty,
necessities for collective prosperity. The Seasons also represents state institutions and positive
law as only imperfectly capable of embodying economy-adjacent, moral ideals and cites
historical polities that failed partly due to inadequately moral statecraft. Ultimately, The Seasons
denies states the possibility of having absolute, moral authority while granting, even anticipating,
the perpetual refinement of their apparatuses. Beyond protecting property rights and other,
vaguer liberties, Thomson gives few impressions of what state apparatuses should look like and
instead offers counterexamples which figure tyranny. Yet emphasizing positive laws’
securitizing function and tying them to the community’s economic health opens the door for
expanding state powers in the name of the public good. This chapter has thus read Thomson as
anticipating political economists in the following decades who also found in ostensibly natural
systems justifications for economic liberalism. They too viewed the state to be subservient to the
national economy but therefore also required the state to expand its power by developing new
apparatuses responsive to and capable of subtly influencing an increasingly complex socioeconomic order.
My next chapter reads texts by François Quesnay and Adam Smith, two early political
economists whose respective thought exhibit varying degrees of materialism by arguing that the
operations of a society’s economic system precede and determine the form of its government.
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Quesnay attempts to reconcile his transhistorical, sociological model of agricultural production
and circulation with French monarchical absolutism. Smith writes in part to correct Quesnay and
to advance political economy as a historically sensitive subsystem for studying government
within his larger, comprehensive project on moral philosophy. Though he argues that specific
state apparatuses emerge in response to concomitant modes of subsistence, he agrees with
Quesnay in justifying a state whose securitizing and economy-supporting functions entail not
only its continuous refinement, but also its expanded potential for subjectivizing a body politic.
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Chapter 3
3

Repetition and Difference: Adam Smith’s Historicizing Revision of
François Quesnay’s Political Economy

3.1

Economic Laws and political economy
James Thomson’s The Seasons decentered the georgic mode’s focus on agriculture in

favor of alternative forms of labor such as the work of natural philosophy. Natural philosophy’s
study of nature helps society understand and instrumentalize nature, the latter achieved in part by
developing new means for controlling and harvesting nature’s goods. The Seasons presents
technical and technological innovation as almost natural extensions of nature’s own creative
potential. Yet the poem also conceals the role of state apparatuses that support and direct
individuals who may otherwise seem autonomously productive, creative, and self-organizing.
This chapter on the intellectual history of political economy informs my larger discussion of
representations of the state and statecraft in British georgic poetry. Foundational treatises on
political economy by François Quesnay, the founder of the first, economic science known as
Physiocracy, and Adam Smith (1723-1790) show that Smith rejected Quesnay’s earlier argument
that a nation’s economic health solely depends on its consistency with an ideal, timeless,
economic model. Smith’s revisions of Quesnay’s core, economic concepts guided his own
historical analysis of economic development. I argue that while Smith retained Quesnay’s point
that a state must expand and refine its power in order to support its national economy, his
reinterpretations of Quesnay’s theories of wealth creation and of the division of labor caused
Smith both to redefine the origins of state apparatuses and to justify their indirect, though still
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great influence over the socio-economic lives and liberties of its subjects.117 Unpacking this
claim requires an initial understanding of one area of agreement and one area of disagreement
between the authors.
Both writers depicted social systems in which a socio-economic base gives rise to a
superstructural government capable of and obliged to support the base’s economic productivity.
That is, a responsible state serves its body politic in part by overseeing material prosperity by
means of various state apparatuses. A key distinction between Quesnay and Smith bears on their
ideas about the sources of modern nations’ wealth and that wealth’s relation to innovations in
subsistence modes and statecraft.118 For Quesnay, fixed natural laws prescribe an agriculturebased, free market economy that must be governed by a centralized, absolutist regime called
legal despotism. David McNally argues that in Quesnay’s political economy, “the fundamental
precondition of stable economic reproduction…is that the state establish social arrangements
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To review some relevant terms, I use state to refer to a sovereign, political entity holding a monopoly
on violence and whose political power enables it to determine its nation’s form of government.
Government refers to types of regimes such as monarchies and republics in which state power is invested.
The activity of government is statecraft. Through statecraft, governments create and control a variety of
state apparatuses through which states exert their political power to influence the behaviors of their
subjects. I also refer to the whole government itself as a state apparatus or sometimes as a piece of
political technology. I use polity and body politic interchangeably to describe an independent, sociopolitical population while the idea of the nation fuses population and government into a single entity. My
discussion almost solely addresses Althuserrian ideological state apparatuses, (rather than repressive state
apparatuses) which influence subjects’ behavior without immediate recourse to state-sanctioned violence.
The state apparatuses that I most frequently refer to in this chapter include positive laws, physical
infrastructure, and public education systems. Louis Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism:
Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, trans. G. M. Goshgarian (New York: Verso, 2014), 75-77.
118
Though Quesnay and Smith are both sensitive to economic history, except where noted, my
discussions of their analyses and recommendations for state apparatuses address a European modernity
largely characterized by international commerce, which allows nations to avoid relying solely on food
produced internally. My discussion of stadialism below further explains modernity as a function of
subsistence modes. Moreover, with regard to Smith in particular, the georgic poems I discuss participate
in a self-consciously modern, nationalist, and progressivist discourse in which the British state enshrines
the liberty which enables private innovation and economic prosperity.
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which specifically favour a capitalist organization of agriculture.”119 Quesnay attributed modern,
socio-economic stability to a natural and immutable social composition of three groups defined
by their types of labor. He believed that only harvesting the earth creates wealth, and he
distinguished productive farmers from the other two groups whom he deemed sterile nonproducers.120 The first sterile group comprised artisans who merely altered goods and merchants
who aided economic circulation. The second sterile group were landowners who collected rents
and filled bureaucratic roles. Fundamentally, Quesnay described a fixed division of labor
without naming it as such. By contrast, Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations redefined wealth creation to include manufacturing and trade.121 Expanded
opportunities for wealth production effected his revision of the division of labor, which he
understood to be an open-ended process of technical and technological122 innovation capable of
gradually changing a nation’s mode of subsistence, its primary sources of wealth, and enabled
more flexibility in government. In short, Quesnay’s division of labor secures a largely
unchanging socio-economic order, whereas Smith’s division of labor enables complex,
synergistic forms of politico-economic growth and innovation. Not only did Smith surpass
Quesnay’s narrow, economic analysis, but he tried to make his political economy accountable to
a wider and more historically-informed range of human experience.

119

David McNally, Political Economy and the Rise of Capitalism: A Reinterpretation (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1988), 120.
120
Quesnay considered mining and other forms of resource extraction to also be productive but also that
their returns were negligible compared to agriculture.
121
Where Wealth of Nations addresses the history of political economy, his only other, published work,
The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) argues that interpersonal sympathy influences our theories of
justice and morality. Hereafter, WN and TMS.
122
I use technical to describe practices whereas technological describes apparatuses that enable or support
practices.
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The arguments of Smith and Quesnay are important to my study of British georgics for
asserting that socio-economic stability and the potential for progress derive from apparently
natural, self-interested processes of production and circulation, an assertion which georgics like
The Seasons and Darwin’s Temple of Nature reiterate by describing ecological and physiological
economies. Smith and Quesnay influentially regarded the economy as an autonomous domain of
social practice which governments support rather than exploit as part of their stewardship of their
nations’ collective interests.
For some initial context on Smith’s relationship with Quesnay, Smith traveled in France
during the 1760s, met leading philosophes and politicians, and was so impressed by Quesnay’s
innovative theories as to intend WN’s dedication for him. Most importantly, WN’s Book IV,
Chapter IX, “Of the agricultural Systems, or of those Systems of political Oeconomy, which
represent the Produce of Land, as either the sole or the principal Source of the Revenue and
Wealth of every Country,” describes and responds to Quesnay’s economic analysis. Quesnay’s
influence on Smith has been noted in work by Donald Winch, Istvan Hont, Tony Aspromorgous,
and Laurent Dobuzinskis, but, with some notable exceptions, their work mainly focuses on
Smith’s revisions of Quesnay’s economic analysis rather than on those revisions’ effect on
Smith’s correlative revisions of political economy.123 Donald Winch reads Smith as a
For example, Donald Winch and Laurent Dobuzinskis both address Smith’s development of Quesnay’s
belief in the variable productivity of different forms of labor. Donald Winch, Riches and Poverty: An
intellectual history of political economy in Britain, 1750-1834 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), 78; Laurent Dobunzinskis, “Adam Smith and French Political Economy: Parallels and
Differences,” in Propriety and Prosperity: New Studies on the Philosophy of Adam Smith, eds. David F.
Hardwick and Leslie Marsh (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 60-61; 64-65. Tony
Aspromorgous observes a similarity in Quesnay’s and Smith’s theories of wealth. “The key substantive
point in relation to the conceptualization of political economy is that Quesnay, like Smith, centres the new
economic science on the growth of ‘wealth’ in the sense of the flow of annual or national product.”
Though Aspromorgous questions whether Quesnay or even Smith have left behind mercantilism or
whether Smith is truly liberal, he highlights the increased significance which Quesnay and then Smith
attribute to circulation, or more precisely velocity, as a factor in producing wealth. Tony Aspromourgos,
The Science of Wealth: Adam Smith and the framing of political economy (London: Routledge, 2009), 41.
123
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continuation of Lockean “liberal individualism” and argues that Smith’s theories on morality and
jurisprudence cohere with Smith’s other writings:
As the upholder of a system of natural liberty within which individuals possess certain
natural rights and pursue selfish ends of an economic character, Smith occupies a crucial
role in this tradition. He is the first major economic spokesman for an emerging capitalist
order within which a distinctive set of economic or property relationships – mediated by
impersonal market mechanisms – was becoming firmly established.124
The phrase “emerging capitalist order” includes the state apparatuses that enable and stabilize the
socio-economic order by securing “economic or property relationship(s)” and which I explicate
below. In Jealousy of Trade, Hont makes the useful point that Smith followed Quesnay in
thinking that national economies benefit from state-regulated, free trade, but then went beyond
Quesnay to argue that long-term, urban-driven prosperity led to the expansion of liberty in
Europe. Hont emphasizes that Smith imagined that “[a]n ill-considered economic reform in
favor of restructuring European agriculture could damage not only the urban economy but with it
Europe’s hard-earned liberty as well.”125 I expand on Hont’s point by showing, for example, that
in Smith’s political economy property rights do not derive from timeless natural law, as John
Locke and Quesnay believed, but instead are historically contingent, state apparatuses which
only come into being as positive laws when prerequisite levels of economic progress are reached.
Therefore, I also follow scholarship addressing Smith’s analysis of governments
developing new state apparatuses in response to shifting, stadial conditions.126 For example, in

Donald Winch, Adam Smith’s Politics: An Essay in Historiographic Revision (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1978), 13-14.
125
Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical
Perspective (Cambridge: Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 2005), 109.
126
Following the appearance of the Glasgow Edition of Smith’s works in 1976, Ronald Meek published
an essay emphasizing Smith’s stadial theory of history that leaned toward economic determinism and
124
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Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy: A Historical and Contemporary Perspective on Markets, Law,
Ethics, and Culture Jerry Evensky says, “in the opening pages of the WN, Smith is making
explicit that essential connection in his simultaneous, evolving system: the constitution of social
and political institutions, the progress of opulence, and the human prospect are
interdependent.”127 Smith’s key concept of the progress of opulence refers to gradual, socioeconomic developments and even stadial shifts caused by the division of labor’s accumulating,
positive, economic effects. Evensky highlights Smith’s belief that analyzing historical examples
of waxing and waning nations illuminates trends that show predictable, cooperative development
between nations’ economies and their governments. Smith’s revisions of Quesnay’s theories
regarding wealth creation and divisions of labor led him to justify an ostensibly more liberal
government than Quesnay’s legal despotism. However, Smith’s revisions also led him to reason
that governments must support economic development by crafting new, more complex and
powerful apparatuses to nominally expand liberty and free enterprise, but which also increase the
state’s influence over the body politic.128

Meek’s own materialist historiography. Notably, the concepts of property and property laws have no
operative meaning or use prior to a culture’s development of pasturage. Ronald L. Meek, Smith, Marx, &
After: Ten Essays in the Development of Economic Thought (London: Chapman & Hall, 1977), 18-32.
Frank Palmeri usefully reviews European precedents for the Scottish Enlightenment’s reception of stadial
theory in Frank Palmeri, State of Nature, Stages of Society: Enlightenment Conjectural History and
Modern Social Discourse (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 27-58.
127
Jerry Evensky, Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy: A Historical and Contemporary Perspective on
Markets, Law, Ethics, and Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 112.
128
As my Introduction mentioned, my thinking on the relation between the progress of opulence and the
open-ended expansion and refinement of state apparatuses has been informed by the work of Michael
Dillon. In his elaboration of Walter Benjamin’ theory of sovereignty, he argues that the world presents
itself to sovereigns as an infinite number of finite things which require an infinitely large and interminable
effort of government to prevent their entropic descent into disorder. In our slightly modified terms,
political economists recognize the existence of the world’s various, material economies as capable of
being instrumentalized by humans’ commercial economy. While liberal states must avoid direct, socioeconomic regulation, Quesnay’s and especially Smith’s require that modern, liberal governments create
and continuously refine state apparatuses in order to administer and optimize the commercial economy.
Doing so reflects the state’s need to continuously expand its power and influence to answer the challenge
posed by the simple existence of infinite, not-yet-optimized, thingly resources including humans.
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I begin discussing Quesnay by contextualizing his analytical method with reference to his
medical training. I refer to his most famous text, the Tableau économique to present his key,
economic theories and to set up a reading of Le Despotisme de la Chine, a text which presents
China as the nearest, historical expression of his model of political economy. Quesnay’s
political economy, unlike Smith’s, devalued entrepreneurial innovation, while promoting
stability via personal industriousness and, above all, encouraging the productive, agricultural
sector. Le Despotisme de la Chine shows that Quesnay’s prescriptive, economic principles
which seemed to disclose natural laws also seemed to justify legal despotism’s paternalist
statecraft. The text’s examples of Chinese statecraft demonstrate the characteristic inflexibility
of Quesnay’s political economy in which the attributed nature of wealth creation and the division
of labor do not drive progress but instead predetermine subjects’ functions within a fixed socioeconomic order. His laudatory analysis of China’s bureaucracy, its infrastructure, and its public
education system help frame the similarities and differences between Quesnay’s and Smith’s
approaches to modern statecraft. Specifically, each author favors state apparatuses oriented
toward economic liberalism, but Smith’s economic analysis justifies a far more open-ended
statecraft that allows states’ more sophisticated means for influencing subjects’ lives.
I then argue that Smith’s revisions of Quesnay’s political economy led him to propose
that governments develop positive laws and other state apparatuses concurrently with the
progress of opulence while rejecting Quesnay’s statecraft based on his narrower, economic
analysis of natural law. However, Smith and Quesnay agreed on several socio-economic or
economy-adjacent domains which modern governments should indirectly regulate. Therefore, a

Michael Dillon, Biopolitics of Security: A political analytic of finitude (New York: Routledge, 2015) 616.
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study of Smith’s revisions of Quesnay’s economic theories followed by an analysis of those
revisions’ effects on Smith’s theory of statecraft show him favoring greater regulatory creep
within purportedly liberal governments. I start by defining key economic concepts in WN that
differ from their precursors in Quesnay’s economic model. First, WN rejects Quesnay’s claim
that only farmers harvesting land produce wealth; instead, it argues that the labor of artisans and
merchants can also increase the value of wealth and thereby have greater influence on a nation’s
prosperity.129 Second, I show that Smith’s definition of the division of labor offers new and
alternative ways for nations to produce wealth, which underscores my main distinction between
Quesnay’s fixed socio-economic order and Smith’s open-ended version.130 Smith’s division of
labor also justified expanded state administration by problematizing laborers as complicated
agents rather than fungible parts of a timeless socio-economic order. Workers seemed more
complicated not only due to their more dynamic labor, but also for being susceptible to the
division of labor’s unintended, negative effects; these effects include injuries to workers’
rationality through enforced deskilling or weakening their socialization-based, moral sympathy.
Unintended consequences were important to Smith, because while entrepreneurs divide labor to
increase profits, the cumulative effects of individuals attempting to improve their stock can also
unintentionally transform broad economic and political conditions. Thus, the progress of
opulence and the expansion of liberty-securing state apparatuses seemed to proceed as
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Both Quesnay and Smith hold essentially materialist perspectives on wealth, but we will see that
Smith’s labor-command theory of value shifts away from Quesnay’s simpler belief that wealth’s value is
a simple reflection of material quantities and towards the belief that value is determined by its cost of
production itself measured as in labors hours standardized against the cost of corn. Laurent
Dobunzinskis, “Adam Smith and French Political Economy,” 64-65.
130
This distinction is replicated between more conventional British georgics such as John Dyer’s The
Fleece which focuses on a single, rural industry and more innovative georgics like Thomson’s The
Seasons, which directly cites the intellectual labor of natural philosophy for supporting new,
technological means for instrumentalizing nature.
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predictable, but unintended consequences of the division of labor. Having shown that the
division of labor and the progress of opulence epitomize the historical sensitivity of Smith’s
economic analysis, I conclude by showing that these revisions color his understanding of
infrastructure and education, two public works previewed in Le Despotisme de la Chine. Such
state apparatuses compensate for the open-ended, unintended consequences of the progress of
opulence.
These contemporary, politico-economic texts which reduce the significance of states to
support systems for national economies reflect and justify British georgics’ own tendency to
disregard all but the most flagrantly oppressive example of statecraft and state apparatuses in
these poems’ otherwise wide range of topics. Georgics valorize capable, skillful agents who
remain blurrily responsible to and influenced by various physical and moral systems beyond the
scope of human comprehension. Both georgics and economically liberal political economy
ultimately obfuscate state apparatuses’ influence on the socio-economic order.131 We may even
say that georgics aspire to see the world like the modern, liberal state recommended by Smith,
since georgics encourage their publics to perceive human and non-human economies to be freely,
creatively mingling rather than frame this complexity as a carefully administered liberty.
Quesnay’s and Smith’s political economies addressed how nations can protect subjects’ liberties,
foster their industry and virtue, and help them and their communities prosper. In sum, reading
politico-economic texts illuminates poets’ direct or indirect participation in debates regarding

The discovery of economic analysis and the economy’s eventual disembedding concurrent with the
rise of political and economic liberalism tended to marginalize the influence of the state and disavow its
extensive, regulatory functions. As Bernard Harcourt states, “the naturalness of the market depoliticizes
the distributional outcomes…” and “[t]he idea of natural order, in effect, masks the state’s role…”
Bernard E. Harcourt, The Illusion of Markets: Punishment and the Myth of Natural Order (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2012), 32. For disembedding as the subjection of all social, cultural, and
political systems to market rationality, see Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and
Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 75.
131
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statecraft; meanwhile, georgics remind us that much of the useful, economic innovation and
liberties praised by WN depend on understanding and engaging with the broader, ecological
systems that the poems exuberantly represent.

3.2

Quesnay’s agrarian economy and his vision of Chinese statecraft
I begin with Quesnay’s economic analysis, because its revision in WN forms Smith’s

basis for his own theories of statecraft. Quesnay paved the way for Smith’s more elastic and
historically-informed political economy by introducing the first, holistic model of economic
production and circulation in his famous Tableau économique. A brief review of the Tableau’s
concepts of wealth production and the division of labor will demonstrate the key point that
Quesnay, and to a lesser extent Smith, believed that economic theory illuminates natural law and
so also determines the socio-economic order and the functions of government. Further, many
scholars have noted a core contradiction in Physiocracy, essentially a tension in Quesnay’s
attempt to use a truly avant-garde, if misguided theory of liberal economics as a basis for a
feudal socio-political system.132 To put it another way, Quesnay’s political ideology of
centralized paternalism is incompatible with and drags on the potentially progressive, dynamic
aspects of his liberal, economic policy.

For example, Elizabeth Fox-Genovese’s major study observes that Quesnay’s economic liberalism was
incompatible with his feudal, socio-political structure, because the former insisted on individualism and
the pursuit of self-interest while the latter’s system of rights and obligations restrained individual desires
by prioritizing the collective’s specific organization and perpetuation. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, The
Origins of Physiocracy: Economic Revolution and Social Order in Eighteenth-Century France (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1976), 57; 244.
132
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I advance criticism on Quesnay by tying together three threads in the scholarship: the
ability of materialist133, economic analysis to express fixed, natural laws; the requisite, triadic
division of labor that defines the socio-economic order; and specific examples of state
apparatuses. These three threads showcase the prescriptive rigidity of Quesnay’s political
economy as a foundation for my ensuing discussion of Smith’s more flexible, nuanced
version.134 I place particular emphasis on the point, largely neglected by scholars, that
Quesnay’s social triad informed Smith’s own, crucial theory of the division of labor and its
subsequent importance in his theory of statecraft. For Quesnay, natural laws defined the fixed
division of labor and so also the specific state apparatuses that promote industrious workers, free
trade, and the socio-economic order’s reproduction. Then, Le Despotisme de la Chine
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Here I mean that Quesnay thinks of economies both commercial and ecological in physical terms. It is
also the case, as I mentioned earlier, that Quesnay understands the socio-economic order (base) to precede
and determine a society’s government (superstructure).
134
Margaret Schabas and Lorraine Daston have been crucial for my understanding of the relation between
eighteenth-century economic analysis and natural law. Schabas’s work describes how early, economic
theorists including the Physiocrats understood economic production and circulation in physical,
materialist terms as opposed to the abstract, numerical models in current use among economists.
Analyses like Quesnay’s were often developed by association with other, ecological systems that natural
philosophers contemporaneously explored with new fervor and depth. Physiocracy especially
demonstrates how such interpretations could derive apparent lessons from natural economies that seemed
to justify socio-economic homeostasis. Margaret Schabas, The Natural Origins of Economics (Chicago:
Chicago University Press, 2005), 2-4. Lorraine Daston’s work addresses the point made in my last
chapter that the study of physical nature by natural philosophers could produce physical laws of nature
that could successively inform moral philosophers’ knowledge of moral, natural laws. Daston observes
that jurisprudential language migrated from Roman and ecclesiastical, canon law to provide a grammar
for organizing knowledge of the order discovered in physical systems which manifested the moral order
of the universe. Lorraine Daston and Michael Stolleis, “Introduction: Nature, Law and Natural Law in
Early Modern Europe,” in Natural Law and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Europe: Jurisprudence,
Theology, Moral and Natural Philosophy, eds. Lorraine Daston and Michael Stolleis (Burlington:
Ashgate, 20080, 2-3, 12. Regarding the socio-economic order, Liana Vardi has produced the most
complete and informative account of the intersecting and at times conflicting philosophical contexts that
led Quesnay to mix relatively conservative, ancien régime political philosophy with an innovative,
economic science that arrived at an abstract, circulation model from materialist, agrarian premises. Liana
Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2012).
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exemplifies the proper, state apparatuses of legal despotism, a regime justified by the natural
laws disclosed by the Tableau’s economic analysis.
Quesnay’s thought both borrows and departs from contemporary ideas about economic
topics and political philosophy. As my Introduction discussed, eighteenth-century French
political economy operated on mercantilist principles. Mercantilists generally thought that a
state should support its nation’s commonwealth by means of domestic interventions such as price
regulation and international protectionism in order to amass material wealth, ideally in precious
metals, in the zero-sum balance of international trade.135 Direct government regulation of the
national economy comported with French political philosophy which, as McNally points out,
recognized the nation as the king’s household.136 Before Quesnay, Jean Bodin’s Six livres de la
république (1576) and Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet’s Politique tirée de l'Écriture sainte (1709) had
both influentially defended royal absolutism. Nominal restraints of the crown by councilors, by
the 13 parlements137, and by the Church did not fuel the same politico-philosophical reckoning
as had England’s mixed government in terms of rights, obligations, and checks and balances.
Seventeenth-century France’s overlapping legacies of mercantilism and monarchical absolutism
led to decades of government interventions in the national economy that regularly produced food
crises and would lead to the scapegoating of Finance Minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert (16191683). Colbert’s many successful policies would nevertheless be decried as excessively
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For a recent account of the complex and often conflicting ideas grouped under the name mercantilism,
see Lars Magnusson, The Political Economy of Mercantilism (London: Routledge, 2015).
136
Referring to Quesnay description of the Tableau a book of household accounts, McNally states that
“[w]ith this expression, Quesnay indicates that, for all his analytic innovations, his enterprise remains
curiously within the traditional discourse of political economy which conceptualized the economy from
the standpoint of—and as an extension of—the royal household.” McNally, Political Economy and the
Rise of Capitalism, 115-116.
137
Provincial courts possessing the right to remonstrate against the king’s decrees.
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protectionist by Quesnay and others favoring comparatively laissez-faire policies.138
Additionally, Bourbon monarchs entered several wars which they supported by the short-sighted,
venal selling of inheritable, annuity-bearing offices and thus monstrously expanded the national
debt. Lewis Gwynne observes that the crown eventually sold away much of its political
power.139 Quesnay feared that these activities fed limited, partisan interests and hurt the
commonwealth; unenlightened kings, tax-farmers, and licensed, corporate monopolies
collectively choked the net produit140 and state revenues. Quesnay sought to mitigate these
prosperity-sapping practices by prioritizing free, domestic and international circulation of goods
over balance of trade, which would additionally weaken the balance of trade’s legitimization of
expensive, colony-protecting wars.141
Quesnay’s initial success as a physician led him to eventually head an influential group
known either as the Économistes or the Physiocrats (meaning rule of nature) who shared his
politico-economic beliefs. Living at Versailles as the king’s physician, he was a favorite of
Louis XV’s mistress, Madame de Pompadour and convinced other influential nobles and
administrators to spread and implement his ideas. One of his closest adherents, Victor de
Riqueti, marquis de Mirabeau (1715-1789) promoted physiocratic ideas in the popular L'ami des
hommes : ou, Traité de la population (1759). Perhaps most notably, Anne Robert Jacques
Turgot (1727-1781) became Controller-General of Finances from 1774 to 1776 and was able to
partially deregulate the grain trade before a series of bad harvests and criticism from Ferdinando
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Max Beer, An Inquiry into Physiocracy (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1966), 39-45.
Gwynne, Lewis, France 1715-1804: Power and the People (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2004), 15.
140
Essentially the net, domestic product, the exact, annual reproduction of which crucially enables the
reproduction of the socio-economic order. Its perfect reproduction is one of the primary objects of
Quesnay’s political economy.
141
Istvan Hont uses the term jealousy of trade to describe the mercantilist pursuit of national self-interest
via international, zero-sum commercial competition as a continuation of war by other means. Hont,
Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective, 5-6.
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Galiani (1728-1787) and the statesman Jacques Necker (1732-1804) effectively ended popular
engagement with physiocratic thought. In addition to the Tableau, Quesnay left several texts
attempting to explain his economic and socio-political theories, including four articles written for
the Encyclopédie.
His article “Evidence” usefully demonstrates that not only physiocratic, political
economy’s materialism but also its holism and inflexibility derived in part from Quesnay’s
medical training. “Evidence” reflects a fundamentally Lockean epistemology; for example, it
distinguishes objective, primary qualities from subjective, secondary qualities as Locke defines
them in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.142 “Evidence” rejects entirely deductive,
system-based thought in favor of a mix of Lockean empiricism and educated hypothesizing,
though Smith nevertheless criticized Quesnay as a dogmatic “man of system.”143 Quesnay’s
background in iatrophysical medicine guided his wish to minimize the use of analogy and
imagination for understanding any set of complex, enmeshed systems; it informed his general
research method, which proposed that measurable, empiric experiments should enable the
theorization of larger systems susceptible to abstraction, numerical modelling, and ultimately
predictability and fixed principles.144 Empiric study should then also be capable of arriving at a
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John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1975), II.viii.9-10.
143
“The man of system, on the contrary, is apt to be very wise in his own conceit; and is often so
enamoured with the supposed beauty of his ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer the smallest
deviation from any part of it. He goes on to establish it completely and in all its parts, without any regard
either to the great interests, or to the strong prejudices which may oppose it.” Adam Smith, The Theory of
Moral Sentiments, eds. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1984), VI.ii.2.17.
Deborah Redman observes that Locke’s “historical, plain method” for implementing political economy
derives its empiricism-based pragmatism from his own background in medicine. Deborah Redman, The
Rise of Political Economy as a Science: Methodology and the Classical Economists (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1997), 67.
144
Iatrophyical medicine understood physiology in mechanical, physics-based terms. “L'évidence résulte
nécessairement de l'observation intime de nos propres sensations…Ainsi j'entens par évidence, une
certitude à laquelle il nous est aussi impossible de nous refuser, qu'il nous est impossible d'ignorer nos
sensations actuelles.” (Evidence necessarily results from the close observation of our own
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holistic, political economy that, like a human body, reacts with reasonable predictability to
regulative interventions ranging from slight and corrective to injuriously heavy-handed.
Supporting my view that “Evidence” validates the connection between Quesnay’s medical
training and his political economy, Jessica Rifkin, Margaret Schabas, and Liana Vardi each note
that Quesnay’s materialist conception of bodily health determined his emphasis on the
(re)production and circulation of wealth through the body politic. For example, Schabas states
that “[h]is discernment of the circulation of goods between three sectors—the landowners, the
artisans, and the farmers—was directly inspired by his knowledge of human physiology.”145
“Evidence” ultimately argues for translating empiric information into operable knowledge of
nature and its physical laws, a method extensible to economic analysis and policy-making. The
article’s empiric epistemology grounded in his medical training helps us see that later texts like
the Tableau and Le Despotisme de la Chine would rely on methods described in “Evidence” to
elevate to the status of natural law their claims regarding wealth’s physicality, the socioeconomic triad, and the necessity of legal despotism.
Following methods described in “Evidence,” Quesnay presented his innovative,
economic theories in three, increasingly annotated editions of his Tableau économique; the text’s

sensations…Thus I mean by evidence, a certain which is as impossible for us to refuse as it is to ignore
our immediate sensations.) “EVIDENCE,” in Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des
arts et des métiers, etc., eds. Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert eds. Robert Morrissey and
Glenn Roe (University of Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie Project (Autumn 2017 Edition)),
http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/. Regarding the Tableau, Philippe Steiner calls Quesnay’s extrapolation
from bits of hard evidence to an ideal, national system “quantitative empiricism.” Philippe Steiner,
“Physiocracy and French Pre-Classical Political Economy,” in A Companion to the History of Economic
Thought, eds. Warren J. Samuels, Jeff E. Biddle, and John B. Davis (Malden: Blackwell, 2003), 68. Vardi
notes the importance for Quesnay and for Enlightenment political economists more broadly to discover
regularities in socio-economic systems that allow governments to eliminate uncertainty and chance when
implementing policies. Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment, 57.
145
Margaret Schabas, The Natural Origins of Economics, 46-47. Jessica Riskin “The ‘Spirit of System’
and the Fortunes of Physiocracy,” in Oeconomies in the Age of Newton, ed. Margaret Schabas and Neil
De Marchi (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 43; Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the
Enlightenment, 29-39.
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centerpiece, zig-zagging chart represents the annual circulation of France’s wealth through the
social triad. Despite its notorious complexity, he insisted that any reasonable person studying his
ideas would reach an epiphany, discover their self-evidentiary truth, and acknowledge
Physiocracy as the expression of natural laws. According to Yves Charbit, the chart mixed the
empirical and the ideal:
On the one hand, in keeping with his contemporaries' enthusiasm for agriculture, and like
the thinkers of the agronomic school, he bases his analysis on solid empirical evidence
supplied by a network of correspondents. On the other hand, the diagram of the Tableau
économique contains purely theoretical numbers, which purport to illustrate the annual
flows of exchanges between social groups.146
In addition to explaining farming’s reproduction of wealth and the socio-economic triad, the text
insists on certain, progressive policies perhaps the most crucial of which was the need for free
trade among French counties and ideally with other nations. While the idea of free trade did not
originate with Physiocracy, Quesnay and Smith gave it firmer theoretical ground than it had had
from less systematic, mercantilist thinkers.147 In Quesnay’s opinion, free trade ensured that
grain, the most vital commodity, would approach the bon prix, a point of equilibrium reflecting
the balanced interests of buyers and sellers and thus the grain’s true value. Ideally grain would
be both abundant and maintain a high enough price that people would be fed, and enough money

Yves Charbit and Arundhati Virmani, “The Political Failure of an Economic Theory: Physiocracy,”
Population 57, no. 6 (2002): 862.
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For example, Terence Hutchison highlights Charles Davenant (1656-1714) as an early economic
theorist who advocated domestic, free trade and even prefigured Adam Smith’s argument that a nation
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would eventually circulate back to the farmers for them to afford the next year’s supplies.148
Free trade would also prevent individuals from hoarding grain during low-price periods, allow
surpluses to be sold to grain-poor regions, and generally discourage selling practices that might
have immediate, self-serving benefits but would have cascading, negative consequences for
farmers’ supplies of money and seed in following years. The Tableau’s progressive, free-market
model of domestic circulation nevertheless betrays its conservative tendencies, because this
system, attributed to fixed, natural laws, works to annually reproduce the socio-economic triad
by also reproducing the same amount of consumable resources year to year. In addition to
Quesnay’s almost fanatically conservative fixation on land as not only the source of wealth but
also of political power, we should note that he presented even the progressive aspects of his
economic analysis as natural laws which justify his fundamentally conservative argument for
maintaining the socio-economic order and absolutist government.
Quesnay’s innovative, circulatory model originates in his conservative theories of wealth
production and labor’s division into the three socio-economic groups.149 Given that each group
must consume a fixed amount of resources to reproduce itself, Quesnay claimed that only
nature’s productive powers can replace consumed wealth. His Encyclopédie article “Fermiers”
defines the productive group:
[Fermiers] sont ceux qui afferment & font valoir les biens des campagnes, & qui
procurent les richesses & les ressources les plus essentielles pour le soûtien de l'état ;
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Foucault provides an example of Physiocracy proposing a new state apparatus in the form of a law
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ainsi l'emploi du fermier est un objet très-important dans le royaume, & mérite une
grande attention de la part-du gouvernement. 150
([Farmers] are those who lease and make yield the goods of the fields and who procure
the most essential riches and resources for the support of the state; thus, the farmer’s
employment is a very important subject in the kingdom and deserves much of the
government’s attention.)
However, Physiocracy gave multiple reasons for proscribing improvements to farmers’ financial
situations. Most importantly, farmers must turn over the entire net produit to the landowners
from whom they rent land. One of the Tableau’s objects was ensuring that each year’s optimal,
net produit reaches landowners who can then guide adequate avances annuelles (annual costs)
back into the farmer’s hands at the beginning of the circulatory process. Additionally, Quesnay
accounted for France’s middling agricultural output, aimed for exact reproduction, and largely
ignored potential increases in efficiency or production arising from technological innovation.151
A glimpse at the sterile group of artisans and merchants underscores how Quesnay’s
definition of wealth creation justified his fixed, labor-based socio-economic order. Quesnay
insisted that applying labor to pre-existing resources does not increase their value regardless of
time or effort spent. He thus implied that, strictly understood, labor neither creates wealth nor
adds value, though it can cause the earth to produce wealth in greater quantities. Yet artisans and
merchants remain necessary, because artisans furnish the means of production while merchants

“Fermiers,” in Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, etc., eds.
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who circulate goods enable markets to achieve the bon prix. However, due in part to their
proximity to luxury goods and merchants’ tendency to impede the economy by hoarding,
overcharging, and otherwise bleeding the net produit, Quesnay considered them to be a
persistent threat to the economy’s smooth operation.
Quesnay argued that natural laws disclosed by his economic analysis justify sterile
landowners’ economic and political powers. By assigning his economic theories the status of
natural laws, he gave a new, enlightened sheen to an ultimately conservative respect for
landownership concomitant with ancien régime feudalism. Fox-Genovese makes a similar point
by asserting that Physiocracy posed itself as a unitary, social science, but was ultimately
grounded in Quesnay’s respect for private property.152 His economic justifications laundered a
feudal ideology granting a landowning aristocracy perpetual right to rule. He asserted that
proprietors retain absolute power over both the net produit and state offices, because their
families had provided the avances primitives, the initial, financial outlays, which allowed farms
to be established in the first place. As sole owners of France’s capital, proprietors bear almost
the whole tax burden and initiate the yearly reproduction cycle by redistributing the avances
annuelles to the other two groups. Quesnay’s outsize esteem for the ruling class is exemplified
by the simple fact that the avances primitives, no matter their size, cannot countenance absolute
and permanent control over their capital and the entire net produit of others’ labor. His desire to
maintain a traditional, aristocratic class that uniquely enjoys a variety of material luxuries and
political privileges is a symptom of his politico-economic conservatism.
Recognizing the importance Quesnay attributed to property rights as an aspect of land
ownership brings us closer to understanding the determinative relationship between his
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innovative, economic analysis and his preference for legal despotism as a positive, political
support system for natural law. Though Quesnay’s opinion of land ownership diverged from
Locke’s labor theory of property, Quesnay shared Locke’s belief that exclusionary property
rights are a key natural right deriving from and serving the natural law that societies should
prosper.153 Physiocracy fulfills natural law by encouraging the optimal exploitation of stock
which means that, as Catherine Larrère summarizes in L'Invention de l'économie au XVIIIe
siècle: du droit naturel à la physiocratie, states must secure landowners’ property rights as a
prerequisite to individuals pursuing their economic self-interest.154 Property rights permit
owners the free and rational use of their wealth which the Tableau conveniently models. Given
that state apparatuses must secure the rights necessary for economic production and distribution,
they also must avoid impeding these flows by, for example, fixing prices and thereby meddling
with the bon prix and net produit. Again, on one hand, Quesnay’s economic analysis defended
progressive, even liberalist positions such as free trade and strong property rights. On the other
hand, these natural rights belong solely to an economically and politically empowered minority
whose high social standing derived from a feudal social order which Quesnay refashioned as
enlightened Physiocracy. He wrote Le Despotisme de la Chine as proof of physiocratic, political
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with respect to their possessions. Locke’s labor theory of property asserts that mixing one’s labor with
unclaimed resources appropriates and grants one property rights to those resources irrespective of the preexistence of a social contract.
154
“L’optimisation de la jouissance se réalise dans la relation qui situe l’individu dans l’ordre naturel, qui
est relation, d’intérêt commun, entre l’un et le tout ; le droit naturel, droit à la jouissance, s’y développe et
s’y renforce sous la forme de la propriété… Mais, en se faisant de la sorte science de la jouissance, la
physiocratie entretient un rapport problématique avec l’objectif politique de la modernité, la sûreté.” (The
optimization of pleasure occurs in the relation which locates the individual in the natural order, in the
relation of the common interest between the one and the whole; the natural right, the right to pleasure,
develops and strengthens in the form of property… But in making itself a kind of science of pleasure,
Physiocracy maintains a problematic relation with the political goal of modernity, security.) Catherine
Larrère, L'Invention de l'économie au XVIIIe siècle : du droit naturel à la physiocratie (Paris : Presses
Universitaires de France, 1992), 13.

117

economy’s real-world viability and to provide specific examples of statecraft carrying out legal
despotism with reasonable accuracy. The durability and continuity of China’s agrarian economy
and absolutist government seemed to him to validate his claim that his economic analysis had
indeed disclosed natural laws which China had implemented through its state-sanctioned system
of moral philosophy.
My study of Le Despotisme de la Chine benefits from recent, critical interest in the text
as an example of non-European influence on Enlightenment thought.155 My claim that the text
usefully demonstrates a homeostatic, socio-economic order sustained by legal despotism is
supported by Stefan Jacobsen Gaarsmand’s observation that “Quesnay’s Chinese ideal contained
an economic equilibrium that secures the stability of agricultural production as well as a
perpetual and stable order of government.”156 My analysis differs from scholars who focus on
Quesnay’s uncertain absorption of Eastern ideas by instead using Le Despotisme de la Chine to
identify specific state apparatuses required to stabilize the socio-economic order based on a fixed
division of labor and ordained by natural laws.157 Though Quesnay participates in a wider
European process of orientalization, and though he invokes China in the service of his own
arguments, he demonstrates a largely tolerant understanding of Chinese political economy by
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accommodating and accepting Confucianism as an alternative moral philosophy capable of
cultivating proper, socio-economic order.
Quesnay published Le Despotisme de la Chine in Ephémérides du citoyen (1767–72,
1774–76), a physiocratic journal Joseph A. Schumpeter deems both “the first genuine history of
economics” and filled with propaganda.158 Despotisme recalls other statecraft manuals such as
Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy (1531) and François Fenelon’s Les aventures de Télémaque
(1699), which use history and legend to convey political philosophy and policies. Quesnay’s text
relied on often second-hand reports by Christian missionaries to produce a synthetic, quasihistorical account of Chinese political economy. He can be critical of his sources, speculating on
the conditions, limitations, and prejudices that would cause missionaries and merchants to
produce uncharitable accounts. Quesnay devotes many pages to correcting Montesquieu (16891755) whose writing, according to Hyobom B. Pak, symptomatized increasing Sinophobia in the
European Enlightenment and not only “misrepresented the philosophical foundations of Chinese
government, but also conveniently selected many sources of dubious origin to vilify the whole
fabric of the Chinese body politic as a prototype of despotism.”159 Quesnay was more sanguine
than many philosophes and perceived that China’s apparently successful, agrarian economy
headed by an absolute monarch harmonized with and verified his own beliefs in the universality
of the natural laws he had identified.
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Quesnay’s approval of Chinese political economy rested on his sense that the country’s
philosophers had come reasonably close to discovering universal, moral principles consistent
with fixed, natural laws. These principles originated with Confucius (551 - 479 BCE), whose
ideas China’s educational system transformed into dogma that would inform its social order for
centuries. An unpublished chapter on Confucius’s life all but attributes two millenia of Chinese
achievements to his moral philosophy.160 Introducing the section “Maxims,” Quesnay stresses
that Confucianism’s consistency with natural law enabled China’s well-regulated political
economy. He states that “[o]n verra par là que la raison est de tous les tems de tous les pais”
(Quesnay, 1067; We will thereby see that reason applies at all times and in all countries). Both
Confucian, moral philosophy and Quesnay’s economic analysis called for paternalist
governments with enough influence to harmonize the socio-economic order with natural law, an
influence channeled through the educational systems I discuss below. Rather than directly
prescribing China’s economy, the maxims assert that the poorest citizen may possess princely
virtue and insist on industriousness, humility, and the subjection of all people to paternalist
Confucianism.
Though a plowman may be as virtuous as the emperor, national stability depends on all
state officials embodying the Confucian virtues consistent with natural law. Though natural laws
reign supreme, in practice and like all legal despots, China’s emperor concentrates sovereign
legal power in his or her person as the political analogue to a paternal head of household. By

“Il a pourtant l’avantage sur eux que sa gloire n’a fait qu’augmenter avec le nombre des années, et
qu’elle subsiste encore en entire dans le plus grand empire du monde qui lui attribute sa durée et sa
splendeur.” (However, he has the edge over [Greek philosophers] that his glory only increased with the
number of years and that it survives whole in the world’s greatest empire which credits him with its
duration and its prosperity.) All further references are taken from François Quesnay, Œuvres
économiques complètes de François Quesnay et autres textes, eds. Christine Théré, Loïc Charles and
Jean-Claude Perrot (Paris : Institut national d’études démographiques, 2005), 1062.
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educating and advising the emperor, mandarins check absolute, imperial power in part by
fostering compassion and responsibility for China’s people; emperors too must be subject to
natural law to avoid arbitrary despotism. Thus, the reciprocal bonds of paternal care and familial
esteem on a national scale should foment ideological consensus regarding the public good.161
While sovereignty belongs solely to the emperor, the Chinese state’s political power
diffuses through its bureaucracy of fourteen thousand mandarins who administer national
stability. A series of competitive exams open to all men tests rote knowledge of Confucianism
and distributes high scorers throughout the bureaucratic and court systems. Again, this system
reflects Quesnay’s preference for meticulously reproducing a nation’s socio-economic
composition. This supposedly meritocratic system answers France’s own problem of monarchs
funding expensive, often unavailing wars by selling titles, annuities, and state offices to, worst of
all, nouveau riche merchants. Such people bleed France by contributing to the national debt, by
tax-farming, and by keeping more qualified people out of office. Instead, mandarins seemed to
epitomize morality and Quesnay lengthily details the internal oversight designed to minimize
corruption and ensure their accountability to natural laws. Each must be impartial and fungible.
For example, mandarins must move away from their home provinces and recuse themselves from
working with or on cases involving family members. Aggrieved parties may appeal up the
command chain to the emperor, and abuses of offices are publicized and punished.
The mandarinate’s internal rigor authorizes them to enforce the positive laws that protect
the nation and let it prosper. “Maxims” establishes that Chinese culture is founded on moral
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principles demanding deference to authority. The section “Positive Legislation” clarifies that
this morality of subjection and submission directly informed China’s codified laws:
Pour ce qui est des lois, elles sont toutes fondées sur les principes de morale que l’on a
vus ; car, comme on l’a déjà dit, la morale et la politique ne forment à la Chine qu’une
même science, et dans cet empire, toutes les lois positives ne tendent qu’à maintenir la
forme du gouvernement … (Quesnay, 1083)
(Regarding laws, they are all based on the moral principles that we saw; because, as we
already said, morality and policy form but one science in China, and in this empire, all
positive laws only aim to preserve the government’s form … )
The text’s “Introduction” states that a nation’s positive laws must not contradict natural laws nor
impede the economy’s natural productivity and circulation (Quesnay, 1015-1017). Predictably,
positive laws protecting natural, property rights are especially important.162 Property laws
exemplify Quesnay’s and Smith’s desire for commutative justice, an approach to jurisprudence
based on fair contracts and exchange and one which provides for exclusionary ownership rights
that ban expropriation of, injury to, or other parties profiting from another person’s possessions.
By contrast with commutative justice, distributive justice seeks specific, socio-economic
outcomes, invites direct, state intervention in the economy, and may redistribute wealth. By
minimizing state-directed economic intervention and redistribution, China’s quasi-liberal
positive laws based on commutative justice help perpetuate an economic and political status quo.
Though Quesnay does not seem to want positive laws to endlessly proliferate, states’
responsibility for the public good require them to subjectivize their polities.163 This key point is

“La propriété des biens est très assurée à la Chine…” (Quesnay, 1078; The property of goods is very
secure in China…).
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supported by Larrère’s argument that Physiocracy created an interminable balancing act by
desiring to maximize subjects’ natural right to pursue their self-interest (and thus maximize net
productivity) while minimizing the regulatory, state apparatuses needed for securing their ability
to do so.164 Positive laws and other state apparatuses proliferate due to liberal governments’
interminable need to more effectively shunt economic flows into their optimal, supposedy
natural channels. As “Evidence” shows, Quesnay preferred predictable, often simple policies
and institutions. For example, he proposed a single flat tax on the landowners’ net produit to rid
France of its complex, corrupt tax system.165 Still, Quesnay and Smith recognized that
commutative justice-based laws alone cannot induce a nation’s economic agents to perform to
the Tableau’s standards. Le Despotisme de la Chine’s discussion of infrastructure demonstrates
that states can continuously reshape physical, public space to optimize socio-economic behavior.
Quesnay valued infrastructure that incentivizes efficient production and circulation. In
concert with public education, infrastructure can continuously encourage people to be rational,
productive subjects. Maintaining and improving a nation’s physical environment requires
significant public spending to endlessly refine the city-walls, roads, canals, and bridges that

relation of a self to an other.” Ranciere means for subjectivization to be an emancipatory process wherein
a state’s marginalized, unequal people force themselves to be recognized by the state as equal,
participatory subjects. I somewhat perversely adopt the Physiocratic and/or liberal state’s point of view
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selves and the other. In this case, each “self” is a member of the population and the “other” is the ideal,
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determine ease of access and transport, incentivize self-serving uses of public space, and add to
the commonwealth.166 Infrastructure creates material conditions that do not compel but
subjectivize individuals by incentivizing, disincentivizing, and thus indirectly guiding their
economic activities. Le Despotisme de la Chine gives several, admiring examples of Chinese
infrastructure. For example, terracing increases the space available for farming. For commercial
traffic, Quesnay approves China’s grand highways and artificial canals. Deemed more efficient
than roads, canals simplify transport and aid irrigation.167 Proper infrastructure eases the
circulation of goods between town and country and within market towns. Foucault supports my
point that the physiocratic state purports to maximize liberty and the pursuit of self-interest by
minimizing state apparatuses that intrude on socio-economic life while expanding its influence
over the environments in which this collective activity takes place: “the market town became the
model of state intervention in men’s lives” and connotes the body-level discipline of physical
space that subjects individuals to a common, state-sanctioned, and (according to Quesnay)
natural, market rationality.168 In Quesnay’s telling, urban markets provide a communal space
where free, self-interested individuals produce the economic equilibrium of the bon prix.
However, free trade between the town and the country ultimately maintains a fixed division of
labor between each sector’s workers. Because only the country creates wealth, farmers must stay
Mirabeau refers to “l’entretien et l’amélioration, qui ne peuvent jamais être trop forts, & dont les
dépenses peuvent être immenses…” (…upkeep and improvement, which can never be too great and
whose costs can be immense…) Qtd. in Yves Citton, Portrait de l'économiste en physiocrate : critique
littéraire de l'économie politique (Paris : L’Harmattan, 2000), 292. Brian Larkin confirms my point that
infrastructure exerts state power over individuals by influencing their economic desires and behavior. For
example, “[roads and railways] form us as subjects not just on a technopolitical level but also through this
mobilization of affect and the senses of desire, pride, and frustration, feelings which can be deeply
political.” Larkin, Brian, “The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure,” The Annual Review of Anthropology
Review of Anthropology 42. (2013): 331-3.
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on the farms and continuously produce without profiting while their harvests must be able to
reach the two sterile, urban groups.169 Circulatory infrastructure epitomizes the distinction
between Quesnay’s homeostatic political economy and Smith’s more historically literate analysis
that recognizes value in urbanization. As we will see, Smith appreciates circulatory
infrastructure, because trade between town and country expands net prosperity and drives the
progress of opulence rather than simply transferring wealth from one area to another.
Le Despotisme de la Chine’s detailing of the relation between China’s Confucian
morality and state apparatuses demonstrates Quesnay’s belief that states must habituate their
subjects to following natural laws. A life-long educational system and positive laws enforced by
an intensively internally-regulated bureaucracy offer a state powerful, refinable apparatuses for
maintaining the socio-economic order. Once a nation discovers natural laws and the triadic,
socio-economic order, political economy’s burden shifts to continuously refining these state
apparatuses to best manage and reproduce the polity. A final example of public works shows
public education to be a particularly powerful apparatus for offering states strong, persistent
influence over subjects’ economic interests and behaviors.
Whereas law enforcement is largely a post hoc solution to already broken laws, public
education precludes transgressions by pre-conditioning and guiding individuals’ behavior.
Public education ideally enables states to train individuals to pursue the public good by
recognizing its identity with their own interests. Quesnay initially highlights the importance of
despots’ education, because they hold absolute, political power, and nations’ welfare depends on
their rulers’ commitment to natural laws. Though positive laws do not bind Chinese emperors,
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they still must subject themselves to a Confucian morality of submission and humility before
nature’s higher law.170 Mandarins prevent China from slipping into arbitrary despotism by
conducting each emperor’s early education then counselling him during adulthood. Beyond the
emperor, Quesnay approves of all Chinese cities and towns having mandarin teachers available
to instruct children in basic literacy before introducing them to Confucian texts. The most
successful students, often those whose families can afford private tutors, may advance to the
colleges and attempt the qualifying tests for government service. To ensure the polity’s
ideological conformity, public education relies on repetition and memorization of a curriculum
standardized and disseminated from the capital in Peking. Though the education of China’s
lower, social orders rarely advances to the intensive study required of applicants to the
mandarinate, all adults continue to receive regular indoctrination in moral principles and positive
laws. Communities convene to hear mandarins reiterate Confucian values in semi-monthly,
state-sanctioned, public speeches. Peking also distributes a similarly themed, national gazette.
In addition to expounding virtues and vices, the gazette summarizes recent, governmental
activity such as new legislation and cites mandarins discharged for corruption.

3.3

Adam Smith and the open-ended power of liberal states
Smith’s rethinking of wealth creation and the division of labor led Smith to reject legal

despotism while retaining some of Physiocracy’s progressive aspects such as property rights,
free trade, and minimal, direct state intervention in the national economy. Smith agreed that
states must develop apparatuses to secure subjects’ liberties while granting that these apparatuses

The second maxim states that ”[u]n Prince est sans conseils lorsqu’il a trop d’esprit et qu’il dit son
sentiment le premier.” (A Prince is without councilors when he has too much spirit and says his first
opinion.) Italics in original. Quesnay, Œuvres économiques complètes, 1068.
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must gradually increase their influence over subjects’ lives in response to the progress of
opulence’s negative, unintended consequences. The progress of opulence, a concept indicative
of Smith’s historicizing political economy, established an alternative rationale for his materialist
point of agreement with Quesnay that a nation’s economy determines the functions of its state
apparatuses. For Quesnay, natural laws prescribe an agricultural economy supported by legal
despotism. Smith’s study of the progress of opulence, an idea reliant on his innovative theories
of wealth creation and the division of labor, led him to argue that many state apparatuses,
including many rights, only emerge under specific, contingent economic circumstances. Two
consequences of Smith’s revisions of political economy for the relationship between liberty and
statecraft are significant. First, unlike Quesnay, Smith considered many rights and liberties to
entirely depend on innovations first in the economic sector and then in statecraft. Second, not
only does the progress of opulence validate a variety of valid regimes, but his analysis of
unintended consequences led him to argue that the state apparatuses within those regimes must
be dynamic and adaptable to nations’ economic needs. Therefore, my discussion of Smith’s
revision of Quesnay lets us see that when a georgic poet like James Thomson refers to British
liberty, liberty demands contextualization both in terms of extant, subjectivizing technologies of
government and even more fundamentally on the processual division of labor driving economic
innovation and the progress of opulence.
For us to understand Smith’s revision of the concept of wealth creation, we must
remember that Quesnay had defined wealth in radically materialist terms as a resource originally
produced by nature and which humans simply husband into being. To the extent that Quesnay
considered wealth in terms of value, he thought of wealth’s value somewhat circularly in terms
of its costs of production. That is, he accounted for wealth’s value as the amount of wealth
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necessary to replace that which is consumed by laborers in the course of its annual reproduction.
Smith rejected Quesnay’s premise that only agriculture creates wealth: Smith states as much
when he says of Physiocracy that the “capital error of this system, however, seems to lie in its
representing the class of artificers, manufacturers and merchants, as altogether barren and
unproductive.” 171 Instead, Smith proposes that Quesnay’s sterile laborers do indeed create
wealth, because their labor time has inherent value which can be added to goods to increase their
value. Book I, Chapter 5 of WN explains Smith’s labor-command theory of value:
The value of any commodity, therefore, to the person who possesses it…is equal to the
quantity of labour which it enables him to purchase or command. Labour, therefore, is
the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities…What everything is
really worth to the man who has acquired it, and who wants to dispose of it or exchange it
for something else, is the toil and trouble which it can save to himself, and which it can
impose upon other people…[Commodities] contain the value of a certain quantity of
labour which we exchange for what is supposed at the time to contain the value of an
equal quantity. (Smith, I.v.1-2)
Smith deduces the existence of this additional form of wealth-creating value, meaning labor, by
using an elementary version of supply and demand to show that objects’ prices can vary
principally due to labor inputs but also because of buyers’ interests; still, mutatis mutandis, an
object’s price reflects the value of the labor time invested in other objects which the initial object
can purchase in exchange.172 Thus, WN rejects Quesnay’s purely material concept of wealth and
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All further references taken from Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations, eds. R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981), IV.ix.29. Laurent
Dobuzinskis refers to this as a cost of production model. Laurent Dobuzinskis, “Adam Smith and French
Political Economy,” 65.
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Dobuzinskis notes that Smith considered that, given free markets, corn would be the most likely
commodity to remain near its true value and thus could most consistently measure the value of labor time.
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instead defines it in terms of the effect of multiple types of labor on its variable value. Smith’s
labor-command theory of value means that “after the division of labour has once thoroughly
taken place” individuals are less likely to be able to satisfy their needs and wants by their own
work; in fact, the labor-command theory’s premise that any labor can increase wealth’s value
enables the division of labor to not only to increase the gross national product but also to drive
the progress of opulence which allows individuals to access more goods and services than they
could themselves produce (Smith, I.v.1).
Though he did not name it as such, Quesnay’s political economy depends on a fixed
division of labor among the groups of the socio-economic triad.173 He denied that any modern,
technical or technological innovation among sterile or non-sterile workers could significantly
affect wealth production or alter the socio-economic order or the need for legal despotism. For
Smith, the division of labor instead refers to breaking a single, complex task into multiple,
simpler tasks.174 This change of production methods answers an entrepreneur’s desire to

This assertion by Smith may reflect lingering materialism in his conception of wealth. Dobuzinskis,
“Adam Smith and French Political Economy,” 64. Schabas supports this point by arguing that Smith
holds in tension his labor command theory with the sense of embodied wealth, which Schabas attributes
to Smith’s tendency, symptomatic of his age, to still think of commercial economy through analogies with
physical, ecological economies. Schabas, The Natural Origins of Economics, 83-88.
173
The triad itself reflects the broad division. We can further divide the less favored, sterile group into
merchants and artisans and then into specific jobs. My overriding point is that, because of agriculture’s
sole productivity, because each triadic, group plays a vital role in the Tableau, and because Quesnay all
but disregarded the potential for change via innovation, there is little room for significant variation within
the socio-economic order.
174
Smith seems to regard the distinction between town and country, an echo of Quesnay’s division
between sterile, urban and productive, rural workers, as one of the most basic and fundamental divisions
of labor. In WN Book III “Of the different Progress of Opulence in different Nations,” Smith takes a
more balanced view of the benefits from each side of a simple, geographic division of labor. “The great
commerce of every civilized society, is that carried on between the inhabitants of the town and those of
the country…. The gains of both are mutual and reciprocal, and the division of labour is in this, as in all
other cases, advantageous to all the different persons employed in the various occupations into which it is
subdivided” (Smith, III.i.1).
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increase profits by improving the rate of production relative to any additional costs of
production.175 Smith identifies three advantages of the division of labor:
This great increase of the quantity of work which, in consequence of the division of
labour, the same number of people are capable of performing, is owing to three different
circumstances; first, to the increase of dexterity in every particular workman; secondly, to
the saving of the time which is commonly lost in passing from one species of work to
another; and lastly, to the invention of a great number of machines which facilitate and
abridge labour, and enable one man to do the work of many. (Smith, , I.i.5)
Of course, for the division of labor to increase prosperity, Smith must first assume that
manufacturing produces wealth. In the paragraph preceding this quote, Smith emphasizes that
manufacturing is far more susceptible to and benefits from the division of labor than does
agriculture, which is limited by its seasonal nature and likelihood that individuals often perform
multiple, discrete daily tasks. His first two “circumstances” that improve the “quantity of work”
denote technical changes to manual practices which thereby become more efficient. Such
changes can increase wealth, but the third circumstance involves technological innovations in
production processes which accrue over time to cause significant, socio-economic developments.
The division of labor by technical and especially technological improvements typifies the
difference between Quesnay’s and Smith’s economic theory; Quesnay sees almost no room for
socio-economic change, whereas Smith sees the division of labor not as a fixed distinction
between groups performing different types of labor but instead as the inherent potential to
improve the manner and speed of productive processes. Smith’s division of labor allows
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Added costs of production would likely involve adding either more laborers or new instruments to the
process.
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economic sectors to gradually transform, though changes to production methods also have a
range of unintended consequences for individual workers and for statecraft.
In addition to task-specific, profit-motivated increases in efficiency, divisions of labor
produce various positive and negative effects that Smith called unintended consequences which
become predictable given retrospective analysis. Unintended consequences embody Smith’s
claim that the progress of opulence proceeds due to the aggregate effects of many people
pursuing personal economic interests rather than widely coordinated, technological innovation
intended to produce major socio-economic changes. Smith thought that the division of labor
unintentionally impedes individuals from developing new physical and cognitive abilities by
requiring them to perform repetitive, low skill jobs which may leave a person “mutilated and
deformed in his mind, as another is in his body, who is either deprived of some of his most
essential members, or has lost use of them” (Smith, V.i.f.60). The division of labor deskills
individuals, limits their educational needs and socialization, and generally reduces the
complexity of their life experience. TMS argues that individuals develop morality by taking an
innate pleasure in sympathizing with other people’s emotions, desiring social approval, and
eventually accepting moral norms. Therefore, divisions of labor also unintentionally lead to
moral decadence typified by a lack of social sympathy, selfishness, and corruption. Immoral
individuals may over-value luxury goods and fund gaudier but less profitable and less socially
advantageous business. The constant threat of public immorality requires compensatory,
instructive, state-run institutions.
The division of labor’s positive, unintended consequences generate the economic
dynamism and political mutability comprising the progress of opulence. For example, as a
nation urbanizes, and its individuals develop new, more efficient methods for creating wealth
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outside of the agricultural sector, such individuals unintentionally drive the stadial transition
from the third, agricultural mode to the fourth, commercial mode. Increases in urbanization,
manufacturing, and trade correlate with such progress. WN proposes that investments in
manufacturing are only somewhat less profitable than investments in agriculture which benefit
from the aid of organic growth; therefore, profit-seekers confronted with a saturated agricultural
sector optimize their revenues by investing in manufacturing and then in trade. Further, because
the division of labor benefits manufacturing more than the other two sectors, a nation can
ultimately offset a land-poor or otherwise weak agricultural sector by adequately funding
manufacturing and trade. Whereas Physiocracy depends on maintaining equilibrium between the
sterile town and the productive country, Smith’s progress of opulence allows the town to
displace the country in terms of net production.
Smith’s innovative theory of the progress of opulence involved the claim that major
socio-economic changes caused by private enterprise required states to develop responsive state
apparatuses including rights-protecting, positive laws. Quesnay attributed a modern, agrarian
society’s stability to legal despotism’s compliance with fixed natural laws including respect for
natural rights. A key difference between Smith’s historico-materialist political economy and
Physiocracy is that Smith portrayed many rights as both organically and technologically latent.
By organically latent, I mean that Smith reads European history as showing that specific state
apparatuses emerge predictably and in concert with each stadial age. By technologically latent, I
mean that the existence of state apparatuses depends not only on initial economic innovations,
but also on governments’ legislation and establishment of requisite, auxiliary institutions.
Crucially, Smith regarded many of the rights that georgic poets evoke with the term Liberty not
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as natural rights derived from natural laws but as rights that only exist due, first, to prerequisite,
stadial conditions, and second, by coming into being through their creation as positive laws.
I reinforce this distinction between Quesnay and Smith first by showing that Smith understood
justice not merely as an effect of social sympathy but also as determined by the progress of
opulence. Then I turn to Smith’s proposals for the influential state apparatuses suited to
stadialism’s fourth, commercial age.
Smith claimed that societies and their governments recognize new liberties as they
transition into each new stadial age rather than believing, as Locke and Quesnay did, that such
liberties derive from timeless, God-given, natural laws. We have insight into this branch of
Smith’s moral philosophy thanks to two sets of class notes taken by his students, which are now
compiled as Lectures on Jurisprudence.176 For Smith, jurisprudence fundamentally concerned
codifying varieties of injury as positive laws along with plans for redress should such laws be
transgressed.177 As LJ(B) states, “The object of Justice is the security from injury, and it is the
foundation of civil government.”178 Governments expand and develop new state apparatuses, in
part because subjects of successive, stadial ages recognize new forms of injury to persons and
things. However, Smith did not entirely deny the existence of natural rights. LJ distinguishes
between natural rights which exist independently of the progress of opulence and adventitious
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Hereafter LJ, LJ(A), and LJ(B). The notes comprising LJ(B) were discovered first and cover more
lecture material but in less depth. The notes in LJ(A) come from an earlier year (1762-1763), are more
detailed, but cut off before the end of the lecture series. Smith’s jurisprudential lectures sequentially
covered the three areas of private, domestic, and public jurisprudence until the school year of 1763-4
when the order was reversed. We know this because the notes of LJ(B) were taken during the year when
Smith adopted the new approach.
177
“Smith’s entire system of jurisprudence is thus structured around the question of “in how many ways a
man may be injured.”” Michael Frazer, The Enlightenment of Sympathy: Justice and the Moral
Sentiments in the Eighteenth Century and Today (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 105
178
Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, eds. R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael, and P. G. Stein
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982), 4.
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rights which emerge as nations enter new, stadial modes. For example, in the domain of private
jurisprudence, a natural right disallows others from physically harming a person’s body
regardless of the stadial age, though such natural rights still require complementary, positive
legislation for courts to mete out justice. By comparison, because the concept of property does
not emerge until a society reaches the second stadial age of shepherding, neither do the
adventitious, property rights that emerge contemporaneously with property itself. Adventitious
rights originate in and through contingent historico-economic circumstances and are codified,
refined, and enforced by positive legislation and court systems. The emergence and malleability
of adventitious rights exemplify Smith’s view of statecraft as capable of dynamic compensatory
responses to the progress of opulence’s unintended consequences.
That Smith accepted various regimes as viable means for supporting national economies
further demonstrates that he viewed government as a far more adaptable and dynamic, political
technology than had Quesnay. Whereas Quesnay only accepted the absolute monarchy of legal
despotism, LJ finds history validating three main types of regimes: monarchy, aristocracy, and
democracy. Each has disadvantages, and Smith suggested that mixed government may best
serve modern commercial states by offsetting each type's potential weaknesses. Dividing
governmental powers may mitigate the threats posed by arbitrary monarchs or excessively selfinterested and corrupt, aristocratic republics. For example, a mixed government can assign
taxation and legislation to parliament while granting law enforcement powers to an independent
judiciary.179 Dividing political power reduces the potential for its abuse, better secures the rights
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Knud Haakonssen emphasizes the particular importance of an independent judiciary as well as a welleducated populace in order to reserve strong checks on mixed governments. Knud Haakonssen, The
Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 131-132.
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of its subjects, while potentially strengthening the state by creating a denser network of
interdependent, state apparatuses.180
To reemphasize, Quesnay and Smith both viewed governments as mutable, political
technologies that serve their subjects by crafting securitizing and economy-supporting, state
apparatuses. Crucially, Quesnay and Smith also shared the liberal, economic theory that
minimizing impediments to free trade facilitates wealth creation. Therefore, like Quesnay, Smith
preferred commutative justice, because redressing injuries to legally protected rights allows for
more precise punishment and recompense than distributive justice’s redistribution of goods.181
Though redistribution has merits such as directly reducing poverty, Smith regarded its methods
and outcomes as imprecise and therefore unreliably just.182 Further, direct, economic regulation
via subsidies, price ceilings and restricting access to domestic and foreign markets risks
preventing goods from settling at their fair and proper prices. Instead, reasonably free markets
should naturally redistribute wealth and reduce the wealth gaps that may otherwise lead to
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Regarding the potential for administrative creep, Susan E. Gallagher cites Smith’s tentative concern
that governments and their state apparatuses may outgrow the proportions best suited to fulfilling political
economy’s two “objects” and the state’s responsibility for securing justice. Given the broad viability in
government types, Smith appears less concerned with the problem of whether governments may accrue
too much power or influence than with whether governments’ own efficiency or corruption impede the
efficiency of their economies. “However, having broadcast this warning against runaway government
spending, Smith proceeded to note” with almost incredible optimism “that such ‘violent and forced’
encroachment on the productivity of society is extremely out of the ordinary.” Susan E. Gallagher, The
Rule of the Rich?: Adam Smith’s Argument Against Political Power (University Park: The Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1998), 95.
181
Property rights, whether constituted by natural law or by the progress of opulence, exemplify Smith’s
agreement with Quesnay that a government should only directly interfere in its subjects’ lives when
personal or collective security is threatened. Again, the meaning of threat or injury varies for each writer
and for Smith can vary throughout a society’s duration.
182
Michael Frazer’s study relates TMS’s theories of moral sympathy with states’ problem of establishing
fair, politico-economic, jurisprudence. Alluding to Smith’s preference for commutative justice, he also
notes that Smith thought that policies based on the correction of harm tend to be more accurate than
policies which try to impose good. Frazer, The Enlightenment of Sympathy, 105. Winch notes that
distributive justice is not only faced with the problem of how much redistribution is necessary to achieve
the public good, but that such redistribution in the name of benevolence easily turns into unjust injury of
those whose property the state expropriates. Winch, Riches and Poverty, 97-101.
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oligarchy and political corruption. However, I showed with Le Despotisme de la Chine that
Quesnay meant for states to retain considerable influence over their national economies.
Revisiting the two types of public works addressed earlier, “those for facilitating the commerce
of the society, and those for promoting the instruction of the people,” in WN will demonstrate
Smith’s agreement that states should only indirectly support the economy (Smith, V.i.c.2).
However, his recommendations for infrastructure and public education did not simply echo
Quesnay’s interest in conforming subjects’ beliefs and practices to natural law. Instead, Smith
required states to account for the progress of opulence’s negative, unintended consequences so
that subjects could take full advantage of modernity’s unfolding economic opportunities.
Again, infrastructure enables a state to indirectly influence its subjects by shaping the
environments where wealth is created, circulated, and exchanged. Both large and small
infrastructural projects typify the progress of opulence’s endless stream of potential opportunities
and challenges. In addition to its need for upkeep, infrastructure is similarly susceptible to
technological innovations that improve quality of life and wealth creation. Even though WN
preceded the Industrial Revolution, Smith saw the fourth stadial age of commerce affording more
opportunities for urban development as manufacturing and trade outstripped rural agriculture and
the agricultural revolution and enclosure guided people from the country into cities.
Smith largely agreed with Quesnay that state support for commerce requires taxes and
publicly-funded labor to build, maintain, and improve highways, bridges, canals, and so forth.
Both authors identified infrastructure as a worthwhile task suited to states, because the initial
investment and upkeep of projects tend to exceed the financial means of most individuals and, if
able, repay costs slowly. While states must undertake large projects like highways, WN argues
that bureaucrats of centralized states like France and China who oversee smaller, local projects
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like roads often fail to do so with adequate care and efficiency (Smith, V.i.d.16-17). Instead, the
text recommends that provincial administrators should handle construction and maintenance by
means of local tax collection and tolls; the interested parties served tend to be local, and
decentering responsibility away from state officials and toward local markets reduces the
potential for corruption.
Quesnay and Smith agreed on the necessity of public education, but its raison d'être for
Smith dramatically shifts due to his regard for the division of labor’s negative, unintended
consequences. Whereas Quesnay’s homeostatic political economy required Tableau-enlightened
subjects to be reproduced ad infinitum, Smith’s commercial age sees the division of labor
aggressively expanding and continuously deskilling and desocializing subjects as capital flows
toward urban, manufacturing enterprises.183 Over time, the aggregated, rational decisions of
profit-seekers produce negative, unintended consequences which can destabilize a nation by
corroding workers’ intelligence and morality. To compensate for these negative consequences,
Smith recommended that states fund and run educational institutions for both children and adults
in order to maintain a high degree of corrective influence over its subjects throughout their lives.
Smith initially argues for public education’s cost-effectiveness; he states that “[t]he
institutions for the education of the youth may, [like other public works], furnish a revenue
sufficient for defraying their own expence” (Smith, V.i.f.1). States must ensure that individuals
can contribute to society by managing vulnerable groups; children from the lowest orders must at

“The man whose whole life is spent performing a few simple operations, of which the effects too are,
perhaps, always the same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert his understanding, or to
exercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally
loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible
for a human creature to become. The torpor of his mind renders him, not only incapable of relishing or
bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble, or tender sentiment,
and consequently of forming any just judgment concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private
life” (Smith, V.i.f.50).
183
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least learn to “read, write, and account ... [f]or a very small expence the publick can facilitate,
can encourage, and can even impose upon almost the whole body of the people, the necessity of
acquiring those most essential parts of education” (Smith, V.i.f.54). The public dissemination of
common systems of measurement has been regarded by many authors as an effective
subjectivizing technique for naturalizing calculative rationality and liberal economy.184 By
comparison, the well-off typically can afford private tutors, attend public schools and
universities, and generally acquire a high level of educational, cultural capital for their families.
In addition to incentivizing study with small prizes, Smith recommends testing and credentialing
as barriers to entering trades.
As most non-aristocratic individuals become adults, narrow working conditions enforced
by the division of labor impede personal growth. Consequently, Smith devotes a section of WN
to compensatory state apparatuses for adult education to correct subjects’ deteriorating
intelligence and morals. He proposes programs partly designed to foster industriousness and
critical thought and partly to suppress the superstitions to which he thinks small minds are
susceptible.185 The first branch of his agenda reiterates the professionalizing education available
to younger people:
[T]he study of science and philosophy, which the state might render almost universal
among all people of middling or more than middling rank and fortune; (not by giving

For example, Andre Gorz argues that the ability to “measure, calculate, and plan” naturalizes an
economic rationality that compels individuals to reckon all time in terms of potential “working time…”
Leisure time becomes an effect of time not spent working or saved due to efficiencies implemented
during the hours of labor. Andre Gorz, Critique of Economic Reason, trans. Gillian Handyside and Chris
Turner (London: Verso, 1989), 3. See also, James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to
Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 25-33.
185
With respect to European religion, he appreciates Christianity’s history of instilling some virtue and
order in society, but its tendency to sow superstition and sectarianism reduces its utility and ultimately
makes it unwelcome.
184
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salaries to teachers in order to make them negligent and idle,) but by instituting some sort
of probation, even in the higher and more difficult sciences, to be undergone by every
person before he was permitted to exercise any liberal profession, or before he could be
received as a candidate for an honourable office of trust or profit. (Smith, V.i.g.14)
Such programs train and credential individuals who aspire to both public and private positions of
power. Smith also expects such education to produce positive, downstream results in social
morality: “Science is the great antidote to the poison of enthusiasm and superstition; and where
all the superior ranks of people were secured from it, the inferior ranks could not be much
exposed to it” (Smith, V.i.g.15). The second branch of Smith’s agenda for adult education
involves state-sponsored, cultural programs. The state encourages all subjects to engage with
various fine arts at and compete for prizes at public exhibitions; Smith expects these events to be
agreeable experiences of creativity and liberty. “[T]he frequency and gaiety of publick
diversions” permits therapeutic, behavior management which enlivens and exercises minds
stultified by religion and simple, repetitive work.
Public education’s many moving parts make it a strong example of a dynamic and
refinable, state apparatus proper to modern, liberal states. By accounting for both children and
adults, the system can influence subjects throughout their lifespans. Multiple schools and
credentialing systems can standardize the basic knowledge required to sell one’s labor and buy
commodities while also channeling subjects into economic sectors and jobs. Smith’s and even
Quesnay’s economic liberalism led them to insist that state apparatuses should not unduly
regulate or artificially restrict the socio-economic flows understood by analogy with other,
physiological or ecological systems. To recall Larrère, liberal states’ apparatuses must not
impede individuals’ economic pursuit of self-interest and pleasure, but as my next chapter
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shows, what counts as artificial regulation and intervention becomes a question of perspective
and a government’s ability to conceal its own labor.
Adam Smith’s division of labor and progress of opulence reflect a view of a socioeconomic order susceptible to innovation and broad transformation, a view reflected by British
georgics which attribute stability and prosperity to advances in the sciences harnessed by private
industry. The Seasons’s genealogies of technology addressed in my second chapter anticipate
and exemplify Smith’s progress of opulence and his mention of the “gift of Industry” suggests
the individual work ethic and creativity which drive the division of labor.186 Looking ahead,
Erasmus Darwin will echo TMS by arguing that humans innately take pleasure in imitating one
another. Imitation fuels the innovative syntheses of ideas which can be implemented through
practical technological innovations which further expand individuals’ capacities for pleasure and
liberty.
My next chapter addressing gardening texts by Horace Walpole and George Mason
introduces my conceit of the georgic garden. In light of British georgics’ expanding, disciplinary
interests and especially their thematic shift away from hard, manual labor, gardens sometimes
replace farms as sites for didactic instruction, representing physical and intellectual labor, and
addressing socio-economic order through a self-reflexive deployment of aesthetic, literary
beauty; Mason’s Preface even announces his poem’s use of the georgic mode. Most importantly,
I read the georgic garden as signifying a nation governed according to economic and political
liberalism. While Walpole and Mason admire a naturalistic garden’s landscaping, their flora,
and their other physical elements, the texts acknowledge that a garden’s ideal, aesthetic harmony
requires gardeners’ careful and constant influence but whose extensive interventions should be
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James Thomson, Autumn, in The Seasons, ed. James Sambrook (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 141.
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well disguised. The georgic gardener-as-politician must exert control over the garden’s organic
economy to maximize the potential pleasure it can give.
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Chapter 4
4

Naturalistic Landscaping, Georgic Gardens, and the ProprietorPolitician
Gardening and architecture owe as much to the nobility and to men of fortune as to the
professors.
-Horace Walpole, The History of the Modern Taste in Gardening

4.1

Gentleman gardeners
In this chapter I argue that texts by Horace Walpole and William Mason, which dictate a

style of landscape garden187 design, also imply that privately owned land and the free and
rational enjoyment of property rights are linchpins of a liberal, plutocratic, political economy.188
In The History of the Modern Taste in Gardening, Walpole identifies this gardening style as a
new, English discovery; because he claims its aesthetic principles reflect an idealized form of
nature’s own, creative principles, scholars describe this style as naturalism.189 The naturalistic
style is also the theme of Mason’s georgic poem, The English Garden, which epitomizes my
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Interchangeable with landscape park or English garden.
By property rights more generally, I allude to the Lockean ideas that natural rights are granted by
natural laws irrespective of government, that such rights inalienably belong to individuals, and that these
rights are most fundamentally concerned with sole enjoyment and non-injury of one’s property in one’s
person and goods. The last chapter showed that Adam Smith disagreed that property rights were natural
rights, but the overriding point is that the liberal government described in this chapter nominally
prioritizes equal rights for individuals.
189
In perhaps the text’s most famous quote, Walpole states that William Kent (1685-1748), who
exemplifies the naturalistic style, “leaped the fence, and saw that all nature was a garden.” Walpole
conversely implies that nature’s own principles of composition must be brought into the literal garden
where elements will be composed to their best and most pleasing effect. All references to Walpole’s
essay on gardening are taken from Horace Walpole, The History of the Modern Taste in Gardening (New
York: Ursus Press, 1995), 43.
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concept of the georgic garden.190 This concept, which I will also apply to poems by Erasmus
Darwin in the next chapter, draws on the georgic’s traditional self-presentation as a didactic,
aesthetic space comparable to a farm that receives the author’s labor.191 Georgics teach the
importance of studying and respecting nature’s physical and moral laws while also emphasizing
the virtue of personal industriousness. Similarly, georgic gardens are literary spaces dominated
by images of ecological economies that humans try to understand and instrumentalize. Georgic
gardens appear in poetic texts continuing the trend in Thomson’s The Seasons of decentering the
georgic’s traditional topics of farming and manual labor; georgic gardens depict well-managed,
often enclosed spaces in which beautifying natural resources convey the mutual importance of
liberty and pleasure. By subtly championing land ownership and exclusory, property rights,
georgic gardens symbolize a sovereign, British nation; national prosperity depends on its
government’s commitment to liberal, natural law-based rights and its ruling class’s commitment
to “Th’ appropriate bounds of Pleasure, and of Use” in its own, private works that signify its
fitness to rule (Mason, II.160). The various natural and social economies depicted in georgic
gardens convey moral principles that enable the public good and that governments must enshrine
into law.
Given that georgics’ interest in the relation between labor, material nature, and nature’s
moral laws connotes political economy, studying the use of the georgic mode in gardening texts
lets us see how the discourse of naturalism props a plutocratic government favoring economic

All references to Mason’s poem are taken from William Mason, The English Garden: A Poem in Four
Books (York: A. Ward, 1783).
191
In the eighteenth century, the concept of the three sister arts reinforced this alignment of poetry and
gardening which, with painting, shared a basis in imaginative, representational practice. To clarify, the
georgic garden is a space described by the poem, but the georgic mode’s convention of figuring itself as a
cultivated space also allows the poem itself to become yet another figural iteration of the georgic garden.
190
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and political liberalism.192 Texts advocating naturalism sublimate the material fact of wealth into
the discourse of taste, which then justifies liberal, plutocratic government. As John Barrell
argues, “The main point…is to show how a correct taste, here especially for landscape and
landscape art was used in this period as a means of legitimating political authority, particularly
but not exclusively within the terms of the discourse of civic humanism.”193 In showing the
importance of land beautification and property rights to the georgic garden, I thus use the georgic
garden and the proprietor-political correspondence to argue that Mason’s and to a lesser extent
Walpole’s texts compare the work of naturalistic garden design to the managerial work of liberal
statecraft including its centering of property rights. Mason asserts that proprietors of naturalistic
gardens possess “plain Integrity, Contempt for gold, / Disdain of slav’ry, [and] liberal Awe of
rule / Which fixt the rights of People, Peers, and Prince” (Mason, IV.683-685). I build on prior
chapters which argued that the innately politico-economic, georgic mode obfuscates the role of
statecraft; the georgic garden helps us to unpack these texts’ sublimation of plutocratic liberalism
into naturalism by framing the moments when politico-economic topics and figures for
administration appear. Whereas Walpole establishes correspondences between naturalism’s
aesthetic principles and proprietors’ reverence for British liberty, two of Mason’s key vignettes
analogize garden owners with politicians. Ultimately, the georgic garden shows us that these
texts cite naturalistic landscaping as evidence of proprietors’ right to rule by moralizing the
proper uses of land while presenting property rights as a synecdoche for the other bundle of
liberties that governments must secure.
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Economic liberalism refers to a preference for free market trade and the perception of a disembedded
economy. Political liberalism refers to a legal system which tends to grant subjects equal rights that
prioritize individual freedom from unjust acts or injuries from other individuals or from the government.
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John Barrell, The Birth of Pandora and the Division of Knowledge (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992),
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My critique takes place within a larger conversation regarding the ideological work
performed by European gardening styles. John Hunt Dixon’s and Ronald Paulson’s foundational
studies argue that eighteenth-century England’s shift from emblematic to expressive landscaping
styles reflected a shift in their representational method and so also the qualifications for
appreciating them.194 Emblematic gardens’ compositions of flora, architecture, and sculpture had
fixed, allegorical meanings and retained more of the geometric elements popular in French,
Italian, and Dutch formal gardens.195 Expressive naturalism displaced fixed, allegorical
interpretation based on claims in texts such as Thomas Whately’s Observations on Modern
Gardening (1770) that non-narrative designs would be more pleasing to those with objectively,
morally correct tastes, because such designs better reflect nature’s own, timeless, creative style.
Stephen Bending later argues that expressivism reinforces the ideological work of emblematism
by replacing, for example, busts of politicians with landscapes that are instead “about nature”
and are still interpreted through a “set of conventions” fixed in texts like Walpole’s essay and
Mason’s poem, which associate taste with virtues corresponding to liberalist, Whig
government.196
I begin with Walpole’s The History of the Modern Taste in Gardening. I use this
manifesto for naturalistic landscaping to establish its design principles and then to show that he

194

John Dixon Hunt, Emblem and Expressionism in the Eighteenth-Century Landscape Garden,”
Eighteenth-Century Studies 4, no. 3 (Spring, 1971): 294-5; Ronald Paulson, Emblem and Expression:
Meaning in English Art of the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 19-22.
195
William Kent filled the gardens at Stowe with classical statuary and busts of figures which, despite his
identification with naturalism by Walpole, often required intimate knowledge to understand their
significance and which also required spectators to occupy proper viewing positions signaled by paths and
benches to appreciate a series of linked, statement-making scenes. Paulson compares the emblematic
garden to a text; Stowe’s Elysian Fields constituted a massive “verbal construct” in which a set sequence
of viewpoints produced a narrative. Ronald Paulson, Emblem and Expression, 24.
196
Stephen Bending, “Re-reading the Eighteenth-Century English Landscape Garden,” Huntington
Library Quarterly 55, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 379-389.

145

attributes those principles to quasi-physiological, aesthetic sensibilities. Whereas The Seasons’s
physico-theological argument uses depictions of nature’s physical laws to assert the force of
moral laws, Walpole uses aesthetic sensibility, meaning a proper taste for naturalism, to index a
person’s morality. Walpole conveys that virtue is the subjective expression of an individual’s
commitment to political justice and liberty. He establishes this relation by giving
counterexamples of tasteless French and Chinese gardens whose forms he blames on the
immorality of the rich and powerful persons commissioning them. The implication of their
arbitrary and illiberal political power contrasts with English plutocrats whose tasteful, naturalist
estates base their right to rule on their virtuous sensibility. Walpole’s naturalistic aesthetics
normalize plutocratic liberalism by analogizing land owner’s proper use of their land with
government’s respect for property rights. Walpole forecasts the analogy between the improving
proprietor and the politician made more explicit in Mason’s vignettes.
Turning to Mason, I establish that Mason’s georgic poem shares Walpole’s commitment
to naturalism with examples in which Mason oscillates between material details and general
principles both moral and aesthetic. I then explicate the concept of the georgic garden by
showing that Mason’s English Garden recognizes its accountability to a wider world of labor,
commerce, and political history. In addition to passages telling its elite audience to balance
land’s pragmatic and entertaining uses, many of the other evocations of politico-economic topics
occur in the poem’s two main parables. The first concerns Alexander the Great having
overthrown Sidon’s Persian despot and crowning the humble, industrious Abdalonimus, whose
lengthily-described garden sanctuary signifies his virtue. The second parable concerns the
English aristocrat Alcander who has built an exemplary naturalistic estate. He shelters and falls
in love with Nerina, a refugee of the American Revolution who soon dies. We learn that she had
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been betrothed to Alcander’s other guest, Cleon, who had saved her father’s life, has been
commending Alcander’s design choices during his stay, and consoles Alcander after Nerina’s
death. As Alcander recovers, he demonstrates his ability to manage his passions by tastefully
adding to his estate. The Abdalonimus and Alcander parables convey that proprietors who
creatively express their good taste possess the civic virtues necessary for governing. Though
Abdalonimus is not initially wealthy, his humility demonstrates the disinterest that naturalism
conveys to be the subjective, moral complement to liberalism’s equitable respect for personal
rights.
Finally, I use Mason’s references to the genius loci197 -- in his telling a guardian spirit for
naturalism -- to elaborate the proprietor-politician relation established in the parables. I show
that Mason delineates both active and passive aspects of each Genius, a duality which he invites
us to map onto characteristics of both proprietors and liberal governments and which reinforces
their interdependence. Recognizing naturalism’s support for plutocratic, liberal political
economy is an important addendum to the work of scholars like Terry Eagleton, who argue that
in the eighteenth century taste and manners diffuse laws and moral prescriptions into aesthetics
and sensibility. Eagleton claims that people increasingly found themselves “free, equal,
autonomous human subjects, obeying no laws but those they give to themselves…an entirely
new human subject – one which, like the work of art itself, discovers the law in the depths of its
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A figure from classical mythology, genius loci is a watchful spirit who protects a specific place.
Alexander Pope (1688-1744) notably uses the trope in Epistle IV of his Moral Essays:
Consult the genius of the place in all;
That tells the waters or to rise, or fall;
Or helps th' ambitious hill the heav'ns to scale,
Or scoops in circling theatres the vale;
Alexander Pope, Epistles to Several Persons: Moral Essays, ed. Frederick Wilse Bateson (London:
Methuen, 1951), 57-60.
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own free identity.” 198 However, Eagleton’s argument for an increasingly democratized access to
taste disregards the extent to which the upper class’s ability to not simply appreciate beauty but
to create it from their own stocks of wealth proves that private land use was not only a vital
object of government protection but lent governments and politicians their moral authority.

4.2

Modern tastes, timeless virtues
Known for authoring The Castle of Otranto (1764) and for being the son of Prime

Minister Sir Robert Walpole (1676-1745), Horace Walpole first presented The History of the
Modern Taste in Gardening in his Anecdotes of Painting in England (1780).199 He selfpublished this four-volume collection at Strawberry Hill Press, an imprint named after the Gothic
Revival home he commissioned at Twickenham. The text participates in an eighteenth-century
subgenre of manuals instructing the rich to improve their large, rural estates. Improvement could
mean either techniques to increase agricultural production or landscaping practices thought to
beautify the property in part by concealing reminders of the manual labor improvement required.
Whereas manuals like Stephen Switzer’s Ichnographia Rustica (1741-1742) or Henry Home,
Lord Kames’s Gentleman Farmer (1776) borrowed a georgic register to affirm that agricultural
improvement signified civic virtue and even gave the land a sort of pragmatic beauty for its
contributions to the commonwealth, Walpole’s essay argues for a similar link between
proprietors’ efforts at naturalistic beautification and personal morality. Despite Walpole’s claim
that “it is not my business to lay down rules for gardens, but to give the history of them,” the
essay’s aesthetic theory presents tasteful landscaping as “opulence of a free country” as well as
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proof of the civic virtues needed to administer the laws which enable that opulence (Walpole, 51;
58).
First comparing Walpole’s prose and Mason’s stated purpose for using georgic poetry
allows us to recognize the association between naturalistic landscaping and liberalism. In short,
Walpole’s essay implies that the British aristocracy’s execution and patronizing of arts such as
naturalistic landscaping conclusively proves the moral superiority of British government while
Mason emphasizes the potential for creativity and satisfaction which Britain’s constitutionally
protected rights and liberties afford its subjects. Walpole specifically attempts to close debate
over taste by claiming that naturalism’s timeless style emerged as gardeners shed past mistakes
to finally mimic nature’s own, ideal forms. His wit and high-minded yet dilettantish blurring of
learned and conversable discourse interpellates a ruling class while disseminating naturalism to a
wider public.200 The essay’s inclusion in the Anecdotes of Painting suggests that Walpole’s
subject was meant for non-aristocratic connoisseurs with disposable income.201 Yet Walpole’s
primary addressees possess an inherited right to improvable lands; the text’s emphasis on
heritable property rights to estates implies that such rights metonymize the physical property
itself, which stays in the hands of an elite ruling class, and thus also imply low social mobility.
The prose identifies and speaks to a class of improvers about their corresponding obligations to
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beautify England and oversee its freedom.202 Using a different style to convey a similar
message, Mason’s Preface announces his intent to use the georgic mode to wash readers in the
beauty attending both poetry and gardening in the service of his moralization of the
government’s defense of “BRITISH FREEDOM” (Mason, v-vii; IV.687). Framing his text as a
“Didactic Poem, of which the Georgics of Virgil afford so perfect an example,” assumes the
educated audience traditionally addressed by georgics.203 The georgic mode holds in tension its
didactic assertion of fixed, moral laws of nature with earthier, subjective, detailed images of the
world’s infinite variety of things which call for political economy. Supported by the notion of
cross-pollinating sister arts204, he also compares the aesthetic experience of reading his georgic
poem with naturalistic landscaping and thereby poses both reading and gardening as appreciative
and creative activities.205 Yet although middling classes might be able to read the poem in an
associative, writerly fashion and even possess taste and civic virtue, they lack the wealth and
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property rights that allow for the landscape park’s creation and that ultimately legitimize political
participation.206
Walpole argues for naturalism by tracking three, related trends in gardening which are
useful for us to note because they ground naturalism’s evocation of liberty in histories of
material practices dependent on wealth and ownership. These three trends include the erasure of
pragmatic, economy- or labor-evincing elements from pleasure gardens, a cultural-geographic
progress, and stylistic shifts. The first track distinguishes practical kitchen gardens -- which
clearly display their affiliations with manual labor, economy, and care and which thereby differ
in their purpose and appearance -- from the wide lawns, wandering paths, and sprinkled copses
of entertaining, landscape parks.207 Walpole notes “how naturally and insensibly the idea of a
kitchen-garden slid into that which has for so many ages been…distinguished by the name of a
pleasure-garden” (Walpole, 24). He begins with legendary, practical gardens in the hortus
conclusus tradition.208 Walpole cites and dismisses Eden’s garden “prototype” (“it does not
belong to the present discussion”) because naturalism does not love a wall, and because it was
too obviously practical for being filled with “every tree that was pleasant to the sight and good

Barthes’s concept of an open, writerly text comports especially well with the georgic mode’s
thematization of care, labor, seemingly infinite, ecological variety, and continuous production. “…the
writerly text is ourselves writing, before the infinite play of the world (the world as function) is traversed,
intersected, stopped, plasticized by some singular system (Ideology, Genus, Criticism) which reduces the
plurality of entrances, the opening of network, the infinity of languages.” Ultimately, the British georgic
presumes its themes to be contained and determined by natural law, but the text and the garden are both
experienced from a subject’s necessarily limited, incomplete point of view. Roland Barthes, S/Z, trans.
Richard Miller (New York: Blackwell, 2002), 5.
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for food” (Walpole, 17; 18). Other examples such as the garden of Alcinous, the hanging
gardens of Babylon, and both rural and urban Roman gardens repeat Eden’s aesthetic sins by
being mixed-use gardens and having defensive walls which disrupt scenic continuity and
disagreeably recall utility and economy.209 However, some Roman villas and later, geometric
European gardens, such as the seventeenth-century jardin à la française, expelled elements
suggesting use-value. Naturalism develops the premise of gardens-for-useless-beauty’s-sake by
insisting that its own design principles could provide lasting, disinterested aesthetic pleasure and
by obscuring even the labor required to refine landscape’s own distinct qualities.
Cultural-geographic and stylistic trends together led to the discovery and gradual
implementation of naturalistic designs suited to England’s free soil. In terms of geography, the
shedding of tasteless styles occurred along a roughly occidental path from the aforementioned
gardens in the current Middle East, to Greece and Rome, to early modern developments in Italy,
the Netherlands, and France, before England’s discovery of a timeless style. Stylistically,
Walpole disdains designs in which elements tend to be geometric and abstract or excessively
irregular and novel. These approaches may overlap and each answer what he considers to be
unhealthy or immoral preferences for artifice rather than for nature’s own tendencies towards
irregularity and asymmetry. The gardens of Andre Le Notre (1613-1700) at Versailles typified
the abstract style of French formal gardens. Walpole finds the geometric style not only to raise
unwelcome, socio-political associations with France’s arbitrary and absolutist government but
also to contaminate English’s own practices; he thus disdains formal gardens’ right angles,
symmetrical parterres, and lined paths. Ornamental topiaries, fountains, and excessive statues
and buildings reinforce his sense of French artificiality. Walpole also rejects England’s fondness
“Gardening was probably one of the first arts that succeeded to that of building houses, and naturally
attended property and individual possession.” (Walpole, 17)
209
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for novelty, which he associates with Chinese influence. Elements such as an “artificial
perpendicular rock” or a “mæandring bridge” feed a misguided taste for surprising forms or
juxtapositions that artificially heighten a viewer’s interest.210 Unlike unnatural, French and
Chinese styles, naturalism prefers smooth curves and borders blurred, serrated, or otherwise
made irregular. Carefully employed asymmetry and gradual transitions between colors ensure a
coherent aesthetic capture by the idea of unity in variety. Though nature may elsewhere be
sublime, rugged, or barren, naturalism’s modest variety and timeless beauty continuously please
viewers, whereas novel, exaggerated, and overwrought elements lose their power to hold a
viewer’s interest. By explicating the three tracks, Walpole asserts naturalism’s timeless ability to
satisfy viewers’ disinterested, aesthetic sensibilities.
Walpole based the aesthetics of naturalistic beauty on a quasi-physiological theory of
intellectual pleasure which seemed to prove that tasteful landscaping principles required moral
sensibility for their discovery and appreciation. On this topic he borrows significantly from John
Locke and Joseph Addison in that his essay’s defense of naturalism attributes the ability to
perceive visual beauty to a person’s righteousness, civic virtue, and commitment to liberal
principles.211 Both Addison and Walpole absorbed Lockean epistemology and thought that

“[Chinese gardens] are as whimsically irregular as European gardens are formally uniform, and
unvaried—but with regard to nature, it seems as much avoided, as in the squares and oblongs and strait
lines of our ancestors. … In short, this pretty gaudy scene is the work of caprice and whim; and when we
reflect on their buildings, presents no image but that of insubstantial tawdriness.” (Walpole, 38-39)
211
We have seen that John Locke and Adam Smith oriented their liberal, political economy theories
regarding property rights and liberty around the concept of pleasure. For instance, Locke describes
liberty as the volitional choice of a rational, moral preference that pleases the individual and benefits both
herself and society. Smith argues that the experience of sympathizing with and being thought worthy of
merit by other people instinctively causes pleasure and so will lead people to act according to moral
norms. Marion Harney’s Place-Making for the Imagination: Horace Walpole and Strawberry Hill shows
the similarity of Joseph Addison’s “On the Pleasures of the Imagination” Spectator essays (1711-1712) to
Walpole’s text. For example, “The literary concept of painting scenes in narrative together with
gardening practices first delineated by Addison were to become an important part of Pope’s poetics and
Walpole’s philosophy.” Spectator 414 cites landscaping to prove naturalism’s superiority to blatantly
210
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associative pleasure arises in conjunction with the transitions from objective, primary sensations
to subjective, secondary sensations and then to a network of contingent, personal associations.212
Reason compares new perceptions with its pre-existing ideas as a prelude to developing and
refining complex ideas. Pleasure arises when reason discovers identity, affinity, and difference
between new images and accepted ideas. Though Paul Guyer claims that Addison did not
ground his aesthetic theories in morality, Addison nevertheless suggests that the pleasure in
reasoning exists to pursue timeless principles:213
The final cause, probably, of annexing pleasure to this operation of the mind was to
quicken and encourage us in our searches after truth, since the distinguishing one thing
from another, and the right discerning betwixt our ideas, depends wholly upon our
comparing them together, and observing the congruity or disagreement that appears
among the several works of Nature.214
Addison’s belief that pleasure serves the search for truth echoes natural law’s premise that
human reason can derive moral principles from the empiric study of physical nature, though he
admits that scenic pleasures of the imagination do not themselves produce original, innovative
understanding. Walpole’s pleasures of the prospective imagination are not themselves innately
instructive, but rather index people’s civic virtue by resonating with their own moral beauty.215

artificial designs for pleasing viewers. Marion Harney, Place-Making for the Imagination: Horace
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Naturalism’s design principles are superior to other styles because they provide enduring, visual
interest as opposed to the artificial and distasteful forms found rejected by modern English taste.
Conversely, an object or form’s ability to give consistent pleasure indicates that it is consistent
with nature and possesses moral truth.
While Addison provided Walpole with naturalism’s aesthetic theory, William Hogarth’s
Analysis of Beauty (1753) more clearly explicates its visual design principles.216 Walpole’s
landscape design principles such as curved lines, variety, and simplicity echo topics in Hogarth’s
text. For example, Hogarth prefigures Walpole’s preference for moderate, respectable
irregularity in “Of Simplicity, or Distinctness”: “[W]hen variety is join’d to (simplicity), then it
pleases because it enhances the pleasure of variety, by giving the eye the power of enjoying it
with ease.”217 Moderate variety in shapes, colors, and chiaroscuro offer many objects for the

therefore potentially morally beautiful objects. Though my project only occasionally touches on
Shaftesbury, his claim for a nation’s government as an aesthetic object has obvious similarities with my
own claim that the georgic garden is a figure for the nation:
There are several ways in which we can take our bearings in these proposals for rural and
extensive gardening and see their connections with the georgic tradition in seventeenth-century
England. …We can look at actual estate layouts of the period, and we can consult a somewhat
opaque pronouncement by the third Earl of Shaftesbury, whose genius presides over much more
of this material than is generally accepted today (not least because of his strong determination
that English art should discover its own taste and style).
What is relevant here are the gardening consequences of Shaftesbury’s notion set out in
The Moralists that each natural thing has an inherent character; we may have lost sight of these
qualities, but Shaftesbury nonetheless argues that inherent perfections or characters can be
relearnt – perhaps by seeing them refined and reasserted in the artificial world of a garden where
man has cultivated the nascent taxonomy of natural forms.
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cognitive free play that Walpole associates with imaginative pleasure. Hogarth goes on to say
that “The shapes and colors of plants, flowers, leaves,…seem of little other intended use than
that of entertaining the eye with the pleasure of variety” and “I mean here, and everywhere
indeed, a composed variety; for variety uncomposed, and without degree is confusion and
deformity.”218 Transitions from ground cover, to shrubs, to large trees and mixing species of
shrubs and flowers create subtle gradations of color and light and achieve Walpole’s desired
smoothness and harmony. Borders should be irregular or blurred, and asymmetric curves should
replace straight lines to create visual interest. Walpole cites Milton’s “prophetic eye of taste”
which saw that Eden possessed these agreeable, naturalistic characteristics:219
--from the sapphire fount the crisped brooks,
Rolling on orient pearl and sands of gold,
With mazy error under pendent shades
Ran nectar, visiting each plant, and fed
Flow’rs worthy of Paradise, which not nice art
In beds and curious knots, but nature boon
Pour’d forth profuse on hill and dale and plain,
Both where the morning sun first warmly smote
The open field, and where the unpierc’d shade
Imbrown’d the noon-tide bow’rs. — Thus was this place
A happy rural seat of various view. (Walpole, 30-31)
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Walpole invokes Milton in order to borrow the authority of his voice, not just as a preeminent,
creative, English Genius but as the poet of a distinctly English, political liberty.
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Emphasizing Walpole’s preference for “nature” rather than “nice art,” the passage includes key,
naturalistic elements; flowers are grouped in irregular, “curious knots,” and the “mazy” streams
exhibit “freedom of pencil” (Walpole, 30). Of William Kent’s designs, Walpole praises “the
beauty of the gentle swell, or concave swoop” and states that the “gentle stream was taught to
serpentine seemingly at its pleasure” and that “borders were smoothed, but preserved their
waving irregularity” (Walpole, 43; 45). Walpole suggests that smooth curves and irregular
borders connote viewers’ civic virtue and commitment to political liberty; his pictorial references
to “freedom” of design, the “open field,” and the free pencils of both the landscaper and Milton
imply that the personal motive to improve property originates from liberalism itself.220
Walpole conveys that a naturalistic beautification signifies a proprietor’s capacity for
government administration by arguing that such improvements reflect personal virtues
corresponding with an individual’s ability to be consistently disinterested, fair, and just rather
than being arbitrary, capricious, and mercenary. He makes this point by attributing tasteless
landscaping in China and France to the debased virtues of the ruling elite and by implication
their larger political systems.221 The Chinese taste for novel, whimsical, and grotesque forms
such as those in the imperial gardens show that the gardens’ “pomp,” “caprice and whim” and
“unsubstantial[ity]” connotes the despotism of China’s government, which corrodes its rulers’
valuation of liberty and taste for beauty (Walpole, 25; 39). Similarly, fecklessness affects
Chinese and French aristocrats and causes an immoderate “pursuit of variety” (Walpole, 54).
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Arbitrary political power and the excessive pursuit of self-interest by elites loom behind
these improper foreign tastes; such problems also threaten the virtue and taste of English persons
whose wealth enables retirement on secluded estates. Great wealth and rural seats may lead
proprietors to quell the potential tedium of country life with visual extravagance. Walpole states,
“A modern French writer has in a very affected phrase given an account of this, I will call it,
distemper. He says, l’ennui du beau amene le gout [sic] du singulier.”222 The French quote
implies that isolation can produce peculiar, immoderate, self-serving, and anti-social tastes.
Whether caused the corruption, love of luxury, or boredom, le gout du singulier contrasts with
naturalism’s simplicity and timelessness. However, proprietors insulated by wealth and distance
from commercial centers may also theoretically be less involved in mercenary, self-interested
business and should therefore be freer to take a general interest in overseeing public liberty and
the commonwealth. Retired land owners on estates with wide, open prospects secured by
property laws at once exemplify happy, private citizens and symbolize a well-governed nation in
harmony with natural laws.
Liberty depends on the existence of a wealthy, virtuous, administrative class. The essay’s
first words avow the importance of land ownership: “Gardening was probably one of the first
arts that succeeded to that of building houses, and naturally attended property and individual
possession” (Walpole, 17). Walpole presents the garden as relieving economic care and
permitting moral stability. The garden’s development into naturalistic landscapes enjoyed by the
first rank represents the expansion of rights to the wider, British polity: “Truth…will probably
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not carry our style of garden into general use on the continent. The expence is only suited to the
opulence of a free country where emulation reigns among many independent particulars”
(Walpole, 58). Having seen unity in variety as an aesthetic principle, here it suggests that an
individual’s enjoyment of their personal wealth is a function of the government-protected rights
which belong to each English citizen, though in practice the public might only avail itself of
bare, personal rights such as habeas corpus rather than enjoying possession of landed property.
The taste and virtues necessary for creating landscape parks’ open fields contrast with the caprice
and arbitrariness signified by artificial gardens’ “geometry of power”; moreover, English gardens
signify their proprietors’ ability to protect the public’s rights through the managerial work of
government.223 Similarly, Walpole identifies naturalism as a distinctly English rather than
British style of gardening. He seems to suggest that England plays a structurally similar role in
the British Empire as estate-owning plutocrats do in England’s socio-economic order. Though
other countries and territories nominally benefit from exposure to British markets and rule,
England alone embodies the unifying principle of freedom and can maintain stability amid the
cultural variety of the larger empire.

4.3

Garden management
Where Walpole’s essay implies a correspondence between moral requirements for the

work of improving proprietors and the work of statecraft, Mason’s didactic vignettes draw a
direct analogy. Mason’s poem is the work of a somewhat reclusive, Cambridge-educated, Whig
clergyman. Sharing Walpole’s dilettantish interests in the sister arts, Mason also collaborated
with Walpole on An Heroic Epistle to Sir William Chambers (1773), a satirical poem rebuking
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Chambers’s welcoming Dissertation on Oriental Gardening (1772). Mason’s dramatic tragedies
Elfrida (1752) and Caractacus (1759) received moderate praise and like his juvenilia exhibit the
classicism permeating The English Garden. The poem’s four books, written between 1772 and
1782, are written in georgics’ characteristically hybrid style of history, parable, allegory,
biography, scenic descriptions, fragments of gardening instructions, fragments of aesthetic
theory, elegy, odes, and ekphrasis on painting. The Preface to the poem’s corrected edition of
1783 announces his intention to adapt the georgic mode to an innovative, poetic defense of
naturalistic gardening. Mason tells readers that his poem, like the naturalistic garden, uses
beautiful content to convey moral principles while also insinuating the georgic garden’s
symbolization of a nation whose laws and officers manifest those principles. Compared with
Walpole’s essay, the poem explicitly argues that proprietors who beautify their gardens in the
naturalistic style thereby demonstrate a civic virtue that suits them for liberal government.
A few examples evince The English Garden’s agreement with Walpole’s essay in
advocating naturalism. The following quote shows that Mason argues by giving detailed
examples of naturalism’s aesthetic principles rather than by narrating the history of their
discovery; in one passage he figures their implementation by narrating an imaginary person’s
walk through a sequence of improved prospects.224 The preceding stanza establishes Mason’s
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In the Abdalonimus parable, Mason details scenery visible along the path Alexander takes into
Abdalonimus’s grove:
A pathway brown
Led thro’ the pass, meeting a fretful brook,
…
From the flower’d verge
Of this clear rill now stray’d the devious path,
…
Now, to the left, the path ascending pierc’d
A smaller sylvan theatre, yet deck’d
With more majestic foliage. (Mason, II.504-505; II.513-5.14; II.526-528)
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familiarity with landscape’s painterly optics by highlighting the placement of this stanza’s flora
in the low, foregrounded third of the three, conventional, color-differentiated tiers:225
Where’er thou wind’st
That path, take heed between the scene and eye,
TO vary and to mix the chosen greens.
Here for a while with cedar or with larch,
That from the ground spread their close texture, hide
The view entire. Then o’er some lowly tuft,
Where rose and woodbine bloom, permit its charms
To burst upon the sight; now thro’ a copse
Of beech, that rear their smooth and stately trunks,
Admit it partially, and half exclude,
And half reveal its graces; in this path,
How long soe’er the wanderer roves, each step
Shall wake fresh beauties; each short point present
A different picture, new, and yet the same. (Mason, I.204-215)
Mason presents the landscape—and ultimately Britain—as a carefully, though not too obviously
composed space designed for occupants’ enjoyment. A winding path’s perspectival
discontinuity creates visual interest for viewers walking along it. The path is also more
interesting to look at from a hilltop than from a straight, tree-lined alley would be due to the
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innate pleasure of curves, and because paths guide the eye through the landscape.226 The third
line paraphrases naturalism’s principle of unity in variety. Sightlines are interrupted by the path,
by artfully placed shrubs and clumps of trees and a gently rolling terrain that together repeat the
path’s sinuous line of beauty. Mason augments the passage’s naturalistic beauty with the poetic
beauty of blank verse while moving between abstract, design principles and detailed examples.
The English Garden begins its first and last books by apostrophizing naturalism’s
timeless principle: Simplicity. Like Walpole’s core principle of unity in variety, Simplicity
invites difference and complexity; yet, in doing so it excludes highly irregular, deviant, and
overwrought garden elements that would disturb holistic visual harmony.227 The poem opens by
describing Simplicity as an authoritative moral standard for judging landscaping, georgic poetry,
and by extension the georgic garden’s liberal political economy:
TO thee, divine SIMPLICITY! to thee,
Best arbitress of what is good and fair,
This verse belongs. O, as it freely flows,
Give it thy powers of pleasing; else in vain
It strives to teach the rules, from Nature drawn,
Of import high to those whose taste would add
To Nature’s careless graces (Mason, I.1-7)
Mason presents his poem’s own georgic method of beauty serving didacticism as an instance of
the principled subordination of pleasure to practical purposes that will inform estate
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The hilltop views associated with many loco-descriptive poems demonstrate the prospective eye,
which we have seen in The Seasons and which sublimates both epistemological and imperial urges to
comprehend and control the material world and its peoples.
227
To foreshadow my point, though the passage defends tasteful naturalism against tasteless artifice, it
also represents a preference for liberalist policies to the exclusion of mercantilist interventionism and the
violence of repressive state apparatuses.
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improvement. “Good and fair” play on the idea of pleasure’s proper uses and “bounds” in the
sense that pleasure itself can be a useful, even pedagogical tool for cultivating taste given that
beauty can index the righteousness of a thing and its maker.228 Book Four’s apostrophe rejects
the “foreign” and the “false” in “Art’s domain” to indict the shifting fashions that Walpole had
associated with French venality and inconstant virtue (Mason, IV.4; IV.2).229 The apostrophe to
Simplicity also forecasts the poem’s address to and instruction of an elite audience by implicitly
framing the reader as a witness to the poet’s own invocation.230 The passage goes on to specify
that while it may teach tasteful appreciation, it interpellates its primary, elite audience by
identifying subjects wealthy enough to beautify their estates by “add[ing] / To Nature’s careless
graces.”
Naturalism’s aesthetic principles of simplicity and unity in variety describe a method
within a narrow, artistic field for imposing order on nature. The naturalistic aesthetic sublimates
plutocrats’ moral obligations to impose order across politico-economic domains in a world
whose complexity and challenges Mason’s poem illustrates in greater detail than does Walpole’s
essay. Georgics readily admit that scarcity and care guide humans to study the challenges and
opportunities of their natural environment. The georgic garden and the well-governed British

Elsewhere, Mason’s reinforces this tenet of propriety though with a more plainly economic meaning.
“But chief consult him ere thou dar’st decide / Th’ appropriate bounds of pleasure, and of Use” (II.159160). The subordination of pleasure to use means that a land’s economic uses should be prioritized but
also that in georgic poetry and gardening the pleasure of the beautiful can serve use and itself become
useful by directing attention toward or signifying moral principles. Mason’s theory of the georgic
suggests that poetic beauty and ornament offer a sort of superficial pleasure analogous to artifice or
novelty in landscaping, but which acquires moral validity to the extent that it serves the poem’s didactic
message.
229
“If I smile at such visions, still one must be glad that in the whirl of fashions, beneficence should have
its turn in vogue; and though the French treat the virtues like every thing else, but as an object of mode, it
is to be hoped that they too will, every now and then, come into fashion again.” (Walpole, 41)
230
Jonathan Culler argues that poetic apostrophe stages the poet’s visionary voice and teases readers’
awareness of their own, spectatorial presence. Jonathan Culler, The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics,
literature, deconstruction (London: Routledge, 2001), 156-157.
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nation it represents are, in my project’s language, apparatuses which regulate the world for the
purpose of helping individuals to freely and rationally pursue pleasure. In the georgic garden’s
case, the study, appreciation, and naturalistic replication of nature’s aesthetic beauty serves an
end similar to the study of physical nature in The Seasons; such studies cultivate the moral
principles that legitimize states which unify the nation by equitably enforcing private rights.
From the perspective of variety and particularity, the study of nature, whether with an eye toward
aesthetic or physical rules, gives individuals methods for better instrumentalizing otherwise
scarce material resources. Regarding the poem’s central theme of landscaping, material nature
determines the local conditions and limitations which would-be improvers must negotiate,
organize, and harmonize to create landscape parks. For example, English gardens require
adequate water sources that must not form a contrived, artificial, “stiff unlink’d chain / Of flat
canals” (Mason, III.425-426). Mason emphasizes landscaping’s deference to nature in terms of
proprietors’ negotiation of contingent, material conditions in addition to naturalistic principles:
Learn that, whene’er in some sublime scene
Imperial Nature of her headlong floods
Permits our imitation, she herself
Prepares their reservoir; conceal’d perchance
In neighb’ring hills, where first it well behoves
Our toil to search… (Mason, III.438-443)
By “Permit[ting the] imitation of “Imperial Nature,” Mason claims that nature itself authorizes
naturalism’s imposition on nature to better control it and connotes a similar authorization for
England’s control and exploitation of the British Empire. More narrowly, the passage insists that
proprietors reproduce nature’s best likeness with the resources afforded.
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Elsewhere, Mason cites different climates and anticipates hardiness zones to exemplify a
more general condition limiting plant selection. Nature differentiates indigenous plants apt to
thrive in English gardens from plants requiring careful oversight:
Nor will [Art], scorning truth and taste, devote
To strange, and alien soils, her seedling stems;
…
From Nature’s laws
[Art] draws her own; Nature and she are one.
…
Nor will [Art’s] prudence, when intent to form
One perfect whole, on feeble aid depend,
And give exotic wonders to our gaze.
She knows and therefore fears the faithless train:
…
Warn’d by his error, let the Planter slight
These shiv’ring rarities (III.226-227; III.230-132; III.240-243; III.287-288)
Mason reinforces the idea that English gardens’ design principles are subject to and conditioned
by nature’s physical laws. Chauvinist tropes emphasize that exotic species may be hard to
integrate into the garden’s unity given that their visual interest relies on a potentially
disconcerting novelty. More fundamentally, England’s climate simply prevents Mediterranean
and Indian “Aliens” from surviving without recourse to greenhouses (Mason, III.286). The use
of opportune waterways and appropriate flora exemplify attention to harmonizing local,
ecological conditions via general design principles. Poetically oscillating between abstract
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principles and concrete details, Mason conveys that the georgic garden signifies an apparatus that
is itself created in harmony with nature’s law and diffuses that harmony among the various
elements within the space that it organizes and unifies.
Complementing naturalism’s negotiation of local, ecological conditions, The English
Garden acknowledges politico-economic topics such as pragmatism, commerce, and labor. Such
topics appear in Mason’s moralizing statements about pleasure and use and in the Abdalonimus
and Alcander vignettes; they are important for my argument because the georgic garden
analogizes these worldly objects of liberal, political economy with the material objects
transformed by naturalistic beautification. Mason takes a sober, practical tone early in the poem
by establishing unpleasant work to be the universal lot of “Industrious man, by heav’n’s first law
ordain’d / To earn his food by labour” (Mason, I.105-106). Gardening for pleasure can only
occur when the more pressing needs of subsistence have become a remote concern; meantime,
pragmatism and “use” must be prioritized over pleasure as in georgic poetry. Mason warns
proprietors to beware of “Th’ appropriate bounds of Pleasure, and of Use; / For Pleasure, lawless
robber, oft invades / Her neighbour’s right” (Mason, II.160-162). The line tropes on property
rights to warn against not only a corrupt taste for unnatural gardening styles but also the more
general love of luxury that would sacrifice farmland and the public good to personal pleasure.231

Mason describes an Elizabethan aristocracy’s unwelcome taste for pomp, fashion, and excessive
refinement, which inspired the production of artificial and unappealing landscapes:
Not but the mode of that romantic age,
The age of tourneys, triumphs, and quaint masques,
Glar’d with fantastic pageantry, which dimm’d
The sober eye of truth, and dazzled ev’n
The Sage himself; witness his high-arch’d hedge,
In pillar’d state by carpentry upborn,
With colour’d mirrors deck’d, and prison’d birds. (Mason, I.422-428)
231
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In addition to citing rural land’s economic utility as farmland and aneconomic, pleasuregiving utility as naturalistic landscape, the poem also refers to manual labor and trade networks
that enlarge the commonwealth and influence the socio-economic order. For example, Mason
recognizes that garden improvement directed by rich owners requires the manual labor of the
lower ranks. He acknowledges the work of the “plodding hind” and the meager “Cot” where
“Penury and Toil within reside” (Mason, II.400; II.406; II.409). Later, Mason presents Alcander
as the creative designer of an arguably overwrought estate, but there again we see “hinds, /
Call’d to the task, their willing axes wield” (Mason, IV.639-640). The appearance of human
capital managed by Alcander and the background upheavals of the American Revolutionary War
indicate a larger socio-economic order beyond the story’s three dignified, lead characters.232 In
the Abdalonimus story devoted to “To Commerce and to Care,” Mason establishes the setting to
be a major trade port that will contrast with the discovery of Abdalonimus’s humble home:
…[the sun’s] slaunting beams
Shot to the strand, and purpled all the main,
Where Commerce saw her Sidon’s freighted wealth,
With languid streamers, and with folded sails,
Float in a lake of gold. The wind was hush’d… (Mason, II.488-492)
This parable of moral government starts by recognizing Sidon’s status as an important, economic
nexus in a wider network of international trade. The scene’s calm weather and the unfilled sails
suggest that tyranny and war have arrested the port’s usual business. Abdalonimus’s
contentment and his carefully tended garden sanctuary insulate him from the city’s profiteers.

Again, the upheavals signify the imperfection in nature’s beauty; Mason’s georgic insists that
naturalism should be able to control these aberrations and implies that proprietor-politics should also be
able to manage the global, socio-political instabilities arising in the course of Britain’s imperial project.
232
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Though he is not wealthy, his retirement and his humble work ethic designate his ability to
oversee the legally protected liberties that allow a society to prosper. The pleasure he takes in
his sanctuary, which Alexander admiringly reiterates, signals that property rights are among the
most important of these liberties.

4.4

Two faces of the genius
The georgic garden’s liberal political economy implies that property rights are the basis

for socio-economic stability and are therefore a crucial object for government oversight. The
texts rarely refer to property rights; instead, the texts address them indirectly by referring to
freedom and liberty in aesthetic or broad political contexts in addition to the central thematic of
private land use. For example, Walpole describes naturalism’s “freedom of pencil” and the
“[f]reedom…given to the form of trees” and Mason refers to his poem’s “freely flow[ing],”
blank verse as means for matching superficial beauty of aesthetic creations to the moral beauty
of nature’s principles (Walpole, 30; 45; Mason, I.2). These contrast naturalism’s affiliations
with disinterested taste and political liberty with French formal gardens’ geometry of arbitrary
political power. Mason invokes past and present political history to champion a liberal, rightsoriented concept of freedom. He identifies “Liberty and Peace” as a nation’s “best blessings”
and on multiple occasions contrasts his positive visions of Britain’s political freedom with
examples of tyranny, violence and slavery (Mason, II.602). For example, he calls the “freeborn”
“sons of Albion” the inheritors of Greek liberty and unfavorably compares Rome (“While Rome
was free”) with the modern papal state subjected to “slavish superstition” (Mason, I.51; I.50;
I.61; I.62). He reproaches Charles II for having been an “abject tool to France, / C[o]me back to
smile his subjects into slaves” (Mason, I.468-469). By contrast, he praises the British
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government’s respect for natural rights while hinting at the risk of backsliding with his brief,
sympathetic gesture to the Thirteen Colonies in the Alcander parable. Mason’s georgic garden
figures this relation between liberal political economy, property rights, and rights in general as
the basis for individual and collective prosperity:
Each plant that springs
Holds, like the people of some free-born state,
Its rights fair franchis’d; rooted to a spot
It yet has claim to air; from liberal heav’n
It yet has claim to sunshine, and to showers;
Air, showers, and sunshine are its liberty. (Mason, III.179-184)
In this allegory, the garden represents England and the plants England’s rights-bearing citizens.
The plant’s figurative property rights give way to a larger bundle of rights. The allegory implies
that individuals have a right to life-sustaining resources; more cynically, individuals may claim a
proprietary right to enjoy resources should they be able to appropriate or “claim” them in the first
place. For many English people, being “rooted to a spot” refers to their inclusion in a national
identity that grants them legal protections as well as referring to their inclusion in a protocapitalist, socio-economic order rather than guaranteeing their ownership of a homestead. Yet,
even prior to possession of any material property, the passage figures natural rights, whether to
property, to non-injury, or otherwise, as themselves a type of permanent property. Security
against physical injury may be a more fundamental natural right, but property rights become a
sort of archetypal right that a person innately “Holds,” because the poem’s liberalist version of
natural law regards natural rights in toto as fixed possessions which enable the enjoyment of
one’s life, health, and liberty, as well as possessions. In a poem about land use, the ability to
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properly employ and enjoy beautified land takes on heightened significance to become the
emblematic object of governmental protection while also providing a figure for the correct
performance of that oversight.
Given the centrality of property rights and especially land ownership to the georgic
garden’s liberal, political economy, Mason’s use of the genius loci provides a heuristic for
understanding his analogy of naturalistic landscaping with liberal government. Mason invokes
multiple Geniuses; most guard famous or privately-owned plots of land while one guards the
whole of England. In each case, the Genius is a withdrawn, watchful steward who only emerges
in order to inflict mostly undefined retribution against transgressors who misuse the land
including betrayals of its naturalistic aesthetic. Thus, each Genius possesses both a passive, noninterventionist aspect and an active, interventionist aspect. Moreover, Mason associates
Geniuses with both gentleman gardeners and politicians; because the Abdalonimus and Alcander
stories frame gardening and governing as comparable, even interdependent roles, applying the
Genius’s passive-active duality to each of these two roles clarifies The English Garden’s sense of
plutocratic liberalism.
Mason’s longest passage on a local Genius describes it as ensuring that improvements to
its local plot of land comport with naturalism. He applies explicitly political terms to the Genius,
which gives naturalism’s aesthetic principles a juridical, moralizing cast:
Him then, that sov’reign Genius, Monarch sole
Who, from creation’s primal day, derives
His right divine to this his rural throne,
Approach with meet obeisance; at his feet
Let our aw’d art fall prostrate.
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…Yet to those
Who do him loyal service, who revere
His dignity, nor aim, with rebel arms,
At lawless usurpation, is he found
Patient and placable… (Mason, II.110-114; II.119-122)
Each Genius tends to be grand, stately, retiring, and “Awfull still” in “his shadowy pomp”
(Mason, II.137; II.155). Beyond their phantasmatic character, Geniuses remain withdrawn
unless enforcing aesthetic laws. As a “sylvan Despot,” the Genius even blurs between figuring a
political personage and figuratively embodying the law itself. Given the Genius’s typical
passivity, its character models a liberalist approach to implementing and enforcing laws, which is
to say that the state largely restricts its direct interventions into the socio-economic order to
preventing and punishing injuries to personal rights.
Due to their attachment to local plots of land, Mason’s Geniuses are most immediately
affiliated with estate owners whose wealth, civic virtue, and taste should incline them to estate
improvement. Walpole and Mason contrast naturalism’s simple, mimetic refinements with
artifice and intervention. Naturalistic landscaping reflects a proprietor’s humble compliance
with the Genius’s prescriptions as opposed to chasing self-gratifying novelty or fleeting fashion
by imposing peculiar ideas and forms on the land they share with its Genius. Naturalistic
improvement adapts itself to each new landscape, which it simply refines rather than actively
imposing artificial designs. As mentioned, Abdalonimus carries out the naturalistic aesthetic,
and Alcander’s emotional rebalancing turns on his recovered interest in competent estate
improvement. Further, Geniuses’ tendency to be withdrawn correlates with land owners’
retirement from the worlds of venal commerce and fashion. Financial security and retirement are
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the best means to cultivate disinterest and to prevent one’s morals from being corrupted by
profit-seeking or the desire to impress others with ornamental displays of wealth, though
Abdalonimus achieves as much with his remarkable example of a simple life of seclusion and
toil. Problematically for plutocracy, the lower ranks may acquire both taste and civic virtue.
Still, the best evidence of civic virtue is not tasteful appreciation, but instead submitting to
Geniuses’ intentions for their land’s best use. Taken further, civic virtue fundamentally depends
on the transmission and inheritance of aristocratic wealth which functions like a passively
acquired birthright.
Correlative with Geniuses’ tendency to be withdrawn, politicians govern best by only
directly interceding in the nation’s domestic affairs to correct clear disruptions of a natural order
in which socio-economic divisions are maintained and individuals are free to pursue their selfinterest.233 Mason shares Adam Smith’s preference for liberal markets and states but speaks less
directly about institutional or repressive state apparatuses than do Thomson or Darwin.
Repressive state apparatuses must be restrained and kept inoperative unless needed to restore
order and defend liberties. Geniuses’ usual restraint not only implies which citizens should
govern but that they should govern according to a liberal, political economy prioritizing natural
rights and commutative justice.234 By prioritize, I mean that liberal government prevents the
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For example, I read the following passage on gardening methods as applicable to broader, economic
administration. The following lines threaten a vengeful Genius’s appearance should the recommended
methods not be followed:
But learn to rein,
O Youth! whose skill essays the arduous task
That skill within the limit she allows.
Great Nature scorns controul:
…
’tis thine alone
To mend, not change her features. (Mason, II.71-7)
234
As discussed in the last chapter, commutative justice focuses on defining rights and redressing
transgression rather than trying to achieve distributive justice by actively attempting to redistribute
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infringement of private citizens’ rights by both other citizens and the state itself. My last chapter
showed that nations can assert their commitment to economic and political liberalism as long as
institutional state apparatuses’ use soft power to subjectivize their nation’s public rather than
engaging in interventionist protectionism or flagrantly turning repressive state apparatuses
against private citizens. The cessation of trade in Sidon due to the political violence caused by
Persian tyrant Azemilcus and by the conquering Alexander provides a counterexample to
peaceful liberalism’s positive, economic effects. By contrast, Abdalonimus imposes neither on
nature’s beauty nor on society. He demonstrates his fitness to rule by secluding himself in his
remote garden sanctuary and by letting nature, or perhaps the local Genius, the “Parent of good,”
direct his toil (Mason, II.557).
Turning to Geniuses’ active characteristics, Mason warns that Geniuses react to
landscapers overtly tampering with natural beauty with vaguely defined violence:
But dare with caution else expect, bold man
The injur’d Genius of the place to rise
In self-defence, and, like some giant fiend
That frowns in Gothic story, swift destroy,
By night, the puny labours of thy day. (Mason, I.83-87)
As I noted, Mason’s Geniuses barely demonstrate an active, non-punitive aspect. Rather, as a
source to be consulted, Geniuses embody natural laws like simplicity and unity in variety, which
regulate people’s creative activities while remaining a benign, enabling factor. However,
Geniuses, when required, actively respond to transgressions of their principles with sublime,
overwhelming violence. Again, Mason does not specify the form of this violence, but his

resources. Commutative justice is therefore comparatively non-interventionist and was considered to be a
more precise form of justice by political philosophers such as Adam Smith.
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Orientalist characterizations of the Genius trope on conventional associations of despotic,
arbitrary power to evoke the sublime, moral force of the natural laws that condition aesthetic
principles235 and that justify the wielding of repressive state apparatuses by legitimate
governments.236 Local Geniuses’ own retribution may simply be the glaring, tasteless
unsightliness that unnatural, formal, and arbitrary landscapes force on viewers’ sensibilities.
Thus, Geniuses’ violence would not only respond to but coincides with the violence of false
aesthetics; we can then extrapolate the moral force or justice of the acts which Geniuses’
retributive violence represents.
Proprietors actively demonstrate their fitness to govern not by imitating Geniuses’ active
interventions, but by freely improving their estates within the bounds of naturalistic principles.
Though improvement possesses a passive aspect in that proprietors subject themselves to
naturalism’s tenets, here the demonstrated will to improve is the significant side of the same
coin. Active improvement of estates is crucial for Mason, because unlike taste alone,
improvement evinces regard for the proper, virtuous uses of wealth. By themselves, taste and
land ownership remain inert credentials that merely enable civic virtue; instead, taste should
motivate the wealthy to improve their estates, rather than remaining the barely engaged
appreciation described by Addison. The improving proprietor organizes the technical
knowledge, material resources, and manual labor required to make a pleasing, orderly landscape.

Referring to the mind’s fitness for perceiving aesthetic beauty and recognizing truth and moral
principles in nature’s material face.
236
Mason invokes oriental despots to evoke sublime power:
They of Ind,
The Tartar tyrants, Tamerlane’s proud race,
Or they in Persia thron’d, who shake the rod
Of power o’er myriads of enervate slaves,
Expect not humbler homage to their pride
Than does this sylvan Despot. (Mason, II.114-119)
235

174

The georgic garden frames English gardens’ aesthetic pleasure and aesthetic pleasure more
generally as an aneconomic form of use encompassed by and subservient to practical,
instrumental use. The proprietor’s improvement tropes on the economic activity of other
industrious private citizens; however, while evincing proprietor’s managerial capacity as other
labor might, beautification is the expensive, disinterested creation of the aneconomic pleasure
offered by these apparatuses, which in turn uniquely enables proprietors to prove their capacity
to govern.
Both Abdalonimus’s and Alcander’s beautification efforts exemplify active proprietors’
virtuous taste, work ethic, and land management. For example, Mason designates Abdalonimus
as “the man of toil” (Mason, IV.674). His rulership is “doubly dear / By birth and virtue”; he
possesses the right to rule by passive, dynastic inheritance, but also because his demonstrated
“virtue,” meaning the physical labor invested in his garden, validates that right. Alexander
crowns him because Abdalonimus’s humble retirement, benevolence, and soft, naturalistic touch
in his gardening evince qualities necessary for stewarding commercial Sidon into a new period of
“Liberty and Peace” (Mason, II.602). In the Alcander parable, Alcander channels his grief for
Nerina into modest, tasteful “sylvan arts” (Mason, IV.642). When “Alcander’s taste / Disdains
to trick with emblematic toys / The place,” the poem attributes his restrained approach to
improvement to a correlative self-management and sense of aristocratic responsibility.
Finally, Geniuses’ stewardship and potential for vengeance illustrate two, active modes
of liberal government. The first mode, subtler and exemplary of liberalism in general, relates to
Geniuses’ embodying naturalism’s principles given that Geniuses oversee, enforce, and
ultimately epitomize their force and truth. Naturalism’s principles provide for modest
refinements that optimize landscapes. Similarly, liberal, positive laws create the conditions that
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foster national prosperity by maximizing the freedoms and protecting the rights of profit-seeking
subjects. Though Mason’s Geniuses do not themselves act in ways that satisfyingly correspond
with legislation or establishing and running institutional state apparatuses, to the extent that they
embody naturalism’s nomic force, naturalism’s advocates nevertheless acknowledge that its
method includes artificially manipulating an environment. That is, proprietors’ transformations
of their estates signify the administrative conditioning of the vast domain of the nation’s
disembedded economy by means of laws and other state apparatuses; naturalism sublimates
nature’s moral laws while liberal government codifies them to encourage acceptable, socioeconomic activity and to define disorderly activities that require corrective intervention. By
contrast with Geniuses’ embodiment of light-handed, liberal stewardship, their sublime, “swift
destroy[ing]” retributions confirm through the threat of righteous violence the moral authority
investing naturalism’s aesthetic principles. Such violence has a clearer analogy in the repressive
state mechanisms that Mason illustrates in his parables. Violence appears most visibly when
Alexander enters Abdalonimus’s sanctuary. The great conqueror ends the permanent state of
emergency installed by the Persian, arbitrary despotism by crowning Abdalonimus and so
validating the proprietor-politician analogy. Moreover, the crowning by Alexander demonstrates
violence to be a founding element of even legitimate states, and while the laws administered by
proprietor-politicians maintain states’ legitimacy, the state violence figured by avenging
Geniuses remains a latent, potential force for re-imposing order.
In figuring the Genius as naturalism’s guardian spirit, Mason’s descriptions of the
managerial aspects of landscaping convey various aspects of liberal political economy. He also
conveys virtues such as an equitable, disinterested taste for what is morally and aesthetically
good as suiting a person for government. Naturalistic beautification is excellent evidence of the
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civic humanism proper to politicians obliged to protect natural law-based liberties with the
apparatuses of a lean government. The pleasing beauty of Mason’s naturalistic georgic garden
figures the socio-political unity and the common prosperity achieved through good policy. By
comparison, as we shall see, Darwin’s georgic gardens also thematically re-center pleasure in the
georgic mode, but his poems instead adopt a scientific approach to argue that human’s desire for
pleasure cooperates with the expansion of a liberty understood as cognitive capacity to drive
technological progress. Darwin’s poems, like Locke’s philosophy, present a physiological theory
of liberty, but one which implies an evolutionary continuum between vegetables, animals,
humans, and human’s technological productions. Rather than discussing landscaping, Darwin’s
georgic gardens more closely follow The Seasons by arguing that the study of nature teaches us
the benefits of pursuing a sympathy-moderated hedonism while also offering resources to pursue
a technologically-driven progress of opulence. As with Smith, Darwin imagines a synergistic
expansion of human liberty and prosperity which annuls the most intrusive and violent
apparatuses of government. Darwin’s incomplete Progress of Society forecasts the destiny of the
georgic garden’s described in Economy of Vegetation and Temple of Nature such that biotechnological evolution leads to a cosmopolitan world ruled by nature’s all-comprehending,
pleasure principle.
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Chapter 5
5

“Perhaps all the productions of nature are in their progress to greater
perfection!”: The Pleasures of Physiology and Mythopoeia in Erasmus
Darwin’s Georgic Gardens

5.1

Darwin’s origins
The major poems of Erasmus Darwin continue the trend in georgics such as Thomson’s

The Seasons and Mason’s The English Garden of displacing images of agricultural labor to
instead emphasize intellectual labor and the discoveries of natural philosophy, which enable
humans to better control nature. I argue that Darwin’s poems, like Thomson’s and Mason’s, do
the ideological work of naturalizing liberal, political economy primarily through an analysis of
the physiology presented in The Temple of Nature and with reference to his The Loves of the
Plants (1789) and The Economy of Vegetation (1791) which he compiled together with Loves in
The Botanic Garden. While Darwin’s poems employ Mason’s motif of georgic gardens, Darwin
is closer to Thomson in their shared desire to popularize the sciences. Relative to earlier
chapters, I spend less time discussing states, state apparatuses, and political economy because
Darwin deploys georgic gardens to reorient the georgic around physiological pleasure and
liberty. Rather than the tasteful, aesthetic pleasure of Mason’s georgic, English gardens,
Darwin’s georgic gardens tend to be botanic and thus reflect science’s role in understanding and
encouraging physiology’s contributions to individual and collective development.
I argue that Darwin’s physiological theories of volition and association refute the idea
that liberty derives from an abstract, natural law that would precede and determine nature’s
physical being. Nor does liberty derive from government, though governments may limit it with
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state apparatuses. Liberty is a physiological effect of individual and collective evolution and is
indexed by the strength of an individual’s volitional capacity. John Locke, François Quesnay,
and Adam Smith each address the state’s politico-economic problem of enabling its subjects to
freely pursue rational self-interest, securing their personal rights, and minimizing undue
government interventions. Darwinian physiology fuses pleasure, volition, and a broadly
interpreted labor into a hedonistic ethic moderated by social sympathy and the cooperative
exchange and development of ideas. Pleasure motivates organisms to associate, cooperate,
complicate, and hybridize and thus accounts for sexual reproduction, evolution, technological
progress, language, and Darwin’s own literary experiments.
Amanda Jo Goldstein states in Sweet Science: Romantic Materialism and the New Logics
of Life, “Romantic, revisionary poetic sciences…challenged emergent life-scientific and aesthetic
protocols to understand ‘raw’ sensation itself as susceptible and generative of social and
rhetorical transformation…”237 I begin by delving deeply into Darwin’s fourfold sensorium, a
flexible physiological model that helps him to explain the life processes of all organisms. I dwell
on Darwin’s understanding of sensory pleasure and volition at greater length than many critics
who discuss his physiology, because these attributes of organisms are linchpins for his
justification for reprioritizing pleasure and mythopoeia in the context of the georgic mode.238
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His physiological model also allowed him to compare lifeforms, recognize evolutionary
continuities, and claim that universal self-interest innately causes individual organisms to
transform themselves through engagement with their environment. I then emphasize two, crucial
principles which determine the sensorium’s methods for integrating and instrumentalizing
information drawn from its environment. The principle of pleasure, poeticized by Darwin as
passions and tastes, motivate the sensorium and are volition’s main interest. Consequently, in a
variation of the georgic mode previewed in Mason’s poem, pleasure displaces manual labor as
the georgic’s central thematic. Underwritten by the sensorium, Darwin’s botanic, georgic
gardens establish a universal ethic of hedonism. The second principle, imitation, broadly
characterizes the operations of the sensorium and provides a basis for organisms’ ability to
develop their own capacities by integrating sensations, forming innovative, synthetic ideas, and
executing volitional actions. Imitation enables organisms to transform themselves and to
participate in wider transformations of collective species-life through both organic and inorganic
means.
The philosophy of technology has been helpful to my understanding of the ways in which
Darwinian physiology implies that organic self-transformation forecasts humanity’s
technological progress. As Arthur Bradley begins Originary Technicity, “In the beginning, [life]
was already a machine.”239 He observes that despite the long history of philosophers attempting
to distinguish technology from nature, others have argued that nature demonstrates mechanistic
qualities or that organisms instinctively create and manipulate technological objects.
Technology may naturally emerge from the desires and capacities of living beings, develop in a
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quasi-deterministic fashion adjudicated by physical laws, and play a significant role in
transforming human societies and their environments.
Alan Bewell connotes the significance of Darwin’s physiology-based version of originary
technicity for liberal, political economy by stating that Darwin’s botanic gardens “were more
prospective than retrospective in character, less about the discovery of a lost order of nature than
about making something new.”240 I identify his fourfold sensorium as expressing originary
technicity, because Darwin presents technological innovation as logically continuous with the
sensorium’s internal developments caused by imitation and volitional synthesis. Originary
technicity usefully frames Darwin’s prospective optimism for a peaceful, prosperous future if we
recognize that volition expands liberty by expanding its own techn(olog)ical means for pursuing
pleasure.241 For example, Darwin states, “Thy potent acts, VOLITION, still attend / The means
of pleasure to secure the end.”242 While association empowers volition, Darwin’s footnote to
these lines adds that “it is the greater energy and activity of the power of volition, that marks
mankind, and has given them the empire of the world” (III.435n). An organism’s volitional
labor may directly alter the capacities of its own sensorium by training or learning technical

Alan Bewell, “Erasmus Darwin’s Cosmopolitan Nature,” ELH 76 (2009): 33. Darwin identifies
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processes. It also may indirectly alter its own capacities by crafting tools and environments for
its own use.
Having argued volition and association to be the aspects of the sensorium which truly
free humanity’s creativity, I address language as a particularly significant innovation emerging at
the blurry juncture of internal, skill-based technique and external, instrumental technology. I
emphasize human language’s technological characteristics such as its being a mutable apparatus
exterior to any, single individual which suits it for exchange, education, philosophical inquiry,
and mythopoeia.243 Scholars of Romantic life sciences have noted Darwin’s recognition of
evolutionary epigenesis, or the passing on to genetic inheritors characteristics obtained during
life.244 Language offers a powerful means for transmitting information; each of Darwin’s poems
establishes its own botanic, georgic garden to be a site for readers’ education. Dahlia Porter
observes that by writing Temple of Nature, Darwin recognized that his distinction between loose
and strict analogies, his heuristic for distinguishing beautiful poetic language and more precise,
philosophical language, was collapsing:
the work of containment and differentiation performed by Darwin’s verse–note
composite is continually unraveled by the composite form itself…In registering the
divisions that would become the foundation of disciplinary separation in the structure of
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the text, Darwin allowed this boundary to be transgressed over and over, always
reconstituting itself only to be dismantled.245
Porter’s use of “allowed” connotes that Darwin’s agency in maintaining the “boundary” was
itself compromised by the proliferating syntheses of his loose and strict analogies which we see
in his overdetermined figures such as the garden itself. The sensorium comprehends both loose
and strict analogies under its more general practice of imitation and, even more fundamentally,
executes both in the service of pleasure. Here again, Darwin elevates beauty and pleasure from
their conventional, subsidiary role in the georgic, a change reflected by the prominence he gives
to his own mythopoeic, loose analogies. Having shown that imitative ideation and language are
inadequate to defining the essential qualities of life-originating pleasure, I observe that pleasure
exceeds understanding, and pushes organisms to exceed themselves through self-transformation.
Consequently, Darwin uses his loose, allegorical “machinery” and especially his retrospective
and prospective, botanic, georgic gardens to demonstrate how myth is an appropriate vehicle for
performatively eliciting pleasure and signifying the excessive, originary technicity of
physiological pleasure.246 Addressing four ways in which the trope of botanic gardens
influenced his poetry, I conclude by noting that a mythic, georgic garden functions as a
prospective myth representing the coming Age of Philosophy whose details remain uncertain,
but which promises the continued, general expansion of pleasure and liberty.
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5.2

Pleasure, imitation, and volition in the sensorium
Darwin’s medical career informed the majority of his writing as well as his interest in the

botanic garden. Darwin received his medical training at the Edinburgh Medical School and, like
Quesnay, theorized a hedonistic morality based on materialist physiology. At Edinburgh, in
addition to a two-year course in moral philosophy, Darwin learned the popular theories of John
Brown (1735-1788), who thought that bodies enjoy and benefit from regular stimulation while
avoiding excessive inputs.247 Building upon Brown’s ideas, Darwin crafted his own, unique
theory of physiology by integrating Albrecht von Haller’s (1708-1777) theory that all living
organisms are composed of a variety of sensitive, contractile fibers. Darwin presents his
physiological theories of animal economies and vegetable economies in the treatises Zoonomia;
or the Laws of Organic Life (1794) and Phytologia; or, The Philosophy of Agriculture and
Gardening (1800) respectively. His attempts to popularize botany among women by writing the
whimsical yet densely foot-noted Loves of the Plants aroused his own enthusiasm for writing
poetry in no small part because the poem itself was widely popular. His appreciation for
poetry’s beauty and didactic potential grew, and his Botanic Garden was also well-received for
many years, though his attempt to condense his physiological theories into Temple of Nature met
with less success in part due to its radical, evolutionary implications. Temple of Nature argues
that all organisms from the first “gluten-threads” to contemporary humans respond to and engage
with their environments through a tactile sensibility based on the contractions and relaxations of
different types of fibers composing tissues and organs.248
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Before starting these works, Darwin had already established a successful medical practice
in Lichfield where he arrived soon after finishing his formal education. Here, Darwin grew
attracted to Anna Seward ,who would encourage him to cultivate a botanic garden, would write
his first biography, and from whom he would crib lines of poetry.249 He also founded the
Lichfield Botanical Society and published a multi-volume translation of the botanic taxonomies
of Carl Linnaeus (1707-1778), which became the subject for his first, long poem The Loves of
the Plants. Loves of the Plants thematizes erotic pleasure, sexual reproduction, and taxonomic
variety by narrating the playful courtship of men and women whose groupings Darwin based on
the counts of stamens and pistils of diverse flower species. The later, Economy of Vegetation
purports to describe “the physiology of Plants…and the operation of the Elements as far as they
may be supposed to affect the growth of Vegetables”; in fact, the “operation” takes over the
poem and shows the garden to be a figurative setting for allegorizing natural forces and heroizing
scientists and inventors.250 Though Janet Browne asserts that Loves initiates Darwin’s poetic
career as the “equivalent of a genre painter or, more appropriately, a landscape gardener,” The
Botanic Garden’s Preface announces its georgic agenda of making literary beauty serve
philosophical instruction by stating Darwin’s famous aim “ to inlist Imagination under the
Banner of Science.”251 He attests science’s value by appending enormous sets of footnotes,
sometimes doubly layered, to each poem in order to explain the poetic figures in up-to-date,
academic detail.
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Darwin’s final poem, The Temple of Nature, claims that the level of development of
organisms’ pleasure-oriented, physiological constitutions determines their freedom of action.
His description of volitional liberty as an improvable, physiological capacity contrasts with much
of the moral philosophy I have addressed in earlier chapters. For example, Locke argued that
fixed, moral laws and subsidiary, natural rights together enjoin and support socio-economic
prosperity by offering individuals various liberties such as the right to own property. Locke’s
own quasi-physiological theory of volition related to his theory of natural rights insofar as
possessing volition identified a person as rational, answerable to natural law, and deserving of
rights. By contrast, Darwin presents liberty as identical with and operating through an
organism’s ability to willfully manipulate its environment.252 In short, Darwin thought that
pleasure motivates organisms to engage with their environment, which adds to their cognitive
and motor capacities and thus expands their volitional freedom of action.
The Temple of Nature’s third canto, “The Progress of Mind,” describes Darwin’s
physiological model based on combinations of sensitive, contractile fibers. He organizes his
model around a fourfold sensorium with tiers designating physical capacities. The sensorium
proposes to explain the behavior of all organisms, the potential for simple organisms to develop
higher, cognitive processes such as rational judgment and creativity over long spans of time, and
ultimately humanity’s technologically complex, socio-economic orders. The four capacities of
the sensorium are as follows:
1. Irritation: the internal, involuntary reaction of fibers to external stimulation.
2. Sensation: the retention of ideas which coincide with perceptions of pleasure or
displeasure caused by stimuli.
My first chapter explicates the dependence of Locke’s labor theory of natural property rights on his
theory of volition.
252
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3. Volition: a motivating desire to act or not act for the purpose of experiencing the
pleasure or to avoiding the pain of various sensations and experiences.
4. Association: groups sensations into complex ideas and memories.
Haptic irritation enables simple organisms’ automatic, life-sustaining processes and enables
sensation and voluntary action in more complex organisms. A complex organism’s recognition
of pleasurable sensations encourages its engagement with its environment, leads to organisms’
self-transformation through learning and repetition, and anticipates individual and collective
development. That the higher, creative capacities of volition and association enable voluntary
pleasure-seeking, as we shall see, explains how Darwin’s revision of the georgic mode prioritizes
pleasure, scientific education, and mythopoeia.
Each capacity of the sensorium represents a range of physical processes which occur in
and through the sensitive, excitable fibers constituting an organism’s parts. For example,
nervous fibers differ from muscular fibers though they may cooperate. External stimulation
causes chains of fibers to contract. In complex animal economies, such contractions first affect
superficial, irritable fibers before travelling through fibrous networks to reach nerves in the
brain. Brain fibers retain stimuli as sensations which form mutable ideas through contingent
associations with other sensations. Volition manipulates ideas by recalling them, forming
associations, or deploying them as motivations for world-engaging actions.
Darwinian physiology fuses the concepts of pleasure and utility which are the
cornerstones of the georgic mode. Whereas The Seasons’s physico-theological method of
argument sought to prove the validity of nature’s moral laws by reconciling empiric, natural
philosophy with scripture, Darwin asserts that a hedonistic ethic encouraging self-empowerment
and self-transformation is immanent in the sensorium’s operations. Darwin attributes organic
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life’s individual and collective progress to the physiological principle that complex organism’s
involuntary reactions to stimuli can produce sensations that are pleasurable, edifying, and instill
a volitional desire for their repetition:
…young SENSATION permeates the brain;
Through each new sense the keen emotions dart,
Flush the young cheek, and swell the throbbing heart.
From pain and pleasure quick VOLITIONS rise,
Lift the strong arm, or point the inquiring eyes… (I.270-274)
The quote captures the transition from pleasurable sensations both involuntary, physical
reactions like blushing and the voluntary, pleasure-seeking actions such as looking at an
interesting object. John Brown’s physiological theory adopted by Darwin posited that organisms
enjoy moderate amounts of stimulation and particularly stimuli which satisfy their innate, selfpreserving desires. For example, animals typically appreciate warmth and diet-appropriate food
that generates pleasurable sensations and reinforces their volitional desires. Temple of Nature
calls such desires passions and tastes.
Passion designates an organism’s volitional desire for a sensation or object. Passions
vary from simple, animalistic urges to volitions refined by complex, associative comparisons.
Darwin cites two basic desires: “in wild groups tumultuous Passions stand, and Lust and Hunger
head the Motley band” (III.155). Though Lust and Hunger suggest uncivility, Temple of Nature
and Loves of the Plants enthusiastically view sex as an efficient and pleasurable means for
creative reproduction and reflect his more general view that pleasure benefits from innovation.
The sensorium’s pragmatic hedonism regards passions to be virtuous to the extent that they keep
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organisms happy, healthy, and productive.253 Similarly, “TASTE impassion’d” keeps the
associative, appreciation of aesthetic objects grounded in bodily pleasure and utility (III.246).
Darwin’s theory of taste differs from the version described in my last chapter as a disinterested
appreciation for the timeless beauty of objects like naturalistic landscapes. Rather than defining
taste as a calm, aesthetic appreciation which disregards objects’ appeals to sensory, appetitive
desires, Darwin insists that tastes for abstract, formal beauty remain inseparable from artworks’
associations with familiar, sensory pleasures. For example, Darwin cites William Hogarth’s
claim that humans find curves aesthetically pleasing, because a mature sensorium retains the
infant’s pleasing memories of feeling for its mothers’ breasts with fingertips and lips:
As the pure language of the Sight commands
The clear ideas furnish'd by the hands;
Beauty's fine forms attract our wondering eyes,
And soft alarms the pausing heart surprise.
Warm from its cell the tender infant born
Feels the cold chill of Life's aerial morn;
Seeks with spread hands the bosoms velvet orbs,
With closing lips the milky fount absorbs;
…
And learns erelong, the perfect form confess'd,
IDEAL BEAUTY from its Mother's breast. (III.163-176)
Infants quickly learn to desire soft and warm sensations because, though not necessarily useful,
such sensations are comfortable. Darwin suggests that the “clear[est] ideas” are not those
“Sweet Hope delights him, frowning Fear alarms,
And Vice and Virtue court him to their arms.” (III.443-444)
253

189

formed by associative, intellectual labor, but are instead the tactile sensations which often
involuntarily define a person’s passions and tastes. Thus, “IDEAL BEAUTY” is better
understood as an analogy for “clear ideas” than as connoting the appeal of abstract artworks.
Though Darwin insists that the capacity for sensation requires an advanced nervous system, an
impersonal, automated form of self-interest must also motivate vegetable economies to survive
by a series of involuntary, mechanistic contractions. Again, in animal economies this automatic,
physiological process that converts irritation into passions naturalizes an acquisitive hedonism
causing organisms to desire certain sensations and to develop higher facilitative capacities for
pursuing those sensations.
The arousal of pleasure depends on a series of imitative operations occurring through the
sensorium’s capacities. Darwin presents imitation as one of the sensorium’s overarching
principles (along with pleasure and self-transformation) though he does not include it as one of
the four capacities. Involuntary, imitative contractions underpin the sensorium’s dynamism by
predicating techn(olog)ical innovation on pleasurable, edifying iteration. Irritative contraction,
the most basic form of physiological imitation, enables the more complex, volitional forms of
iteration. In a footnote to Temple of Nature, Darwin highlights the educational effect of the
sensorium’s imitative operations on organisms’ skill-development; he then elaborates that
irritated fibers imitate stimuli to produce sensations and ideas:
The origin of this propensity to imitation has not been deduced from any known
principle; when any action presents itself to the view of a child, as of whetting a knife, or
threading a needle; the parts of this action in respect of time, motion, figure, are imitated
by parts of the retina of his eye; to perform this action therefore with his hands is easier to
him than to invent any new action; because it consists in repeating with another set of
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fibres, viz. with the moving muscles, what he had just performed by some parts of the
retina; just as in dancing we transfer the times of the motions from the actions of the
auditory nerves to the muscles of the limbs. Imitation therefore consists of repetition,
which is the easiest kind of animal action; as the ideas or motions become presently
associated together; which adds to the facility of their production; as shown in Zoonomia,
Vol. I. Sect. XXII. 2.
It should be added, that as our ideas when we perceive external objects, are believed
to consist in the actions of the immediate organs of sense in consequence of the stimulus
of those objects; so when we think of external objects, our ideas are believed to consist in
the repetitions of the actions of the immediate organs of sense, excited by the other
sensorial powers of volition, sensation, or association. (III.309n)
Imitation or “repetition, which is the easiest kind of animal action,” originates in irritation’s,
involuntary, mimetic archiving of responses to stimuli, and characterizes many operations of
both vegetable and animal economies. The final sentence asserts that recalling ideas reproduces
the chain of imitative contractions originally caused by objects’ stimulating qualities. The first
paragraph demonstrates that the sensorium’s tendency to learn about its environment through
imitation causes the self-transformation of organisms which instinctively develop knowledge and
skills. Further, pleasurable imitation encourages organisms to adopt, engrain, and elaborate the
qualities and capacities of other organisms in progressive networks of individual and collective
development.
Imitation can be novel or repetitive and each may improve the sensorium’s capacities.
Novel experiences are stimulating,254 and certain experiences whose interest may fade with
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familiarity stimulate an organism only for being novel. “[T]he novelty of our ideas is generally
attended with pleasurable sensation” and pleasurable experiences instill neophilic “Curiosity” in
immature organisms, which inspires further engagement with their environment (III.145n).
Pleasurable novelty encourages organisms to integrate new sensations and ideas. These
additions usefully transform the organism’s associative network by increasing the resources
available to volition.
Organisms enact a second-order mode of imitation by simply recalling retained ideas or
by repeating gestures and actions. (“Imitation therefore consists of repetition, which is the
easiest kind of animal action…”) For example, recalling an idea requires an organism to will
neural fibers to execute a unique set of physical contractions. Repeating such processes
increases their familiarity, and though familiarity may decrease any pleasure owing to novelty,
the act may itself still involve innately pleasurable sensations. Most importantly, possessing a
skill facilitates the acquisition and refinement of associated skills. This iterative model of selfimprovement applies to cognition as well as motor skills and tool manipulation.
Darwin’s theory of imitative sympathy reduces the sensorium’s potential for becoming
too hedonistically self-serving. Temple of Nature notes Adam Smith’s description of sympathy
in his Theory of Moral Sentiments as a process by which innately self-interested individuals
recognize that their own interests coincide with those of other people:
From our aptitude to imitation arises what is generally understood by the word sympathy,
so well explained by Dr. Smith of Glasgow. Thus the appearance of a cheerful
countenance gives us pleasure, and of a melancholy one makes us sorrowful. Yawning,
and sometimes vomiting, are thus propagated by sympathy; and some people of delicate
fibres, at the presence of a spectacle of misery, have felt pain in the same parts of their
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bodies, that were diseased or mangled in the object they saw.
The effect of this powerful agent in the moral world, is the foundation of all our
intellectual sympathies with the pains and pleasures of others, and is in consequence the
source of all our virtues. For in what consists our sympathy with the miseries or with the
joys of our fellow creatures, but in an involuntary excitation of ideas in some measure
similar or imitative of those which we believe to exist in the minds of the persons whom
we commiserate or congratulate! (I.466n)
Both Darwin and Smith claim that involuntary, sympathetic imitation forms and maintains social
affinity networks. Sympathy operates on the principle that humans innately enjoy imitating each
other’s emotions even when displeasure is displayed. For Smith, sympathy socializes individuals
by gradually inducting them into a shared morality which values justice and merit.255 Darwinian
sympathy denotes a similarly pleasurable process but attributes it to the sensorium’s series of
imitative functions. The sensorium’s ethic of future-oriented, techn(olog)ical progress casts
sympathy as one affect-oriented mode for encouraging people to engage with their milieu; it uses
innately individualistic pleasure to draw curious individuals together and integrates them into
cooperative, productive collectives. 256

Socialization is achieved by a series of sympathetic imitations of other people’s emotions as Smith
describes in the following passage:
When the original passions of the person principally concerned are in perfect concord with the
sympathetic emotions of the spectator, they necessarily appear to this last just and proper, and
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finds that they do not coincide with what he feels, they necessarily appear to him unjust and
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Fund, 1984), I.i.3.I.
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Further, sympathy proves poetically evocative through its correlation with love and so
also through love’s analogization with a variety of organic and inorganic, attractive forces.257
Temple of Nature introduces Love and Sympathy in Canto I, uses them to organize Cantos II and
III respectively, and sees them culminate in the social harmony of Canto IV’s “Of Good and
Evil”:
FIRST, if you can, celestial Guide! disclose
From what fair fountain mortal life arose,
Whence the fine nerve to move and feel assign'd,
Contractile fibre, and ethereal mind:

How Love and Sympathy the bosom warm,
Allure with pleasure, and with pain alarm,
With soft affections weave the social plan,
And charm the listening Savage into Man. (I.215-222)
Each stanza and most of the lines parallel one another by aligning a cause with an effect. The
first stanza connects the earliest, oceanic appearance of “contractile fibre[s]” to their evolution
into the brain’s ineffable structures. The second stanza imagines that the basic, pain-pleasure
sensitivity of irritative fibers will eventually cause humans to form civil, productive societies.
Sympathy’s short- and long-term effects demonstrate that one’s knowledge acquisition and
creativity are not simply self-serving but facilitate broader human-nature or human-human
rapprochement. Sympathy encourages individuals to recognize the value of other people’s
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Immortal Love, or Eros, indicates any attractive force, including the poorly understood concept of
gravity, which Darwin speculated would produce cycles of Big Crunches and Bangs. Darwin suggests
four examples: "Press drop to drop, to atom atom bind, / Link sex to sex, or rivet mind to mind" (I.25-6).
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experiences both affective and skill-oriented. Sympathetic, social engagement remains pleasureoriented for each party while reducing people’s potential to treat each other as instruments for
satisfying their own volitions.
Association and volition help us to understand how the largely imitative integration of
sensations can foster innovative ideas and works. The sensorium integrates imitative sensations
into associative, ideational networks; in a footnote referencing David Hume (1711-1776),
Darwin identifies the main, associative relations between ideas as “contiguity, causation, and
resemblance,” and he speculates that a person’s tendency to privilege one type of relation may
correlate with an inclination for certain vocations.258 The mind’s tendency to privilege a single,
associative relation and for forming inaccurate associations based on contingencies like temporal
proximity demonstrate the sensorium’s inadequacy for discovering Truth. Still, association and
volition together constantly reorganize and refine mimetic ideas of the world.
Though association ranks higher among the sensorium’s tiers, volition judges, organizes,
and executes associated ideas to facilitate its pursuit of pleasure. Crucially, Darwin argues that
reason and liberty improve in concert with volition. Volition is empowered to the extent that
sensation provides it with ideas provisionally organized by association:
Whence REASON'S empire o'er the world presides,
And man from brute, and man from man divides;
Compares and measures by imagined lines
Ellipses, circles, tangents, angles, sines;

“Those who have connected a great class of ideas of resemblances, possess the source of the
ornaments of poetry and oratory, and of all rational analogy. While those who have connected great
classes of ideas of causation, are furnished with the powers of producing effects. These are the men of
active wisdom who lead armies to victory, and kingdoms to prosperity; or discover and improve the
sciences which meliorate and adorn the condition of humanity.” (IV.299n)
258
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Repeats with nice libration, and decrees
In what each differs, and in what agrees;
With quick Volitions unfatigued selects
Means for some end, and causes of effects;
All human science worth the name imparts,
And builds on Nature's base the works of Arts. (III.401-410)
Volition reasons by willfully recalling ideas for comparison and differentiation, processes
Darwin likens to spatial measurement. Volition’s identification of related “causes and effects”
serves its primary function of acquiring means for achieving pleasure. “REASON’S empire”
signifies volition’s tendency to annex as much information about the world as possible. In
addition to synthesizing new ideas, volition exteriorizes its ideational plans into new, durable
objects by executing skillful actions. In a quote evoking originary technicity, volition’s intrinsic
operations improve organic life via inorganic means by “build[ing] on Nature’s base the works
of Arts.” Darwin elsewhere notes that human artifice replicates the sensorium’s own basic
tendency to imitate nature. From the “Muse of Mimicry” derive “The sculptor's statue, and the
poet's song, / The painter's landscape, and the builder's plan, / And IMITATION marks the mind
of Man.” “Marks” collapses the notions that involuntary contractions impress mimetic
sensations on the mind and that imitation characteristically precedes innovation and creative
production. Artworks and other durable, exteriorized apparatuses offer archives of knowledge
useful for educating individuals and accelerating collective progress; but it is malleable language
that stands above other technologies for its malleability and as a vehicle for easing the imitation
of ideas.
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Language replicates the sensorium’s own dynamism and is a useful apparatus for
developing and exchanging ideas. For example, “Association’s mystic power combines /
Internal passions with external signs” (III.355-356). The quote highlights a person’s ability to
use their own ideas and linguistic tools to manipulate each other. Darwin conveys human
language to be an elaboration of the various gestures and utterances observable throughout the
animal kingdom:259
From these dumb gestures first the exchange began
Of viewless thought in bird, and beast, and man;
…
Thus the first LANGUAGE, when we frown'd or smiled,
Rose from the cradle, Imitation's child;
Next to each thought associate sound accords,
And forms the dulcet symphony of words… (III.357-9; III.363-366)
Calling language “Imitation’s child” uses the metaphor of individual maturation to suggest the
evolutionary continuity among species as well as the progression from “Savage-Man” to civility.
Darwin again observes that innovatively producing words involves the ineffable step of matching
ideas to sounds, though most of a person’s language acquisition occurs through the “exchange”
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Thus jealous quails or village-cocks inspect
Each other's necks with stiffen'd plumes erect;
Smit with the wordless eloquence, they know
The rival passion of the threatening foe.
So when the famish'd wolves at midnight howl,
Fell serpents hiss, or fierce hyenas growl;
Indignant Lions rear their bristling mail,
And lash their sides with undulating tail.
Or when the Savage-Man with clenched fist
Parades, the scowling champion of the list;
With brandish'd arms, and eyes that roll to know
Where first to fix the meditated blow… (III.343-354)

197

or sympathetic imitation of other people’s speech. The actions and emotions of other people
become “natural signs” which cause infants to sense that visible things might signify deeper,
perhaps inaccessible meaning whether they be person’s ideas or an object’s inner workings.
According to its preface, The Botanic Garden seeks to “inlist Imagination under the
banner of Science; and to lead her votaries from the looser analogies, which dress out the
imagery of poetry, to the stricter ones which form the ratiocination of philosophy."260
Association forms analogical relations between distinct ideas sharing similarities; language
exteriorizes these analogies to facilitate their development and to better or understanding of the
world. Devin Griffith’s explains Darwin’s theory of analogy’s educational potential by noting
that “[f]or [Francis] Bacon, (and for Darwin), analogy is an attribute of the world, not ascribed to
it; it is not applied to nature by the scientists but is “of” the “things” themselves.”261 Griffith’s
point is that the sensorium can empirically access bits of truth, because sensations capture
imperfect information about a natural world whose unity manifests as a network of analogies
immanent among its parts. As language more accurately describes an idea, its analogies become
stricter. On one hand, neither ideas nor language’s analogies can ever be identical with the
things which they describe. By consequence, truths regarding the absolute origins, causes, or
essences of all things are permanently foreclosed. On the other hand, the sensorium’s innate,
imitative and innovative functions compel humanity’s collective, language-assisted search for
truth.
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Erasmus Darwin, The Botanic Garden (London: J. Johnson, 1791), v.
Devin Griffiths, The Age of Analogy: Science and Literature between the Darwins (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2016), 72.
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5.3

Mythopoeia and georgic gardens
Darwin distinguishes between loose and strict analogies in order to show their productive

cooperation in his own georgic works. Darwin’s “Banner of science” and his compulsive
outstripping of his own poetry with explanatory notes imply the precedence of science’s strict,
didactic analogies. However, the loose analogies correlated with poetic beauty and the strict
analogies correlated with rigorous, scientific discovery and innovation cooperate in serving the
universal pursuit of pleasure. The following quote suggests that loose analogies, being imprecise
associations which bear poetic beauty, are more suited to giving immediate pleasure:
Call'd by thy voice Resemblance next describes
Her sister-thoughts in lucid trains or tribes;
Whence pleased Imagination oft combines
By loose analogies her fair designs… (IV.305-309)
I noted that resemblance is one of the three main types of association. By contrast, relations of
contiguity are more apt for working towards philosophy’s strict analogies. Resemblance forges
more tenuous associations but rewards creators and readers by allowing greater, volitional free
play among ideas. Since language’s loose analogies are better tools for conveying beauty rather
than approaching truth, they are more plastic and susceptible to imaginative revision than strict
analogies. Still, loose analogies can be useful propaedeutics for engaging readers and guiding
them toward the stricter analogies just as Darwin’s poetry directs readers to his footnotes and on
again to his treatises.
Recognizing that Darwin regards myth as a type of loose analogy helps to explain his
poetry’s use of the georgic garden as its master-myth. Myths may be as influential as religious
stories or as trifling as juvenile similes. He rejects treating popular, received, moralizing myths
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with unquestioning reverence, because shared incuriosity may incite stultifying and potentially
volatile, public superstition.262 His use of larger organizing myths like the georgic garden and
smaller myths like Economy of Vegetation’s gnomes and nymphs exemplify the beautiful figures
which georgics conventionally subordinate to their nominally more important moral message of
labor’s virtue. His syncretic mythopoeia takes advantage of loose analogy’s ability to both
please and inform; it also refurbishes received myths as vehicles for his innovative scientific
content and, I argue, revises the georgic mode in which they appear by contributing to the
revaluation of pleasure also found in his discussion of the sensorium.263 As an example of
Darwin’s playful repurposing of myths, he organizes Economy of Vegetation’s four cantos
according to Rosicrucianism’s four elements of water, earth, air, and fire, which he then
associates with gnomes, sylphs, and other fantastic creatures.264 He also mixes his own
references to biblical stories with earlier classical imagery, which he then argues depends on
even earlier Egyptian legends. Comparable to strict analogies leading to even stricter analogies,
myths are continuously preceded by other myths.265 Martin Priestman’s analysis of Darwin’s

Darwin loathed superstition and regarding printing and literature as its remedies. For example, ”…the
curst spells of Superstition blind, / And fix her fetters on the tortured mind…” (IV.83-84). Darwin saw
the first-hand results of persecutorial superstition when reactionary Birmingham rioters targeted the
members of the progressive Lunar Society to which belonged.
263
Darwin’s machinery reflects wider contemporary interest in comparative histories of religion. Major
examples include Joseph Spence’s Polymetis (1747), David Hume’s The Natural History of Religion
(1757), Richard Payne Knight’s infamous A Discourse on The Worship of Priapus (1786), and Volney’s
Les Ruines, ou méditations sur les révolutions des empires (1791).
264
Darwin adopted Rosicrucianism, because he imagined it to exemplify euhemerism, the belief that
mythic stories originate in a kernel of truth and are elaborated over time to potentially include
supernatural elements. Darwin states that “[t]he Rosicrucian doctrine of Gnomes, Sylphs, Nymphs, and
Salamanders, was thought to afford a proper machinery for a Botanic poem; as it is probable, that they
were originally the names of hieroglyphic figures for representing the elements.” Darwin thus seems to
be led more to adopt his structure due to the perceived beauty and order of the four, allegorized elements
than any commitment to their function as a strict analogy for understanding physical laws. Darwin, The
Botanic Garden, vii. Martin Priestman similarly argues that Darwin’s Preface to Temple demonstrates
knowledge and practice of euhemerism. Priestman, The Poetry of Erasmus Darwin, 185.
265
Recognizing that both myths and ideas are forms of loose analogies, tracking myths backwards into
prehistory would arrive at something like pre-literate or even pre-imagistic, mythic ideas. My blurring of
262
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spatial poetics argues that this regression of myths correlates with simplification, flattening, and
reliance on education by means of images typified by as yet illegible Egyptian hieroglyphics. 266
To his compelling argument I would add that this regression leads back to an originary, founding
pleasure only understandable as and through mythopoeia. Thus, Darwin’s philosophical
revaluation and own georgic demonstration of mythopoeia sought to justify the continuous
remaking of myths which are beautiful and pleasurable to the extent that they retain a kernel of
immutable truth.
Life’s innovative, originary technicity and its anticipated volitional expansion entail that
the myths which infinitely regress into the past must also serve to figure a conjectural future
typified by wide-spread liberty and pleasure amid humanity. Darwin judges myth to be the
appropriate mode for signifying pleasure’s innate, ineffable, and creative excess as it appears in
his works at life’s origin and humanity’s future. Pleasure must be understood through myth,
because knowledge of the sensorium at once tells us that pleasure originates and motivates267 all
life while imperfect understanding also forecloses any strict understanding of that origin’s
essential Nature. Darwin collapses in the single emblem of the georgic garden mythopoeia’s
importance and his assertion that pleasure sits at the beginning and end of all things. An
exploration of four ways (botanic) gardens inform Darwin’s revision of the georgic will help to
show that the georgic garden’s associations with pleasure and volition imply humanity’s nighutopian future to resemble cosmopolitan, liberal political economy.

terms is meant to reassert that Darwin regarded the imitative sensorium as possessing “clear ideas” of its
own passions but not of the objects inspiring them (III.164).
266
Dahlia Porter similarly argues that the Egyptian hieroglyph “maps a direct corridor from scientific
knowledge to poetry.” Porter, Science, Form, and the Problem of Induction in British Romanticism, 104.
267
Pleasure strictly originates all life due to the pleasure Darwin associates with procreation but also more
loosely as the motive force of organic life’s originary technicity.
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Firstly, as I mentioned, Darwin’s personal experiences with botanic gardens inclined him
to associate them with bodily well-being, education, and creativity. In the centuries leading up to
and including Darwin’s own, botanic gardens providing medical palliatives grew to include
domestic and foreign plants and so also became a resource for studying plant physiology.268
Darwin’s own botanic studies led him to attribute his sensorium model to both vegetable and
animal economies; Molly Maureen Mahood observes that Darwin’s interest in botanic garden
reflects his desire to forge tenuous, taxonomic analogies between species, a desire that extended
to myths as he wrote each poem.269 Beyond being a site for scientific inquiry and knowledge
production, the plants in botanic gardens physically demonstrate creativity through their own
reproduction and potential for hybridization. Plants’ demonstrated capacity for sensory
irritability and their photosynthetic capacity discovered by Darwin’s associate Joseph Priestley
(1733-1804) suggested to Darwin that plants share with more complex organisms basic forms of
involuntary imitation. Their vegetable economies seemed to serve what might reasonably be
analogized as an unwitting self-interest consistent with Darwin’s concept of originary pleasure.
Secondly, I highlight two effects of Darwin’s foregrounding of botanic gardens on his use
of georgic mode. I have already addressed mythopoeia’s greater prominence as a co-effect of
pleasure’s own revaluation. Here I address the botanic garden’s influence on his revaluation of
pleasure and its incitement of the paratexts whose strict analogies support that revaluation.

In order to evoke the ways in which plants’ irreducible materiality at once encouraged their taxonomic
arrangement by botanists to confirm nature’s grand order yet still resisted and disturbed easy, epistemic
systematization, Theresa M. Kelley invites us to “[i]magine live plants and dried plants crossing the
globe, some sent in or with letters and across seas, sinking with ships that sink,” and also to “[imagine
now their current arrangement in cabinets of natural history museums…as specimens associated with
orders, genera, and species, along with whatever else might illustrate their traits…” Theresa M. Kelley,
Clandestine Marriage: Botany & Romantic Culture (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), 1.
269
Molly Maureen Mahood, The Poet as Botanist (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 7077, 60.
268

202

Patricia Fara and Alan Bewell both suggest that Darwin’s poetry applies older literary styles to
new objects. According to Bewell, “Darwin adopted a dated poetic style in order to present a
thoroughly modern conception of a natural world that was undergoing ceaseless change and
transformation and was inescapably bound up with global commerce, industry and
consumption.”270 The topics of Darwin’s poems do indeed reflect contemporary natural
philosophy; yet floral taxonomy, recent technology harnessing nature’s physical laws, and the
pleasure-driven sensorium are consistent with georgics’ long-standing interest in instructing
readers about the operations of nature and the practical implications and uses of such
knowledge.271 Fara’s and Bewell’s descriptions of Darwin’s applying an older literary style to
new objects miss the extent to which his topics cause him to emphasize or deemphasize the
georgic mode’s conventional themes and formal aspects.
Though Darwin’s scientific topics are modern, they fundamentally revise the georgic
mode by reprioritizing its standard hierarchy in which beauty and pleasure are subservient to
utility, labor, and economic rationality. Loves of the Plants is the least georgic of Darwin’s three
major poems, yet it establishes that pleasure, the scientific instruction, and mythopoeia would
marginalize the virtue georgics traditionally attribute to toilsome, manual labor. Priestman and
Griffiths both support this point by considering Loves of the Plants to be markedly pastoral; its
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Alan Bewell, Natures in Translation: Romanticism and Colonial Natural History (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press), 54. Romantics “regarded [Darwin] not so much as an individually poor
writer, but more as their chosen representative of an outdated poetic movement…Darwin insisted that
poets should versify only what they see in front of them…In contrast, the Romantics deliberately turned
their gaze inwards, emphasizing the importance of imagination and self-reflection.” Fara, Erasmus
Darwin: sex, science, and serendipity, 44-45.
271
The Seasons exemplifies this latter development, though it also appears in other poems of varying
popularity such as Richard Savage’s London and Bristol Delineated (1744), John Dyer’s The Fleece, and
George Cockings’ Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce (1769). To some extent, Darwin synthesizes
Thomson’s georgic centering intellectual over manual, agricultural labor with Mason’s georgic which
also displaced farm and toil by pleasure gardens and the design theory involved in their making.
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tone and content are comic, and extrapolating stories from its vignettes of socializing and
courtship inclines a reader to imagine marriages and procreation.272 Though pain and death
appear in the poem when Darwin mentions the healing properties of specific plants, Loves
implies that plants transcend death and their own species’ physiology through procreation. The
internal, life-sustaining processes of vegetable (and animal) economies are strictly understood as
labor. However, Darwin’s predicates these happy processes on a universal, physiological,
pleasure principle emblematized by the joyful atmosphere infusing the botanic garden where
they take place. This dissociation of labor from desperation contributes to a georgic mode in
which pleasure rather than labor becomes the principle ethic.
A panoply of paratextual notes reinforce the role of georgic gardens as sites of
instruction which return the reader to the topic of hedonism by detailing the physiological
production of pleasure. Again, Loves of the Plants, the Preface to Botanic Garden, and Temple
of Nature’s frame story all announce to readers that they employ garden settings to facilitate the
reader’s education in botany, physiology, or otherwise. The gardens’ flora may themselves be
the objects of scientific inquiry or the garden may simply be a conducive setting for instruction.
Each poem acknowledges its garden to be the place where a Botanic Muse (Loves), Botanic
Goddess (Economy), or Muse (Temple) will offer scientific knowledge directly to readers or
through a proxy student. Noel Jackson entertains the popular idea that “Darwin’s philosophical
poetry…is a mere prop to the serious and entertaining matter of his scientific notes,” but grants
that Darwin believed that poetry is not “subordinate to philosophical ratiocination but [is] its
unlikely ground.” Jackson claims that the disjunction between science and mythopoeia in
Darwin’s “philosophic poetry” prevented modes such as the physico-theological epic and the
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Priestman, The Poetry of Erasmus Darwin, 50; Griffiths, The Age of Analogy, 62.
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georgic from being viable vehicles for Romantic poetry.273 Darwin repeatedly prompts readers
to refer to his poems’ notes, to his other treatises, and other authors’ treatises; all use strict
analogies to complicate the reader’s understanding of the subject matter.274 Still, the sensorium’s
imperfect tools ensure that a thorough understanding of pleasure will forever exceed the
explanatory abilities of natural philosophers. Nevertheless, volition will compel them to try
while philosopher-poets continuously rewrite the myths which lead to para- and intertexts’ everexpanding matrix of strict analogies.
Thirdly, the figure of the botanic garden traverses his major poems, but Temple of Nature
best demonstrates how the garden-as-myth symbolizes life’s pleasure-driven excess. The
georgic garden is an emblematic myth loosely analogizing these stricter, though still relatively
loose analogies.275 My discussion of retrospective and prospective mythopoeia helps us to better
understand Temple’s mythopoeic treatment of the garden of Eden. Having shown that Darwin’s
prominent use of myth correlates with his prioritization of pleasure in life and literature, his
master myth of the botanic, georgic garden signifies that pleasure drives organisms’
techn(olog)ical transformation via their various, natural, self-educating processes. Recall that
Temple’s narrative involves initiation into hidden knowledge of life’s origins and operations by
means of the sensorium. Canto I informs the reader that the temple where the educational rites

Noel Jackson, “Rhyme and Reason: Erasmus Darwin's Romanticism,” Modern Language Quarterly
70, no. 2 (2009): 181; 182. On the physico-theological epic of which The Seasons is an example, see H.
Grant Sampson, “The Physico-Theological Epic in the Later Eighteenth Century,” Canadian Society for
Eighteenth Century Studies 2 (1984): 49-60. Percy Shelley’s (1792-1822) Queen Mab; A Philosophical
Poem; With Notes (1813) represents a late, quixotic effort to revive the style, but he did not use it again,
and the poem had an unfortunate afterlife for being used in court as evidence of Shelley’s atheism.
274
Similarly, he interleaves Loves’s four cantos with Socratic discourses between the characters Poet and
Bookseller, who dictate Darwin’s aesthetic theory of poetry, painting, and music. These discourses
restate his argument that the pleasurably loose ideas obtained during relaxed, fantasizing reveries may be
useful adjuncts to scientific inquiry, but they are also self-justifying in their beauty.
275
Relatively loose compared to those in Temple’s notes.
273
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takes place has been built over the remains of Eden in Syria.276 A credulous, in Darwin’s terms
superstitious reader of the Bible would understand Eden to be humanity’s absolute origin, God
having created Adam and placed him in the garden. A reading of Temple disrupts the ability to
view Eden as a potentially instructive myth, because knowledge of the sensorium involves
understanding that the subtitular Origin of Society is itself a false starting point and in fact
depends on an evolutionary process beginning long before the appearance of any humans.
Darwin suggests that the attempt to learn about any origin not only depends on imperfect though
refinable analogies, but that we will necessarily be led back through a series of prior, perhaps
unexpected causes just as human life depends on earlier, organic evolutions and even the first
“Organic forms…kindled into life” arose emerged from the “elemental strife” of inorganic,
marine material (I.4; I.3). Similarly, Darwin’s retrospective mythography iterates that
investigating past knowledges for truth also confronts one with a regressing series of earlier,
loose, mythic analogies. Locating his own mythic garden of Eden in a geographically
identifiable space, Darwin registers Eden as an attractive, but false, mythic origin; the myth
necessarily points to the existence of time and things existing prior to itself precise knowledge of
which remains inaccessible. Despite Eden being a false origin, which the poem depicts as a
wasteland, the poem’s picturesque imagery still associates an Eden-as-mythic-garden with
pleasure and beauty:
Four sparkling currents lav'd with wandering tides
Their velvet avenues, and flowery sides;

Darwin notifies us that his identification of Eden’s location in this “cradle of the World” follows Lord
Monboddo’s (1714-1799) philological and Jacob Bryant’s (1715-1804) mythological studies (I.36). Their
work and Monboddo’s foundational, evolutionary theories, which particularly influenced Darwin, invite
the reader to consider multiple, earlier origins for human society. Bryant’s work argued for the influence
of the Egyptians on the Greeks; Darwin’s accepted this argument and took it as encouragement for
forming his own, playful, syncretic myths.
276
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On sun-bright lawns unclad the Graces stray'd,
And guiltless Cupids haunted every glade… (I.37-40)
Darwin even deploys tropes of naturalistic landscaping such as the sinuous rivers and mixed light
effects of sunny lawns and shady glades. His georgic Eden suggests that, though life’s
origination in and through pleasure277 may only be understood indirectly through imperfect,
mythic analogies, life’s propensity for producing beautiful, mythopoeic figures validates
humanity’s commitment to that pleasure.
The temple figures Darwin’s prospective myth of the georgic garden, a revision that
indicates his own revaluation of modern mythopoeia. In the narrative, though the first Eden has
been obscured by the sands of time, the temple that replaces it miraculously extends far into the
earth and to the sky such that, as Priestman notes, “the more we look at it, the more it takes up
the whole of space, above and below ground” (I.69n). The temple need not strictly iterate the
conventional elements of Eden’s garden as long as it still offers a site for intellectual discovery
and innovation and conveys pleasure’s importance to life’s innate creativity. The poem
concludes with the instructor lifting the “mystic veil” from the Goddess Nature to reveal
“TRUTH DIVINE” (IV.522; IV.524). No text follows the unveiling; Darwin leaves the reader to
reckon and synthesize the poem’s matrix of loose and strict analogies. The poem seems to
suggest that the reader, having been transformed by the text, return to its beginning and generate
yet more associations. However, this conclusion also functions as an absence or an ineffable
excess into which prospective mythopoeia signified by the georgic edifice must continue to
project itself. Though this future remains uncertain, the poem insists that techn(olog)ical
progress entails pleasure, and the “trembling awe” with which the novitiate discerns this lesson
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In the sense that pleasure tends to drive and attend the reproductive, sexual act as well as being a
motive force for other types of creative work.
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conveys that the future promises the health and happiness characteristic of botanic, georgic
gardens (IV.522). Moreover, the reader recognizes that such boons will be enjoyed in the real
world to the extent that socio-political institutions restrain the potentially anti-social, even
illiberal tendencies which commercialist hedonism can invite. However, this effect caused by,
among other things, new, industrial manufacture, and a concomitant encounter with plutocracy
are recuperated as necessary steps in Darwin’s anticipated advance of civilization.
Finally, my fourth chapter argued that the georgic garden represented a nation governed
according to liberal, political economy; this signification continues to be true for Darwin’s
gardens though his gardens largely do so by addressing liberty and pleasure in terms of natural
philosophy rather than landscaping. Darwin’s botanic, georgic gardens differ from William
Mason’s naturalistic, georgic gardens primarily because Darwin bases his sanguine prospects for
English political economy on the sensorium’s pleasure principle and the promise for driving
techn(olog)ical progress. Mason’s English Garden conveys the idea that plutocrats’ performance
of naturalistic landscaping demonstrates their civic virtue and respect for property rights as a
synecdoche for rights in general. The poem’s aesthetic appreciation for tasteful naturalism
masks its claim for the massive wealth gaps exemplified by plutocrats’ landscaped estates.
Mason deems such estates necessary in part to enable the landscaping that seemingly uniquely
demonstrates a person’s subjection to nature’s aesthetic and moral principles, their civic virtue,
and the managerial skills required to perform the functions of liberal government. By contrast,
Darwin deploys mythic, georgic gardens to describe distant, sometimes obscure, physiological
causes and the socio-economic effects which they anticipate. For example, the comparatively
contemporary, if fantastic garden settings of Loves of the Plants and Temple of Nature
respectively describe botany and organic physiology. These evolutionarily retrospective themes
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instruct readers in the variable operations of a common, pleasure-driven physiological model that
accounts for organic life’s hedonistic ethic and its originary technicity. Supplemented by
sympathy, the imitative, autodidactic sensorium anticipates volitional improvements to
humanity’s collective quality of life.278
The georgic garden in Temple appears on the cusp of the fourth (“Commerce”) and
fifth (“Philosophy”) ages described in Darwin’s unfinished poem, The Progress of Society;279
again, the mythic temple which replaces Eden’s earlier georgic garden projects itself through
physical space as an analogy for liberty and pleasure expanding in concert with techn(olog)ical
progress. Darwin’s schema of human progress in stadial terms reinforces his radical
materialism.280 Each stadial age reflects humanity’s greater control over nature as an effect of
their growing internal and external capacities; as food becomes more dependable, the sciences
advance, education spreads, and apparatuses which contribute to pleasure are invented and
exchanged. As I have said, this physiological model defines liberty in terms of the volitional
capacity unique and immanent to individuals. State apparatuses may protect or restrict
individuals’ ability to pursue their volitional desires, but neither states’ positive laws nor natural
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Recall that as more sensations, ideas, and associations become available to individuals, their volitional
capacities also tend to develop. The empowerment of volition increases the ability to reason, sort ideas
and form innovative associations, select appropriate sources of pleasure, and organize better means for
achieving those pleasures.
279
Darwin abandoned a late poem titled The Progress of Society perhaps partly due to the chilling effect
of the Birmingham riots that affected his associates, but also because Richard Payne Knight had recently
published the similar The Progress of Civil Society (1796). Further, Darwin considered that a rigorous
description of the origins and operations of life would provide a firmer foundation for explaining that the
origins of society must be understood with references to the origins of life itself. Still, the outline and
fragments of the unfinished poem offer useful insight into the politico-economic values represented in his
other work. Darwin’s five, stadial ages are “Hunting,” “Pasturage,” “Agriculture,” “Commerce,” and
“Philosophy.” Erasmus Darwin, The Progress of Society, ed. Martin Priestman,
https://www.rc.umd.edu/editions/darwin_temple/progress/progress.html.
280
Materialism here refers to his belief that all physiological processes including thought involve physical
movement, which also informed his belief that a society’s collective quality of life is determined by its
technological progress and by its mode of subsistence in particular.
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laws originate or grant liberty by means of a common bundle of rights. Instead, the Age of
Commerce’s profusion of wealth and ideas effects a transformation in the socio-economic order
entailing a general but unevenly distributed improvement in a society’s aggregate, volitional
capacities. Temple of Nature’s narrator anticipates the fifth Age of Philosophy that Darwin
outlined in Progress of Society:
Four past eventful Ages then recite,
And give the fifth, new-born of Time, to light;
The silken tissue of their joys disclose,
Swell with deep chords the murmur of their woes… (I.9-12)
The fifth age, uncertain in its details, must be depicted in prospective myth; it will be joyful, but
these visions can only be “tissue” comparable to other, loosely analogical, veiling myths. 281
Though the Age of Philosophy assures a general improvement of quality of life over the fourth
age, the fifth age’s indistinct “woes” convey that it will not be utopic. Darwin’s outline of the
fifth age seems to attribute progress to a collective expansion of volition rather than any major,
technological innovation or stadial change to subsistence modes. Progress of Society implies but
avoids detailing technological and economic improvements with the phrases “Elements subdued”
and “Every man under his fig tree.”282 The latter assertion signifies a crucial transition from the
extreme exploitation characterizing the Age of Commerce, when “gold triumphant rules the
world enslaved,” which I take to signify Darwin’s distaste for a plutocracy founded on extreme
wealth gaps and exploited, lower orders. In the transition to the Age of Philosophy, either
enough wealth has been created for each person to possess property or for a voluntary or
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involuntary redistribution of wealth to have occurred. Darwin does not say which, but his
optimistic theories would seem to favor the idea that technological progress has eased
individuals’ ability to acquire enough wealth to support themselves. Still, the majority of the
notes suggest that society’s general increase of happiness owes to a collective expansion of
volition suggested by the Age’s first, central concept of “Liberty.” From this new liberty which
necessarily reflects the expansion of society’s collective, volitional capacities derives other
boons such as “Philosophy,” Science,” “Peace,” “Swords turned to Plough,” and some lingering
“Ruins of superstition” the last of which again suggests that utopia has not been achieved.
Having said that the georgic garden represents prosperous and well-governed, liberal
nations, Darwin invites us to extrapolate that the benefits England best enjoys will gradually
spread to other parts of the world. Organic life’s techn(olog)ical progress thus far seemed to him
to offer hope for continued improvement into the future. Moreover, good-will amongst societies
should continue to expand in circles of sympathy forerun by the expansion of markets to produce
the global cosmopolitan signified by the fifth age’s “No [war]” and “Moral World.”283 The
broadening of social networks, industrialization’s potential to increase time for leisure and
intellectual labor, and the expansion of liberty complement one another and offer hope that
originary technicity only accelerates in rewarding earth’s good and happy people with liberty and
with new and greater pleasures.
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Conclusion
Common wisdom has the georgic all but vanishing from Britain’s literary scene by the
nineteenth century. The poetic mode’s veneration of both manual, agricultural labor and
intellectual, scientific labor became increasingly unfashionable for being inadequately poetic.
In part, the mode seemed incompatible with the Romantic ideology’s valuation of the author’s
subjective, imaginative genius. In a canonical example, though several poems in Lyrical Ballads
(1798) focused on the experiences of various folk from the lower orders, Wordsworth’s own
intellectual labor superseded and left little room for the details of their rural labor. Lyrical
Ballads reflected and amplified the georgic’s traditional investment in demonstrating authors’
literary skills, which were employed in depicting a more idyllic nature; to the extent that poets
analyzed nature’s works, their investigations seemed to enable the poet’s synthesis with nature
through subjective, literary production.
Further, as Noel Jackson discusses with regard to Erasmus Darwin’s later poems,
philosophic poetry’s blocks of prosaic notes formally exhibited the impropriety of poeticizing
new sciences’ increasingly technical understandings of nature.284 Similarly, Mary Poovey’s
work shows the georgic to be one among a variety of writing modes which not only addressed
economic topics but which collectively developed standards for differentiating fictional and
factual knowledges.285 The rise of the fact as the dominant episteme for defining truthful,
practical knowledges and the fact’s co-emergence with seemingly self-evidentiary techniques of
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counting and measurement allowed statistical sciences such as economics to accrue privilege
among the social sciences and become a crucial element for informing statecraft.
Calling William Cowper’s The Task (1785) one of the last georgics, Ted Underwood
argues that “Cowper finally succeeds in blurring the boundary between work and nature so fully
as to create an intermediate category…a kind of work that can be made to seem genteel.”286 I
would argue for an alternate, bi-polar version of this blurring in which natural philosophers
investigated nature’s own workings, and politico-economic theorists were redefining humans’
work in terms of humans’ own nature. Georgics aestheticized the various ecological and
physiological circulatory systems being discovered by experimental natural philosophers. Such
systems were alternately described in detail then broadly attributed to the sublime and ineffable
management of Nature’s Hand. On the other hand, emergent social sciences drew on nature’s
physical systems and the laws governing them for analogies for the operations of socio-economic
flows. Gradual improvement in the understanding of economic forces lent new significance to
labor, property, property rights, and liberty, even when thinkers such as Adam Smith recognized
some of these categories to have been socially constructed according to the needs of contingent
economic circumstances. Nevertheless, Locke convincingly presented property rights as a
central concern of liberal statecraft by arguing them to be necessary for fulfilling the natural laws
obliging the reproduction of societies. Underwritten by personal volition and liberty, property
rights could seem to serve both rational self-interests and each individual’s obligation to promote
a communitarian good. Many literary authors were at pains to show that concentrations of
wealth in land could benefit the socio-economic order.

286

Ted Underwood, The Work of the Sun: Literature, Science, and Political Economy, 1760-1860 (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 89.

213

Through stylistics such as extensive loco-description, georgics such as The Seasons,
Windsor Forest, and The English Garden contributed to shifting the mode’s focus from
agricultural labor to the great estates owned by oligarchs. By sacralizing property, georgics
reinforced the significance of liberty, which emerges from a common self-interest increasingly
understood in physiological terms, but which also depends on a well-run, securitizing
government. Georgic poems patriotically admired the mixed government of Britain’s
constitutional monarchy and invoked the virtues of classical politicians in order to warn against
corruption’s threat to modern states’ legitimacy and to the public good. The poems deployed the
images of landscape park to signify the liberty nominally shared by the British polity, and they
thereby interpellated a financial and political elite who seemed to be the stewards though also the
primary beneficiaries of Britain’s political economy. While georgics proclaimed British
freedom, their nods to commerce connoted the various state apparatuses required to facilitate a
domestic economy supported by maritime empire. Smith’s Wealth of Nations offered a sense of
how ideological state apparatuses tend to proliferate alongside the progress of opulence then
enjoyed by Britain. His emphasis on public education as the antidote to proto-capitalism’s
corrosion of individuals’ intelligence and civic virtues demonstrated a commitment to a
biopolitical which enables a stable, economic and political elite to continue profiting from the
nation’s stock of land and labor. Reading early politico-economic texts allows us to better
understand the theories of liberty and statecraft which are often only fleeting glimpsed in georgic
poetry.
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